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ABSTRACT 
Laura J. Dunlap: The Relationship Between Health Insurance Characteristics and the Use of 
Behavioral Health Treatment Services  
(Under the direction of Edward C. Norton, Ph.D.)  
 
Rationale:  Many people delay health care treatment and some never seek care from 
the formal health care system.  It is estimated that 28 percent of the U.S. adult population in 
any year has a diagnosable mental or addictive disorder, and yet less than one-third of these 
individuals seek treatment.  Objective:  The objective of this study is to estimate the effect of 
health insurance characteristics on mental health and substance use (MH/SA) treatment 
utilization for privately-insured employees and their dependents.  Methodology: Using a 
two-part model, I estimate the effect of MH/SA health insurance characteristics on the 
decision to use MH/SA services and, conditional on use, the number of treatment days.  
Probability of use is modeled using a random-effects logit model and the number of 
treatment days is modeled using a random-effects negative binomial model.  Data used are 
private insurance enrollment and claims data for 1997-1998 from MEDSTAT’s Marketscan® 
database.  Results:  Individuals are found to respond to expected out-of-pocket expenses for 
outpatient MH care, but this response is very small.  Furthermore, MH/SA health 
characteristics appear to have little or no effect on SA treatment utilization for spouses and 
other dependents.  My models show that the effect of MH/SA health insurance varies for 
individuals by their relationship to the policy (i.e., primary beneficiary versus spouse or other 
dependent).  Primary beneficiaries are found to be more responsive to these characteristics  
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than spouses and other dependents.  When significant, the requirement of precertification by 
an employee assistance program (EAP) has a negative effect on MH/SA utilization.  
Conclusions: My findings suggest that the response to cost-sharing for MH care demand is 
similar to general medical care and brings into question previous arguments against parity for 
MH/SA treatment.  Finally, the role of an EAP is not straightforward. Rather than facilitating 
treatment access, EAP precertification may create an obstacle to treatment and discourage 
utilization.  However, it is also possible that EAP precertification may decrease formal 
utilization by providing some brief MH/SA services to individuals with milder conditions.  
v 
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 CHAPTER I: BACKGROUND AND SIGNIFICANCE 
Mental health and substance abuse (MH/SA) disorders are an enormous problem in the 
United States, affecting many aspects of society including health care, crime, and 
employment.  Approximately 30 percent of the population experiences some diagnosable 
MH/SA disorder in a given year (Kessler et al., 1994).  In 1997, the U.S. spent almost $71 
billion for the direct treatment of mental disorders (Mark et al, 1998.  In addition, indirect 
costs of mental disorders were estimated in 1990 at $78.6 billion (Rice & Miller, 1996)—a 
conservative estimate because it does not include some measure of the pain, suffering, 
disruption, and reduced productivity that are not reflected in earnings.  Substance abuse 
disorders are also associated with high societal costs.  In 1998, the direct costs of alcohol and 
drug use were estimated to be about $91 billion, and the indirect costs, including costs 
associated with crime and productivity losses due to premature death and disability, 
accounted for about $233 billion (Office of National Drug Policy [ONDCP], 2004).  These 
estimates show that mental illness and substance abuse are comparable to many high-profile 
medical conditions including cardiovascular disease ($351.8 billion in 2003; NHLBI, 2003), 
cancer ($189.5 billion in 2003; NHLBI; 2003), diabetes ($132 billion in 2003; Hogan, Dall, 
and Nikolov, 2003), and obesity ($99.2 billion in 1995; Wolf and Colditz, 1998).  Even if we 
only compare the direct costs of MH/SA, it still must be considered one of the more costly 
health problems in the nation (ONDCP, 2004).  
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With MH/SA disorders placing such a large burden on society, it might be expected 
that treatment would be readily available and used by those individuals suffering from these 
disorders.  However, only one-third of individuals with a diagnosable mental disorder or 
substance use problem receive treatment in a given year (DHHS, 1999).  The reasons for low 
treatment utilization among individuals in need vary.  Some individuals simply may not want 
treatment because they do not perceive they have a problem.  Others may recognize their 
problem and want treatment but they are not able to receive it because of financial and/or 
other barriers.  For example, the 2003 National Survey on Drug Use and Health (NSDUH) 
found that 33 percent of the individuals in need who sought drug or alcohol treatment did not 
receive it because of the cost (SAMHSA, 2004).   
Much of the research on MH/SA treatment utilization, especially for substance use 
treatment, has focused on uninsured or publicly-insured individuals who access treatment 
through public funding.  Although this population is extremely important and deserves the 
attention of researchers and policymakers, understanding the relationship between economic 
variables and MH/SA utilization is also important for insured individuals.  Depending on the 
generosity and structure of an individual’s health plan, an insured individual may find their 
access to MH/SA treatment and their treatment choices quite limited.  Furthermore, insured 
individuals may not have the same access to publicly-funded treatment because of their 
employment and/or insurance status.  With the ongoing changes to the financing and delivery 
of MH/SA treatment services, it is important to understand how the out-of-pocket expenses 
faced by insured individuals may affect their likelihood to seek treatment and to remain in 
treatment through its completion.  Furthermore, studies of the help-seeking behavior of 
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privately insured individuals may help guide policy makers about public insurance entities 
such as Medicaid and Medicare. 
Private Insurance Coverage for MH/SA Treatment Services 
Major insurance coverage for outpatient MH services began in the 1950s in the form of 
fee-for-service (indemnity) plans, which were the most common form of health insurance at 
the time.  Initial coverage options for MH care were quite generous and often comparable to 
coverage for medical services (Wells et al., 1982).  However, insurers’ initial experience was 
high costs for intensive MH treatment used by relatively few patients, prompting them to 
limit coverage for MH services making it less generous than general medical care.  
According to Bureau of Labor Statistics reports, 58 percent of adults who had employer-
provided health coverage in 1981 had inpatient coverage for mental illness comparable to 
that for physical illness, and 10 percent had comparable outpatient coverage.  By 1993 these 
percentages had decreased to 16 percent and 4 percent (Otten, 1998).  
In the following years, insurance coverage for both general medical care and MH/SA 
services underwent significant changes, although MH/SA continue to have substandard 
coverage compared to general medical care.  Insurers justified the unequal treatment of 
MH/SA services as a way to control unnecessary costs based on the belief that MH/SA 
demand is more responsive to health coverage than general medical care resulting in a greater 
welfare loss from coverage due to moral hazard (Frank and McGuire, 2000).  Standard 
economic efficiency criteria (Ramsey pricing rules) suggest that insurance coverage should 
be greatest for those services where market distortion due to moral hazard is least (Deb and 
Homes, 1998). 
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Today, most individuals obtain health insurance through their employers and these 
plans offer some coverage for MH/SA services, although this coverage may not be adequate, 
especially for SA services (Rogowski, 1992).  It is still common for MH/SA coverage to 
have limits on annual number of visits or length of treatment episode or to require higher 
levels of cost-sharing per visit for the individual.  For example, private insurance may limit 
the number of MH/SA outpatient visits to between 20 and 30 visits per year and inpatient 
days to 30 days per year.  Thus, MH/SA coverage provides some coverage for low ranges of 
spending but leaves individuals unprotected against more expensive treatment (Frank and 
McGuire, 2000).  For insured individuals in need of MH/SA services, the range of covered 
benefits and the level of cost-sharing imposed on them may significantly influence whether 
they will use MH/SA services or, if used, whether they will receive the appropriate amount 
of care.  If MH/SA treatment demand has greater price responsiveness than general medical 
care, then the optimal insurance literature would indicate that higher MH/SA cost-sharing is 
appropriate (Ellis and McGuire, 1993).  However, if MH/SA demand response is comparable 
to general medical care, then the lack of parity in coverage for MH/SA may not be justified.   
In addition to cost-sharing, health plans may use other mechanisms to help control 
utilization of services.  For example, some plans may require prior authorization or 
precertification for MH/SA services to be covered.  Under these mechanisms, plans may 
require authorization for MH/SA services be given by a primary care physician or a worksite 
employee assistance program (EAP) prior to the individual initiating service use in the 
formal healthcare system.  Procedures to gain prior authorization may vary across health 
plans and may range from calling a phone center for automatic authorization to undergoing a 
clinical screening by a trained health professional (Horgan et al., 2003). 
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At first glance, the use of the EAP as the gatekeeper to MH/SA services seems a 
natural and attractive arrangement.  After all, EAPs are work-based programs designed to 
help in the early identification and resolution of employee problems that may impair job 
performance such as stress, emotional problems, and substance use (Horgan et al., 2003; 
Reynolds and Lehman, 2003).  However, willingness to contact an EAP may be affected by 
fears of job loss or social stigma perceptions.  Therefore, requiring employees and their 
dependents to contact the workplace EAP to obtain authorization for MH/SA service use in 
the formal healthcare system may create unintended obstacles for those individuals in need of 
services.   
In the 1990s, two critical changes in the coverage of MH/SA services took place which 
suggests that continued research in this area is needed.  Mental health and substance abuse 
coverage experienced a dramatic increase in behavioral health care carve-out arrangements. 
Under carve-out contracts, a health insurance purchaser carves out certain types of benefits 
from a general medical plan and these conditions are managed by a separate contract or 
administrator (Sturm and McCulloch, 1998; Frank and McGuire, 2000).  Carve-outs have 
long been the standard for dental or vision care, but their use in MH/SA services was not 
common prior to 1990.   
In 1996, President Clinton passed legislation enacting the Mental Health Parity Act 
(MHPA).  Although the MHPA was heralded as a great advancement for mental health care, 
its scope was quite limited. The MHPA did not require employers to offer mental health 
coverage, only that dollar limits on coverage be equal to dollar limits on medical benefits if 
mental health coverage is offered.  The MHPA did not impose any mandates on deductibles, 
copayments, limits on days or visits, or require coverage for substance abuse (Sturm and 
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McCulloch, 1998).  The debates leading to the MHPA highlighted the uncertainty 
surrounding the impact of insurance cost-containment mechanisms on MH/SA utilization 
(Sturm and McCulloch, 1998).   
As noted above, failure to get treatment not only affects the individual and their family, 
but has high costs for society in general.  Consequently, over the last few decades researchers 
and policy makers have grappled with questions regarding the responsiveness of individuals 
to MH/SA cost-sharing arrangements.  Given the recent and ongoing changes in the 
marketplace (e.g., the growth of carve-out companies), the policy debates surrounding the 
financing of MH/SA treatment and the need for information continues today.   
Previous Studies of Behavioral Health Care Demand 
Early studies of mental health care demand have focused on response to cost-sharing.  
Although the magnitudes of the price responses vary considerably, the consistent finding 
across studies is that mental health care demand is more responsive to cost-sharing than 
demand for general medical care.  The primary policy implication of these early empirical 
findings is that there may be an efficiency rationale for outpatient MH treatment to be 
covered at a higher level of cost sharing than other types of outpatient health care (Frank and 
McGuire, 2000).   
Probably the best known study of the effect of health insurance on health care demand 
is the RAND Health Insurance Experiment (HIE).  During the mid-1970s, researchers at 
RAND randomly assigned families to one of 14 health insurance plans offered by RAND in 
the role as a third party payer.  Using this design, researchers were able to directly observe 
the use of health care services and the prices charged and paid rather than relying on self-
reports from individuals, providers, and payers.   
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Numerous studies have been published using the RAND HIE data and several of these 
studies have focused on the relationship between health insurance and use of mental health 
services (e.g., Keeler, Manning, and Wells, 1988; Keeler et al., 1986; Manning and Wells, 
1987; Manning, et al. 1984; Manning et al., 1986; Wells et al., 1986a; Wells et al., 1986b; 
Wells, et al, 1982).  These studies examined different measures of mental health services 
(e.g., the number of ambulatory visits, expenditures on care, and the use of formal care 
versus informal care) and employed various multivariate regression techniques (e.g., probit 
and logistic models for dichotomous measures of probability of use, negative binomial for 
counts of the number of visits or services, and linear regression for continuous measures of 
expenditures).  In each of these studies, use of outpatient mental health care was found to be 
more responsive to cost sharing mechanisms than medical care with estimated elasticities 
ranging from –0.17 to –1.00.  Participants with less cost sharing were more likely to use 
mental health services and incur higher overall mental health expenditures.   
For example, using RAND HIE data Wells et al. (1982) and Manning et al. (1984) both 
found that the coinsurance rate had a strong impact on MH care expenditures.  Wells and 
colleagues found that the probability of any use of ambulatory mental health services 
doubled from a plan with 95 percent coinsurance rate to a free plan (zero percent 
coinsurance).  Ambulatory MH expenditures per enrollee rose by three-quarters on the same 
plans when coinsurance went from 95 percent to zero percent (free plan).  However, small 
deductibles ($150 per person for ambulatory care followed by free care) had a statistically 
insignificant effect on expenses compared to free care.  They estimated a price elasticity of –
0.17 for outpatient MH care demand relative to price.  Similarly, Manning and colleagues 
found that expenditures on mental health care in the 95-percent coinsurance plan were only 
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53 percent of expenditures in the free plan.  However, compared to general medical care, 
they did not find that the response to psychotherapy services cost sharing was significantly 
larger, suggesting that arguments against parity for mental health coverage may not be true.   
Keeler et al. (1986) examined demand for episodes of mental health care and found 
that individuals with no insurance coverage (i.e., 100 percent coinsurance) spent one-quarter 
as much on mental health care as individuals with free care.  Individuals in plans with a 50-
percent coinsurance rate and no additional limits had two-fifths the expenditures as 
individuals in the free care plan.  In a comparison of prepaid plans and fee-for-service plans 
using the RAND HIE data from the Seattle group, Wells et al. (1986b) found that enrollees in 
the prepaid groups had significantly more mental health problems in a given year than those 
in fee-for-service plans, but they had two-thirds less number of visits per enrollee per year to 
formally trained mental health specialists compared to enrollees in the free and individual 
fee-for-service plans.   
Ellis and McGuire (1986) examined demand responsiveness of outpatient mental 
health care using an increasing block price (no deductible, cost sharing up to a limit on 
outpatient spending) to derive an expected end-of-year price.  They estimated a price 
elasticity (for level of use) of –0.37.   
The RAND health study is the only large-scale study of health insurance to use 
randomization.  Findings from this study provided a substantial contribution to the 
knowledge of medical and mental health care utilization.  However, most of the RAND 
studies did not examine utilization of SA treatment separate from MH care (one exception is 
Wells et al. (1982) who found that increasing the copayment for SA treatment decreased the 
probability of using treatment services).  Furthermore, the RAND study results are limited in 
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their generalizability because their sample included families from only 6 cities in the U.S. 
and some researchers have questioned whether the cap placed on total expenditures for 
families as part of the study design may have biased the results. In response to this last 
criticism, Keeler, Manning, and Wells (1988) examined demand only for those users in the 
RAND sample who were not near the dollar limit on total out-of-pocket expenses when they 
began use of MH care.  They still found MH care to be more responsive than general medical 
care, with individuals in the free care plan using about four times more outpatient MH care 
than those in the 95-percent coinsurance plan. 
In addition to the RAND studies, there have been numerous observational studies that 
use cross sectional survey data and claims data from purposively sampled insurers/employers 
to estimate the relationship between the use of ambulatory mental health services and cost-
sharing provisions in health insurance.  The findings from these studies have been 
inconsistent.  Some studies have shown that insurance increases the probability of treatment 
and the number of visits, while higher out-of-pocket payments are associated with lower 
utilization (e.g., McGuire, 1981; Horgan, 1986; Taube et al. 1986; Watts, Scheffler, and 
Jewel, 1986; Simon et al., 1996; Deb and Holmes, 1998) while others have found only 
limited association or none at all (e.g., Scheffler and Miller, 1989).  In most of these studies, 
the annual number of ambulatory mental health visits is the key outcome of interest and it 
was assumed that individuals faced a constant price that was usually derived as the average 
price for the year.  The most common econometric approach employed in these studies was 
the two-part model.  The first part estimating the effect of health insurance cost-sharing on 
the probability of use and the second part estimating the effect of health insurance cost-
sharing on level of use conditional on any use occurring.   
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McGuire (1981) used data from the 1973 Joint Information Service Survey of office-
based psychiatrists to determine the effect of out-of-pocket costs on the number of visits 
among outpatient MH care users.  He found that expected use was responsive to price and 
that the degree of responsiveness varied by income with higher income individuals being 
more responsive to price.  He estimated a price elasticity of –1.00 indicating a negative 
constant elasticity for mental health care demand.  
Taube et al. (1986) used data from the National Medical Care Utilization and 
Expenditure Survey (NMCUES) to estimate adult’s use of mental health care services in both 
the specialty sector and general medical care.  Using the average percentage of expenses paid 
out-of-pocket by the individual per MH visit for their price measure, they estimated a price 
elasticity of –0.54 suggesting that a 10 percent increase in the price would lead to a 5.4 
percent decrease in annual number of visits.  This estimate was about 4 times larger than 
their estimated price elasticity for medical care (–0.13) leading them to conclude that mental 
health care use is much more responsive to price.  Taube and colleagues also found that price 
elasticity varied by income; however contrary to McGuire’s findings, they found that low 
income (<$10,000) and mid-income ($10,000 and $24,000)  individuals were more 
responsive (elasticity = –0.43) than higher income individuals (>$25,000; elasticity = 0.02).   
Similar elasticity estimates for mental health care were estimated by Horgan et al. 
(1986) who used  the National Medical Care Expenditure Survey to estimate an elasticity of 
–0.44, which was 2.75 times that of their estimate for general medical care (–0.16).  Wallen, 
Roddy, and Meyers (1986) used claims data from the United Mine Workers of America to 
estimate the effect of coinsurance rates on MH expenditures.  They estimated a price 
elasticity of –0.32 for outpatient MH care, and they also found that men are more sensitive 
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than women to changes in the price of MH care.  The estimated price elasticities were –0.50 
and –0.31 for men and women, respectively.  In a study of the Blue Cross/Blue Shield 
Federal Employee Health Benefits Plan, Scheffler and Miller (1989) found no effect of price 
of the probability of using outpatient or inpatient care or on the level of use of inpatient care.  
They did, however, find that price had a negative effect on days of outpatient care with an 
estimated elasticity of –0.27.   
In a more recent study, Deb and Holmes (1998) used data from the National Medical 
Expenditure Survey to study the extent to which patients may substitute physician and non-
physician outpatient mental health services in response to insurance coverage which differs 
by provider type. Their results indicated that insurance coverage significantly affects the 
choice of provider from whom care is sought and, for individuals who seek care from both 
provider types.  They estimated own-price elasticities of about –0.70 and cross-price 
elasticities of about +0.50 which suggests that physician and non-physician services are 
substitutes. 
The studies of SA treatment utilization have not been as abundant as MH care 
utilization studies, but in recent years several studies have examined the effect of insurance 
on SA treatment utilization (e.g., Schmidt and Weisner, 2005; Ciemins, 2004; Weisner et al., 
2002; Garcia et al., 1999; Friedman et al., 2001; Green-Hennessy, 2002; Wu, Hoven, and 
Fuller, 2003) and the specific effect of insurance co-payment amounts or coinsurance rates 
on the level of substance use treatment services used by individuals in treatment (e.g., Stein 
et al., 2000; Lo Sasso and Lyons, 2002; Stein and Zhang, 2003; Lo Sasso and Lyons, 2004; 
Schoenbaum, Zhang, and Sturm, 1998; Goodman et al, 1999).  The findings from these 
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studies are inconsistent and do not provide a consensus view of the effect that insurance may 
have on individuals’ decisions regarding use of SA services. 
Garcia and colleagues (1999) used data from a SA treatment program in southern 
Florida to examine factors associated with completing SA treatment.  They found that the 
likelihood of completing treatment among insured users was 1.34 times that of uninsured 
users (p<0.05) suggesting that insurance facilitates receipt of appropriate levels of SA 
treatment services.  
However, Friedman, Lemon, and Stein (2001) found the opposite result when they 
looked at factors affecting retention in outpatient methadone maintenance treatment and in 
outpatient drug-free treatment.  Using data from the Drug Abuse Treatment Outcomes Study 
(1991–1993), they examined the probability of staying in treatment for at least the minimum 
number of days most often cited as necessary for successful treatment (at least 365 days for 
methadone treatment and at least 90 days for outpatient drug-free).  They found that type of 
insurance (private, public, uninsured) had no significant effect on treatment stay for 
methadone treatment.  However, privately-insured patients in outpatient drug-free treatment 
were less likely to stay in treatment for at least 90 days (Odds Ratio = 0.72) compared to 
uninsured patients.  
Green-Hennessy (2002) found no insurance effect when she examined factors that 
affect use of MH/SA services among adults with substance dependence that participated in 
the 1995 and 1996 National Household Survey on Drug Abuse (NHSDA) surveys. Factors 
that were found to be statistically significant included being female, having an income 
greater than $75,000, having contact with the criminal justice system, being depressed, and 
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perceived need for treatment.  In fact, high income and perceived need for treatment were the 
two strongest predictors of any use.   
Studies that examined the effect of copayment levels specifically found that co-
payment levels had a significant negative effect on utilization of substance use treatment.  Lo 
Sasso and Lyons (2004) estimated elasticities ranging from –0.17 to –0.27 for days of 
outpatient SA treatment and –0.017 for days of inpatient treatment.   
As with studies of MH utilization, these studies have advanced our knowledge of the 
effect of insurance on substance use treatment utilization.  However, they have several 
limitations that reveal the need for more studies in this area.  One limitation of these studies 
is that they either focus on a crude measure of insurance or they focus on only one aspect of 
the insurance design—the copayment.  Another limitation is that most of these studies are 
only able to examine utilization for a population of individuals already in treatment.  Their 
data did not contain information on enrollees who did not utilize SA treatment services and, 
therefore, did not allow examination of the probability of any treatment service use.   
To my knowledge, no studies have examined the specific effect of requiring EAP 
precertification for MH/SA services on the utilization of such services.  However, some 
studies have examined the effect that an EAP per se has on service utilization.  For example, 
Reynolds and Lehman (2003) studied a random sample of municipal employees in the 
southwestern U.S. and found that overall substance abusers were less willing to use the EAP 
than nonusers.  However, substance users who were aware of the EAP and who had 
favorable attitudes about workplace policy were as willing to use the EAP as nonusers.  They 
concluded that creating awareness of and favorability for the EAP might help buffer 
substance abusers’ reluctance to seek help through the EAP.   
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In a study of employees of a large midwestern employer, Zarkin, Bray, and Qi (2000) 
examined the effect of the EAP on health care utilization including both general medical care 
and MH/SA services.  They found that going to an EAP substantially increased both the 
probability of an MH/SA service claim and the number of MH/SA claims in the same quarter 
as EAP contact.  They concluded that the EAP is able to identify MH/SA problems that may 
affect workplace performance and prompt EAP users to access formal MH/SA services 
through their healthcare plan.   
Significance 
This study provides insights into the economic behavior of individuals related to the 
demand for MH and SA treatment services.  Given the ongoing debate on mental health 
parity coupled with the dire consequences associated with untreated MH and SA disorders, 
understanding the effect that insurer’s utilization-control mechanisms have on MH and SA 
treatment demand is essential.  Results from this study could be used to inform policy debate 
on future MH/SA coverage mandates and on the role that employee assistance programs may 
play in MH/SA treatment access.  Although previous studies have examined MH and SA 
treatment demand response relative to cost-sharing, this study fills an important gap and adds 
to the research field in several ways: 
1. I examine the effect of cost-sharing on both the probability of use and on the amount of 
services received by using a recent national database of claims data which contains 
detailed plan information on both service users and non-using enrollees.  With these data, 
I am able to estimate the incremental effect of cost-sharing on MH and SA treatment 
demand and to investigate how demand response differs between the two stages of the 
treatment decision—any use and extent of use.  Many of the previous health utilization 
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studies that use either claims data or self-reported survey data have been limited to 
examining levels of use among users because they do not have data on non-using 
enrollees.  
2. I examine MH care and SA treatment utilization separately which allows me to 
investigate whether users of MH and SA services have differential demand response 
relative to cost-sharing. Until recently, much of the previous behavioral health utilization 
research has focused solely on either mental health or substance abuse without making 
any comparisons.  Furthermore, for each type of care, I also examine inpatient and 
outpatient services separately allowing me to compare responsiveness by service 
modality.   
3. Because of the detailed plan information available in my data, I am able to examine the 
possibility of cross-price effects between inpatient and outpatient care as well as between 
in-network and out-of-network services.  Previous behavioral health utilization studies 
have tended to focus on the effect of a single price variable (e.g., outpatient coinsurance 
rate or average out-of-pocket expense).  To my knowledge, only a few studies have 
examined cross-price effects (e.g., LoSasso and Lyons , 2004).   
4. Again, because of the plan information available in my data, I am able to examine 
insurer’s containment mechanisms beyond cost-sharing.  Specifically, I examine the 
effect that an EAP precertification requirement for MH/SA services has on the demand 
for these services.  To my knowledge, no study has examined this effect in combination 
with coinsurance rates. 
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5. Finally, my study examines demand responsiveness for children as well as adults.  
Previous studies that estimated demand responsiveness relative to price typically include 
only adults in their sample. 
 CHAPTER 2: CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK 
The decision to seek health care has been shown to be a complex process (Furnham et 
al, 1995; Sussman, Robins, and Earl, 1987). As numerous studies have demonstrated, need 
for care does not always result in a visit to a health care provider (Suchman, 1965; Zola, 
1972, 1973). Many people delay treatment, some never seek care from the formal health care 
system, and others who do seek treatment may not obtain the appropriate amount of services.  
This seems especially true for mental health care and substance abuse (MH/SA) treatment 
services in which it is estimated that 28 percent of the US adult population in any year has a 
diagnosable mental or addictive disorder, yet only 8 percent seeks treatment (Klick and 
Markowitz, 2006; DHHS, 1999).   
Although numerous factors play a role in utilizing health care services, there are three 
basic factors that largely drive this demand—need, the ability to pay for services, and having 
access to services.  The latter two factors are clearly interrelated because access can be 
thought of in different ways.  Access typically refers to whether treatment is available to an 
individual upon demand.  For example, does the location of treatment providers make them 
geographically accessible to the individual?  Is the supply of providers sufficient so that 
treatment slots are available and the individual does not need to be unduly waitlisted for 
treatment?  If the answer to either of these questions is no, then the individual lacks access to 
treatment.  However, even if treatment is physically available, if an individual is unable to 
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afford the cost of the service (either as self-pay or through the aid of insurance) then, in 
effect, they have no access to treatment; that is, they lack financial access to care.   
Most health plans offer some level of access to MH/SA services, but they still require 
varying levels of cost-sharing by the individual in the form of copayments, coinsurance, and 
deductibles.  In most cases, an insured individual has access to services as long as they can 
afford their out-of-pocket share of expenses that result from the cost-sharing structure.  Thus, 
the price that the individual faces is an important determinant in the individual’s decisions 
regarding use of MH/SA services.   
In this chapter I describe a two-stage model of decision-making for MH/SA service 
utilization based on the work of Pohlmeier and Ulrich (1995).  In executing this two-stage 
model, I present an economic model of health care demand (e.g., Newhouse and Phelps, 
1974; Phelps and Newhouse, 1973; Phelps and Newhouse, 1974; Grossman, 1972) which 
portrays choices about health care utilization in a utility-maximizing framework.  Next, I 
describe non-economic variables included in my empirical models that may affect the 
utilization decision.  Finally, I present hypotheses drawn from the demand equation for 
health services and from previous research findings.  I conclude the chapter with a brief 
discussion of the job and health plan choice and their effect on the relationship between 
health care utilization and health insurance.   
Demand for Mental Health Care and Substance Abuse Treatment Services 
The decision to seek health care can be conceptualized as a two-stage decision process.  
In the first stage, the individual makes the decision to contact a health care provider about 
treatment.  In the next stage, the individual working with the provider determines the amount 
of treatment services to use.  This conceptualization of the decision-making process 
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recognizes that, although the individual makes the initial decision to make the first contact 
with a health care provider, the decision regarding intensity of treatment involves both the 
individual and the provider (e.g., Pohlmeier and Ulrich, 1995; Charles, Gafni, and Whelan, 
1999; Charles, Gafni, and Whelan, 1997; Bissell, May, and Noyce, 2004; Singh, Cuttler, and 
Silvers, 2004).  The level of involvement for the health care provider can vary.  One extreme 
is that the individual entrusts the provider to make all decisions regarding intensity of use.  
The other extreme is that the health care provider only imparts technical information and 
treatment recommendations, and the individual still assumes sole decision-making power.  It 
is this latter model that I apply in my framework, and which is illustrated in Figure 1.  
Because of the nature of this decision process it makes sense to estimate it using the two-part 
model which mirrors the decision process by separating the estimation into two distinct, yet 
related, regression equations for probability of any use and level of use among health care 
users.    
As shown in Figure 1 (located at end of chapter) , the decision to seek treatment is 
influenced by the 3 previously mentioned utilization drivers—individual’s perceived need, 
their ability to pay for services, and their access to services (i.e., enabling factors).  In 
addition, predisposing characteristics may affect their utilization decisions (Anderson, 1995; 
Aday and Anderson, 1974; Anderson and Newman, 1973).  Predisposing factors may include 
demographic variables, health beliefs, and social structure.  These factors may affect an 
individual’s health status, their ability to evaluate health, and their ability to cope with health 
conditions (Chi, 1998).  Although some of these variables such as age and gender are directly 
controlled for in my empirical model, other predisposing factors are unobserved and, 
therefore, represented in the error term.   
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As indicated by the arrows in Figure 1, not only do these sets of factors affect health 
care utilization but the variables within each set of factors may affect variables in the other 
set of factors.  For example, it is not unreasonable to expect that age or gender (both 
predisposing factors) may affect an individual’s response to health insurance characteristics 
(enabling factors), a relationship which I formally test in my empirical analysis.   
Models of utility-maximization for health demand such as those developed by 
Newhouse and Phelps (1972, 1973) and Grossman (1972) provide a useful framework by 
which the two-stage decision-making process for health care utilization can be modeled.  In 
this framework, both decision stages are driven by utility-maximization based on the 
individual’s preferences and budget constraints.  The only difference between the two stages 
is the individual’s information regarding health care service options and prices.  This is the 
primary reason I view this as a two-stage process.  If individuals had full information at the 
very beginning on all their service options and associated prices, they could maximize a 
single-stage utility problem.  However, most individuals need input from a health care 
provider regarding treatment options and price, and with this information they can make 
choices to maximize the next stage utility problem.   
Utility-Maximization 
A large amount of research has been done on the demand for general medical care.  
Much of this work is based on economic models that represent the demand for health care 
within a utility-maximization framework in which health is one of several arguments in the 
utility function (e.g., Ruhm, 1995; Cameron et al., 1988; Wagstaff, 1986).  As noted above, 
early examples of these types of models include Newhouse and Phelps (1974), Phelps and 
Newhouse (1973, 1974) and Grossman (1972).  These economic models recognize that 
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people do not consume health care services per se, but rather as inputs into the production of 
health.  In this context, the use of health services is a derived demand that is generated from 
an individual’s desire to be healthy and avoid illness. 
An important feature of Grossman-type models for health care demand is that they 
clearly demonstrate that the derived demand for health care services is negatively associated 
with the price of services.  In the basic Grossman model, an individual derives utility from 
the function U = Ut(Ht, Zt) in which Ht is the stock of health capital and Zt is the consumption 
of other goods.  Healthy days bring utility to the individual and individuals produce health 
using market inputs such as medical services and time inputs.   
Grossman-type models yield a reduced-form individual demand equation for medical 
care services (Mt) as a function of wage (wt), price of medical care (Pmt), age (t) and human 
capital (E), which can be presented in logarithmic form as: 
ln(Mt) = β0 + β1ln(wt) –β2ln(Pmt) + β3t – β4E + ut 
The βs are parameters to be estimated and ut represents unobserved characteristics unrelated 
to the three main explanatory factors and random noise.  From this equation, hypotheses can 
be drawn about the relationship between the demand for medical care services and the 
specific explanatory variables.   
Mental Health Care Utilization 
The simplest way to introduce mental health care into the demand for health care 
framework is to recognize that health stock can also denote mental health stock.  Thus, 
higher mental health stock implies better mental health, and individuals derive utility from 
days of good mental health and disutility from days of bad mental health.  In this way, days 
of bad mental health is analogous to sick days in the basic Grossman model.   
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Similar to physical health, mental health may affect an individual’s productivity and 
budget constraints.  For example, mental health factors such as depression, anxiety, and 
emotional stress are often reported as a cause for absence from work, which can result in less 
time for market production and lower earnings.  Investing in mental health increases the 
number of good mental health days that an individual achieves and thereby increases their 
utility and improves their efficiency at producing non-market and market goods.  In this 
framework, individuals produce mental health with both time inputs and mental health care 
services.  Thus, the demand for mental health care services is still a derived demand as an 
input in the production for days of good mental health.  I should still expect to obtain the 
same reduced-form equation for health care services demand which indicates a negative 
relationship between demand and price for mental health care.   
There are some caveats that should be noted regarding this interpretation of the health 
demand utility model.  First, using a utility framework assumes that individuals with mental 
health disorders are rational decision makers—simply put, even with a mental health disorder 
they are able to rank preferences and consistently maximize their utility over time.  Some 
have argued that the assumption of rational behavior is not reasonable for mental health. 
However, I believe that economic rationality is a reasonable assumption especially for my 
sample where the majority of individuals do not have severe mental illness.  These 
individuals are employed (or in the household of an employed individual), have access to 
private insurance, and most likely are able to choose treatment rather than be involuntarily 
committed to treatment.  Although, more severe disorders (e.g., schizophrenia, manic 
depression, psychotic afflictions) may reduce an individual’s ability to function in the 
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consumer role, for this sample it is likely that rational decisions would then be made by a 
caregiver or proxy decision-maker within the household (Frank and McGuire, 2000).  
Another point that should be recognized is that the basic Grossman model is a pure-
investment model in which health care services are investment goods and individuals do not 
receive direct utility from them.  However, individuals may get direct utility from receiving 
mental health care (Williams and Doessel, 2003).  For example, they may get utility simply 
because they enjoy talking to someone.  Under this scenario, I no longer have a pure-
investment model.  Instead, it is a mixed model of investment and consumption.  However, 
this should not change expectations about the negative relationship between service demand 
and its price.  For example, Muurinen (1982) developed demand equations for the Grossman 
model for a pure consumption model, and although the equation of derived demand for 
health care services yielded slightly different coefficients for the equation variables, the 
relationship between health care service demand and its price was still found to be negative.   
Furthermore, unlike medical care, perceived stigma may have a large effect on use of 
mental health care services (Sirey et al., 2001; Dinos et al., 2004; DHHS, 1999; Cooper-
Patrick et al., 1997).  Studies have shown that adults tend to stigmatize individuals with 
mental health or substance use disorders more harshly than those with other health conditions 
(Corrigan, et al. 2005; Glozier, 1998).  Stigma has been shown to be an important barrier to 
treatment seeking and to treatment adherence (Lindrooth, Lo Sasso, and Lurie, 2005; 
Cooper-Patrick et al., 1997). Therefore, not only may stigma be associated with not using 
treatment services among persons in need, but it may also be associated with not receiving 
the appropriate amount of care even once treatment is sought.  Stigma can be viewed as part 
of the full social cost of using MH/SA services.  Individuals with greater fear of 
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stigmatization for using MH/SA services may view these services as more costly.  
Unfortunately, given that I use claims data in my study, I do not have any measures of 
perceived stigma.  If available, I would include these variables in both parts of my two-part 
model with the expectation that individuals with greater fear of stigmatization would be less 
likely to seek treatment services even when in need, and would have lower levels of use once 
treatment is sought.   
Finally, I am examining three different samples.  Primary beneficiaries and spouses 
mostly contain adults over the age of 18.  However, my dependent sample primarily consists 
of adolescents and young children.  The situation of children who use mental health care 
services is different from that of adults.  Children rarely seek treatment on their own, relying 
instead on their parents to make decisions.  Therefore, parents’ characteristics and their 
beliefs and stigmas about mental health and mental health care may be a strong factor in 
treatment utilization decisions for children and adolescents.   
Hypotheses/Expectations for Mental Health Care Models 
Main Explanatory Variables 
Cost-sharing for Mental Health Care Services 
The level of cost-sharing that the individual faces for mental health care services is the 
main variable of interest in my empirical models of mental health care utilization.  I represent 
this cost-sharing with 3 variables that measure applicable coinsurance rates.  The 3 
coinsurance variables are all measured as the percentage of costs for the service that must be 
paid by the individual.  For my outpatient mental health care services models, the included 
coinsurance rates are: 
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1. Coinsurance rate for outpatient mental health care provided by in-network 
providers; 
2. Coinsurance rate for outpatient mental health care provided by out-of-network 
providers; and  
3. Coinsurance rate for inpatient mental health care provided by in-network providers. 
The first two measures represent the cost-sharing faced by the individual for the outpatient 
mental health service.  I cannot distinguish between in-network and out-of-network services 
in my data, and therefore I include the coinsurance rates for both of these types of services.  
In making decisions about overall utilization, it seems reasonable to expect that both prices 
will affect not only whether the individual uses any services but where they will go for these 
services.  In all cases, the in-network price is always lower than the out-of-network price so I 
might expect that the individual would always choose in-network care.  However, other 
factors may influence the individual—such as quality or convenience—which may lead them 
to choose an out-of-network provider.   
The third cost-sharing measure represents the level of cost-sharing for the alternative 
inpatient mental health care service that the individual could choose to use.  I expect that, all 
else equal, an increase in the level of cost-sharing for outpatient mental health care 
(represented by the first two variables listed above) will be associated with a decrease in the 
demand for that service.  However, I expect that, all else equal, an increase in the level of 
cost-sharing for inpatient mental health care will be associated with an increase in the 
demand for outpatient health care.  That is, as the level of cost-sharing for inpatient care that 
individuals face increases relative to outpatient care, individuals may substitute outpatient 
care for inpatient care, and vice versa.   
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For my inpatient mental health care services models, the included coinsurance rates 
are: 
1. Coinsurance rate for inpatient mental health care provided by in-network providers; 
2. Coinsurance rate for inpatient mental health care provided by out-of-network 
providers; and  
3. Coinsurance rate for outpatient mental health care provided by in-network 
providers. 
These coinsurance rates are defined as above except that the mode of care to which they 
apply is reversed—inpatient instead of outpatient for the first 2 rates and outpatient instead of 
inpatient for the last rate. 
In addition, I also include a variable indicating whether precertification by the EAP for 
service use is required.  This variable is included in both the outpatient and inpatient mental 
health care models.  I expect that required EAP precertification will have a negative 
association with utilization of mental health care services.  There are several different ways 
in which EAP precertification may affect mental health care utilization.  First, EAP 
precertification increases the time price associated with mental health care by requiring the 
individual to spend more time gaining access to formal mental health care services.  Second, 
some individuals may feel uncomfortable contacting the EAP because of its association with 
their workplace even though EAPs promise confidentiality.  Individuals may fear that they 
will suffer adverse work consequences resulting from stigma if their mental health condition 
was made known to others in the workplace.  Third, EAP precertification may decrease 
utilization through the formal health care system by providing employees’ and their 
dependents with some mental health care services.  Individuals with milder conditions may 
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receive an adequate dose of services through the EAP and, therefore, not need additional 
services.  Each of these three scenarios should indicate a negative association between 
utilization of mental health care services in the formal health care system and EAP 
precertification.  However, a fourth possibility is that EAP precertification may increase 
mental health care utilization by helping individuals in need navigate a complicated health 
care system.  Under this last scenario, I would expect a positive association between 
utilization in the formal health care system and EAP precertification.  However, I believe that 
this fourth scenario is less likely.  I believe that individuals are more likely to view this 
precertification requirement more as an additional obstacle to treatment. 
 
Other Explanatory Variables 
Age  
In Grossman’s model, the pure age effect (assuming that wage and health stock are 
independent of age) is captured through the depreciation rate of the health stock.  As people 
age, this depreciation rate may increase which leads to an increase in the costs of health and a 
decrease in demand for health.  On the other hand, as the depreciation rate increases the 
health being produced for a fixed investment level is falling.  Therefore more health care may 
be demanded as inputs to maintain the same level of health.  
However, unlike physical health, the expectation of depreciating mental health with 
age is less certain.  For example, several studies have found that older persons do not appear 
unhappier than middle-aged or younger persons, despite declines in physical health, deaths of 
peers or spouses, and other objective rigors that accompany aging (e.g., Staudinger, Fleeson, 
and Baltes, 1999; Brandtstadter and Greve, 1994).  Others even suggest that well-being may 
  28
improve with age (e.g., Carstensen, 1995; Carstensen and Turk-Charles, 1994; Lawton, 
1996).  Several studies have found that the prevalence of depression disorders increases up to 
a certain age and then decreases (Kessler et al., 2005; Bland et al., 1988; Fichter et al., 1996).  
Furthermore, the age of onset for most mental disorders is usually below 30 years.  For 
example, in their recent study of age-of-onset distributions in the National Comorbidity 
Survey Replication, Kessler et al. found that half of all lifetime cases start by age 14 years 
and three-fourths by age 24 years.  Prevalence of disorders tends to increase up to about 44 
years of age and then declines (Kessler et al., 2005). On the other hand, stress-related mental 
health conditions may increase with age due to increasing career and family demands that 
may lead to increased use of mental health care. 
Related to age, studies have found that treatment utilization is often delayed after onset 
of a mental disorder.  Kessler, Olfson, and Berglund (1998) found that first treatment contact 
for depression in a nationally representative sample of people with a lifetime history of 
depression had a median delay of 7 years.  Wang et al. (2004) found the median delay from 
onset to treatment utilization to be 11 years.  In their study, Wang et al. found that patients 
whose first onsets occurred as children have significantly longer delays in seeking treatment 
than individuals whose first onsets occurred as adults.  Taken together, these studies suggest 
that use of mental health care most likely will increase with age up to a point and then 
decline.  Thus, for primary beneficiaries and spouses, I expect that mental health care use 
will be greater in younger age cohorts (16 to 30 years and 31 to 45 years) and less in the 
older age cohort (46 to 64 years).   
The relationship between age and mental health care use among adolescents and 
children is similar to my expectations for the adult samples.  Some studies suggest that very 
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young children in need of mental health care are much less likely to receive help for mental 
health disorders unless they are associated with disruptive or aggressive behavior (Pihlakoski 
et al., 2004; Lavigne, et al., 1998).  In addition, other studies find that young adults (greater 
than 17 years) are much less likely to use services than adolescents and children (Cohen and 
Hesselbart, 1993).  Given the pattern of disorder onset and the delay in treatment seeking, I 
would expect greater mental health care use among young children (6-11 years) and 
adolescents (12 to 17 years) than among very young children (0-5 years) or young adults 
(>17 years).   
Age is included in my models as spline variables.  For the adult samples, there are 3 
age splines for ages 16 to 30, 31 to 45, and 46 to 64.  In all the models, I exclude adults aged 
65 and older because these individuals are most likely to have additional coverage other than 
the employer-based plans (e.g., Medicare).  For youths and young adult dependents, the age 
splines represent 0 (newborn) to 5, 6 to 11, 12 to 17, and greater than 17 years.  
Gender 
Numerous studies have found that women are more likely to use mental health services 
than men (Frieman, 1998; Sturm et al., 1995; Leaf and Bruce, 1987).  Some studies have 
found that women are more likely to seek early help for mental health disorders compared to 
men and this treatment is usually sought from a non-specialty health care physician (Holbeck 
and Segal, 2005; Prior, 1999; Smith, 1992).  However, it is less likely that non-specialty 
physicians will correctly identify mental health care needs in women (Holbeck and Segal, 
2005).  Thus, women may be more likely to use any mental health care services, but may use 
fewer subsequent services (i.e., have lower treatment intensity) if their mental health care 
problem is not correctly identified.  The opposite is true for men.  Men typically seek 
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treatment later in the course of their mental disorder and, therefore, may be more severe upon 
presenting.  This suggests that in a given year, we may see fewer men with any use of mental 
health care, but for men that do use services the intensity of use may be greater because of 
more severe problems.  Therefore, I hypothesize that for my adult samples (primary 
beneficiaries and spouses) any use of mental health care services will be positively associated 
with being female.  Among those that use services, I hypothesize that days of use will be 
positively associated with being male.   
Research findings have been inconsistent on the effect that gender has in predicting use 
of mental health care services among adolescents and children.  For example, Zimmerman 
(2005) and Haines et al. (2002) both found that girls are less likely to use mental health care 
than boys.  One possible explanation for this differential use is the greater likelihood of 
aggressive behavior among boys.  Studies suggest that among adolescents and young 
children, disruptive disorders and aggressive behavior are much more likely to lead to mental 
health treatment than other disorders such as depression.  Since girls are more likely to 
experience depression and less likely to engage in aggressive or disruptive behavior, it 
suggests that girls will have less mental health care use compared to boys.  However, Cohen 
and Hesselbart (1993) and Cuffe et al. (1995) found no gender differences in use of mental 
health care or in the actual prevalence of disorders.  Despite the lack of significant findings in 
some previous studies, I hypothesize that mental health care use will be greater among boys 
in my dependent sample compared to girls.  
Marital Status  
Married clients may have less severe emotional and behavioral disorders than those 
who are single, divorced, separated, or widowed (Prigerson, Maciejewski, Rosenheck, 1999; 
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Hahn, 1993).  Marital status also may proxy for a more stable living environment or more 
family support, which suggests that married individuals may be less likely to use mental 
health care.  On the other hand, married clients may have more family responsibilities or 
family conflicts which may be associated with increased mental health disorders that could 
result in mental health care use.  Thus, marital conflict may increase the risk for mental 
health problems while marital harmony may be a protective factor against use of mental 
health care (Prigerson, Maciejewski, Rosenheck, 1999).   
Previous studies of mental health care use have typically found that being married is 
associated with better mental health for both men and women (Simon, 2002; Waite and 
Gallagher, 2000).  Given the poorer mental health among non-married individuals, we might 
expect greater mental health care use by non-married persons.  For example, Lin et al. (1996) 
using data from a household survey in Ontario, Canada, found greater service use among 
separated, divorced or widowed individuals compared to married or single individuals.  On 
the other hand, Sturm et al. (1995) found no difference in the likelihood of any mental heath 
visit by marital status, but they did find that being married was negatively associated with 
number of mental health visits among individuals who had any use.  Finally, individuals with 
mental health problems may be less likely to get married in the first place. Combining all 
these aspects, I expect that mental health care use will be positively associated with not being 
married.   
Household Size 
Although I expect that household size will affect the propensity to use mental health 
care services, I do not know the direction of this effect a priori.  Studies suggest that 
individuals living with others have less mental health care use than persons living alone 
  32
(Badawi, Kramer, and Eaton, 1996), and that larger households may provide social 
attachment and emotional support (Hughes and Waite, 2002; Rogers et al., 2000).  These 
findings suggest that mental health needs may be less among individuals in larger 
households.  On the other hand, larger households may provide greater emotional stress and 
financial strain for family members (Rogers et al., 2000; Gove, Hughes, and Galle, 1979).  
Furthermore, depending on the structure of the household (e.g., age of children; single-parent 
family versus two-parent family) and the economic demands which it faces, it may be 
difficult for a family member in need of mental health care to actually use such services.   
For children and adolescents, the presence of the father in the household may be a 
protective factor against mental health problems (Zimmerman, 2005), but depending on the 
father’s beliefs and stigmas associated with mental health, his presence may also inhibit use 
of mental health care services when needed.  In addition, children of single-parent families 
are at greater risk for mental health problems (Cairney et al., 2004; Weitoft et al., 2003; 
Lipman, et al., 2002).  Badawi, Kramer, and Eaton (1996) found that individuals in female-
headed households and persons living alone had higher use of mental health care services.   
Worker Characteristics 
Job demands and job stress can be associated with higher levels of psychological 
impairment and with higher rates of mental health care utilization (Dooley, Prause, and Ham-
Rowbotton, 2000; Atkinson, Liem, and Liem, 1986; Dooley, Catalano, and Rook, 1988; 
Turner, Kessler, and House, 1991).  Theoretical frameworks of job characteristics and work 
stress (e.g., the Job Characteristics Model [Oldham and Hackman, 1981; Hackman and 
Oldham, 1980]; the Demand-Control-Support Model [Karasek and Theorell, 1990]; Warr’s 
Vitamin Model [Warr, 1987]) suggest that jobs characterized by greater demands, low 
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control, and low social support increase the likelihood for worker’s anxiety and emotional 
exhaustion.  Furthermore, some studies suggest that family members of workers who 
experience job stress and associated psychological impairment may also suffer from anxiety 
and psychological problems.  My data have limited variables which measure job 
characteristics, but I include dichotomous variables that represent the industry in which the 
worker is employed.  Although I have no clear expectations a priori as to the direction of the 
effect that these variables may have on mental health care utilization, it seems reasonable to 
expect that workers in different industries experience different work environments and 
therefore different levels of demands, control, and social support.  Furthermore, different 
industry environments may foster different stigmas or support towards mental health care.  In 
addition to industry, I also include variables to control for the work status of the primary 
beneficiary—salaried, hourly, or other status.  Salaried work status may proxy for more 
white-collar job positions whereas hourly work status may proxy for more blue-collar job 
positions.  These characteristics may also indirectly proxy for differences in earnings or 
hours worked.  Individuals with more leisure time or lower hourly wages have a lower time 
price and may be more willing to invest time into mental health production, at least in the 
short-run (Ruhm, 2005).  For example, an individual suffering from depression may choose 
to see a counselor for several therapy sessions for help with this disorder.  However, all else 
equal, an individual with less leisure time or facing greater time costs may choose to use 
antidepressant drugs for their depression rather than take time away from market activities 
for therapy sessions.   
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Region of Residence 
Variability in mental health care utilization exists across different states and regions 
(Sturm, Ringel, and Andreyeva, 2003; Sturm, Andreyeva, and Ringel, 2002; DHHS, 1999). 
Variation in service utilization may be due to differences in need—either in the types of 
mental disorders experienced by individuals or the percentage of individuals with mental 
health disorders.  Geographic differences also may reflect differences in population 
characteristics (e.g., socioeconomic disparities), state/regional characteristics (Sturm, Ringel, 
and Andreyeva, 2003), and social beliefs and stigmas related to mental health disorders and 
mental health care services.  For these reasons, I expect that the geographic area in which the 
individual lives may affect utilization of mental health care services, but the direction of this 
effect is uncertain a priori.  To control for these geographic differences in my models, I 
include 4 dichotomous variables that represent the 4 U.S. Census regions (Northeast, South, 
West, and Midwest [omitted reference category]).   
Substance Abuse Treatment Utilization 
Addiction can enter an individual’s utility-maximization problem in multiple ways.  
Numerous studies have shown that excessive alcohol use and illicit drug use have adverse 
effects on health (both physical and mental health).  In addition, substance use may lead to 
inefficiency in production of market and non-market goods either directly or through an 
effect on human capital accumulation.  Because of its negative consequences on health, one 
might expect that substance use should increase the demand for health and, consequently, the 
demand for health care services.  However, many people with addictive disorders do not seek 
substance abuse treatment.  This observation raises the same question for substance users that 
often is raised for individuals with mental disorders—can individuals engaged in addictive 
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activities behave in an economically rational way?  If not, then implications from a utility-
maximization model regarding demand’s response to price may no longer be valid.   
Addiction can be entered into a utility-maximizing if we recognize that a substance 
user’s problem is to maximize their utility which is now a function of their health stock and 
current consumption of non-addictive goods plus current consumption of an addictive good 
(for my purposes, the consumption of alcohol or other drugs) and their addiction stock (i.e., 
habit) that is built up by previous consumption of the addictive good (Fergusen, 2000).  An 
individual gets direct utility from current consumption of alcohol or drugs.  They also get 
utility from their addiction stock which has an effect on their efficiency in producing their 
addictive kicks (i.e., their enjoyment in consuming the addictive good).  However, their 
addiction has a negative effect on their health stock (both mental and physical) and a 
negative effect on their production efficiency for health and for non-addictive commodities.  
In each period, individuals divide their time and income among work activities, time lost due 
to illness or injury, the production of health, the consumption of alcohol or other drugs (if a 
substance user), and the consumption of other non-addictive goods.  In this framework, it is 
reasonable to expect that substance users engage in utility-maximizing behavior subject to 
budget and time constraints and that we can expect their demand for health and other goods 
(both addictive and non-addictive) to rationally respond to changes in prices.  
Hypotheses/Expectations for Substance Use Treatment Models 
My empirical models for substance abuse treatment utilization are identical to my 
mental health care utilization models except that the cost-sharing variables now pertain to 
substance abuse treatment services.  Below I explain the inclusion of these variables and the 
other non-economic variables in my substance use models and my expectations regarding the 
  36
relationship between each of these variables and substance abuse treatment utilization.  In 
most cases, these variables play the same role for substance use as I described with mental 
health.  This highlights the fact that substance use and mental health are often related, and the 
factors associated with mental health disorders may also be related to substance use behavior.  
Main Explanatory Variables 
Cost-sharing for Substance Abuse Treatment Services 
The level of cost-sharing that the individual faces for SA treatment services is the main 
variable of interest in my empirical models of SA treatment utilization.  Again, I represent 
this cost-sharing with 3 variables that measure applicable coinsurance rates.  The 3 
coinsurance measures are all measured as the percentage of costs for the service that must be 
paid by the individual.  For my outpatient substance use treatment services models, the 
included coinsurance rates are: 
1. Coinsurance rate for outpatient substance use treatment provided by in-network 
providers; 
2. Coinsurance rate for outpatient substance use treatment provided by out-of-network 
providers; and  
3. Coinsurance rate for inpatient substance use treatment provided by in-network 
providers. 
The first two measures represent the level of cost-sharing faced by the individual for the 
outpatient substance abuse treatment service.  The third cost-sharing measure represents the 
level of cost-sharing for the alternative inpatient SA treatment service that the individual 
could choose to use.  As the level of cost-sharing of inpatient care faced by individuals 
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increases relative to outpatient care, individuals may substitute outpatient care for inpatient 
care, and vice versa.   
For my inpatient substance use treatment services models, the included coinsurance 
rates are: 
1. Coinsurance rate for inpatient substance use treatment provided by in-network 
providers; 
2. Coinsurance rate for inpatient substance use treatment provided by out-of-network 
providers; and  
3. Coinsurance rate for outpatient substance use treatment provided by in-network 
providers. 
These coinsurance rates are defined as above except that the mode of care to which they 
apply is reversed—inpatient instead of outpatient for the first 2 rates and outpatient instead of 
inpatient for the last rate. 
In addition, I again include a variable indicating whether precertification by the EAP 
for service use is required, and this variable is included in both the outpatient and inpatient 
models.  For the same reasons that I described above for mental health care, I expect that 
required EAP precertification will have a negative association with utilization of substance 
use treatment services.  These hypothesized reasons include increased time costs associated 
with going through the EAP, fear of stigma, and receipt of necessary services from the EAP. 
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Other Explanatory Variables 
Age  
As with mental health, Grossman-type health demand models suggest that age has a 
positive effect on an individual’s choice to seek substance abuse treatment because the rate of 
depreciation of the health stock is a positive function of age (Muurinen, 1982).  Futhermore, 
Suranovic, Goldfarb, and Leonard (1999) suggest that older individuals are more motivated 
to quit using substances, which may suggest that older individuals may be more likely to seek 
treatment.  Using data from the 1999 National Household Survey on Drug Abuse, Wu and 
Ringwalt (2004) found that younger adults (typically 18-25 years of age) were more likely to 
be dependent on alcohol but less likely to perceive a need for treatment or to use treatment 
services compared to older adults.  And, Hajema et al. (1999) had similar findings in their 
study of male problem drinkers in the Netherlands.  Therefore, I hypothesize that the 
likelihood of using any substance abuse treatment services will be positively associated with 
age.  Furthermore, given the greater motivation to quit among older adults and some studies 
that have found greater treatment retention among older adults despite lower dependency 
levels (Satre et al., 2004), I hypothesize that among service users, the number of days of 
substance abuse treatment also will be positively associated with age.   
For adolescents and young children, the story is similar.  Given that the age of first use 
for most substances is usually after age 12 with the majority initiating alcohol use and drug 
use between the ages of 15 and 20 (SAMHSA, 2003 NSDUH), and furthermore given that 
the age when normative substance use patterns usually reach their peak is around 20 years 
(Labouvie, Bates, and Pandina, 1997), I hypothesize that the likelihood of seeking substance 
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abuse treatment will be greater in my older age cohorts (12-17 years and greater than 17 
years) than in the younger age cohorts.  
Gender 
Women are less likely to seek treatment for substance abuse problems than men 
(Holbeck and Segal, 2005; Wu and Ringwalt, 2004; Dawson, 1996; Schober and Annis, 
1996; Walitzer and Connors, 1997).  Some studies suggest that women are less likely to seek 
treatment for substance use because of greater stigma towards women with addiction 
problems (Holbeck and Segal, 2005; Finkelstein, 1994; Schober and Annis, 1996; Thom, 
1986).  Women may also be more concerned about losing their partners or children upon 
treatment entry (Wu and Ringwalt, 2004).  Research suggests that alcoholic women are more 
likely than alcoholic men to be left by their partners (Holbeck and Segal, 2005).  
Furthermore, women with substance use problems are less likely than men to receive support 
from family or friends to enter substance abuse treatment or to remain in treatment (Holbeck 
and Segal, 2005).  Previous research on gender differences among adolescents is less clear.  
Although earlier studies suggest that boys are more likely to enter substance use treatment, 
more recent studies find no gender differences (Wu, Hoven, and Fuller, 2003; Wu et al., 
2002).  Despite some inconsistencies in previous research studies, I hypothesize that being 
female is negatively associated with any substance abuse treatment use and with days of use 
among treatment users.   
Marital Status 
Similar to mental health, marital status may affect substance use behavior and use of 
substance use treatment services.  Marital status may proxy a more stable living environment 
or more family support, which suggests that married individuals may be less likely to need 
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substance use treatment.  On the other hand, married clients may have more family 
responsibilities or family conflicts which may be associated with increased mental health 
disorders that could result in substance use.  These same family responsibilities may provide 
a barrier to seeking treatment services.  Westermeyer  and Boedicker (2000) found that both 
family responsibilities and a substance-abusing spouse reduced the likelihood of substance 
abuse treatment for women. Although previous studies suggest that married alcoholic men 
are more likely to receive pressure/support to enter treatment from their spouses, alcoholic 
women are more likely to view their spouse as the problem and as an obstacle to treatment 
(Smith, 1992).  These findings suggest that being married may have a negative effect on 
substance use and/or substance use treatment utilization, therefore I hypothesize that any use 
of SA treatment and days of use will be negatively associated with being married.   
Household Size 
Larger households may provide social attachment and emotional support (Hughes and 
Waite, 2002; Rogers et al., 2000) that may be a protective factor against substance use and 
abuse.  On the other hand, larger households may provide greater emotional stress and 
financial strain for family members (Rogers et al., 2000; Gove, Hughes, and Galle, 1979) that 
may lead to substance use and need of treatment services.  Although, family members may 
provide pressure to enter treatment, the structure of the household and the economic demands 
of the family may make it difficult for a family member in need of substance use treatment to 
actually use such services.  For example, a mother with young children may not be able to 
use treatment services if she does not have access to daycare for the time of the treatment 
sessions.  Therefore, as with mental health, I expect household size will affect the propensity 
to use substance use treatment services, but I do not know the direction of this effect a priori.   
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Worker Characteristics 
Similar to mental health, job demands and job stress may be associated with higher 
rates of substance use (Moisan et al., 1999; Lindquist; Beilin; and Knuiman, 1997; Ames and 
Janes, 1992; Atkinson, Liem, and Liem, 1986; Dooley, Catalano, and Rook, 1988; Turner, 
Kessler, and House, 1991).  For example, workers suffering from employment-related stress 
may use alcohol as a coping mechanism (Ruhm, 2005; Lindquist; Beilin; and Knuiman, 
1997).  Most major theories of addiction propose that stress plays an important role in 
increasing substance use and relapse (Sinha, 2001).  Certain work cultures and environments 
may also promote substance use through informal social controls that support values, 
attitudes, and expectations about substance use (Ames and Janes, 1992; Mensch and Kandel, 
1988; Guinn, 1983).  Work-related stress and work environments may differ by industry or 
by employee status.  Therefore, I expect that workers in different industries (e.g., sales versus 
manufacturing) or different employee types (e.g., salaried versus hourly) may have different 
levels of substance use and substance use treatment needs.  Taken together, these notions 
suggest that the job characteristics of a worker may affect the use of substances and the 
potential need for treatment services for the worker and, possibly for members of the 
worker’s family.  However, certain job characteristics or work environments also may hinder 
use of treatment services even when needed.  For example, some workers may fear reprisals 
from their employers or fear stigma from fellow workers if their substance use problems 
become known.  Therefore, although I hypothesize that job characteristics may affect need 
for treatment services and access to services, I have no expectations a priori regarding the 
direction of this effect.   
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I include the same variables for job characteristics in the models for the spouses sample 
and dependents sample.  In this case, these variables represent the job characteristics of the 
primary beneficiary to whom the spouse and/or dependent are related.  Spouses and children 
of worker’s in high stress or high demand jobs may also suffer from psychological distress 
that may lead to higher rates of substance use.  In addition, family members of substance-
using individuals may also be more likely to use substances themselves.   
Region of Residence 
Similar to mental health care utilization, studies have found that substance abuse 
treatment utilization rates vary substantially across states and different regions (Dayhoff, 
Pope, and Huber, 1994; McAuliffe and Dunn, 2004).  Variation may be due to differences in 
drug-of-choice mix by individuals within the state/region or to the treatment concerns 
targeted by specific state administrations (McAuliffe and Dunn, 2004).  In addition, 
geographic differences may reflect differences in population characteristics, regional 
characteristics, social beliefs and stigmas.  Therefore, I expect that the geographic area in 
which the individual lives may affect utilization of SA treatment services.  To control for 
these geographic differences in my models, I include 4 dichotomous variables that represent 
the 4 U.S. Census regions (Northeast, South, West, and Midwest [omitted reference 
category]).   
Primary Hypotheses to be Tested in Models Regarding Utilization 
Hypothesis 1:  The coefficients for the behavioral health care services’ primary 
coinsurance rates are expected to be negative and significant indicating that as the cost-
sharing faced by the individual increases the likelihood of any use of that service decreases. 
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Hypothesis 2:  The coefficient for the coinsurance rates of an alternative service is 
expected to be positive and significant indicating that individuals’ likelihood of using a 
behavioral health care service increases as the level of cost-sharing of the service decreases 
relative to other service alternatives.   
Hypothesis 3:  The coefficient for the EAP precertification requirement is expected to 
be negative and significant indicating that requiring EAP precertification for behavioral 
health care services decreases the use of these services.   
Hypothesis 4:  Conditional on use, individuals who face higher out-of-pocket 
expenditures (as measured by the coinsurance rates) will have fewer behavioral health visits 
than individuals who face lower out-of-pocket expenditures.    
Hypothesis 5:  Conditional on use, the required EAP precertification will have a 
negative and significant effect on the amount of services used.   
Job Choice and Health Plan Choice: The First Step towards Utilization 
Consideration of the individual’s job choice and health plan choice decisions is 
important in my analysis because of the potential for adverse selection.  To estimate the true 
effect of health insurance on service use, I must be able to distinguish the effect of the job or 
health plan selection from the effects of the health insurance.  Ignoring these effects will lead 
to misleading results with the effect of insurance being overstated (Waters, 1999; Manning, 
Wells, and Benjamin, 1987).  Adverse selection can occur at either the level of the job 
choice, the level of the health plan choice, or both.  Much of the literature on adverse 
selection refers to the health plan choice where the most commonly discussed situations in 
the adverse selection literature are those in which employees within a given company may 
switch easily among plans (Harris and Sturm, 2002).  Under this scenario, individuals who 
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expect to use mental health or substance use treatment (MH/SA) services may be more likely 
to choose the health plan that provides more generous coverage for MH/SA services among a 
menu of health plans offered by an employer.  In reality, nearly all plan switching reflects 
changes in employment (the job choice) or in employer offerings (Cunningham and Kohn, 
2000) rather than in individual-driven switching among current plans.  Furthermore, even 
when an employer offers multiple medical care plans, increasing numbers of employers are 
carving out MH/SA services and offering these services as a uniform benefit that covers all 
employees regardless of their main medical plan (Frank, Huskamp, and McGuire, 1996).  
Both of these situations are found in my data where I observe most switching between health 
plans to be due to employment attrition or to changes in the plans offered by the company 
and where for most firms the MH/SA benefits offered within a firm are uniform across its 
workers regardless of plan type.  In this situation, individuals seeking generous MH/SA 
coverage will choose a job in which they expect the employer to provide better benefits, 
making the actual selection at the level of the job choice decision rather than afterwards.   
For MH/SA-related adverse selection to occur at the job choice level, the individual 
needs to have information on MH/SA health plan offerings before taking employment.  
Gathering this information may not be easy.  MH/SA benefits are less likely to be listed on 
benefit summary sheets that may be available to prospective employees, and job candidates 
are likely to be reluctant to make inquiries about MH/SA benefits for fear of harming their 
employment prospects (Harris and Sturm, 2002).  However, firm characteristics may provide 
signals to help the individual decipher what his MH/SA plan offerings might be.   
Previous research findings suggest that firm size, unionization, and the proportion of 
younger workers in the company may provide signals to prospective employees as to the 
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generosity of health benefits (Long and Marquis, 1993; Buchmueller, DiNardo, and Valletta, 
2001; Freeman and Medoff, 1984).  Small firms may face higher premiums and, therefore, 
may offer limited benefits or pass these additional costs along to their workers.  Firms with 
predominantly younger workers may indicate high turnover rates or lower-wage workers for 
whom firms might offer less generous benefits.  Finally, unions are in a stronger position 
than an individual to negotiate better health benefits so firms with higher proportions of 
unionized workers may signal more generous health benefits than firms with lower 
unionization.   
Therefore, to help separate the effect of the MH/SA health insurance characteristics 
and the job choice/health plan choice, I incorporate a 2-stage instrumental variable model 
that is discussed in detail in Chapter 3.  In my study selection bias most likely occurs at the 
level of job choice because most of the employers represented in my data provide uniform 
MH/SA coverage across all employees (discussed in detail in Chapter 4).  Therefore, I chose 
to handle this selection bias by modeling the health insurance characteristics as a function of 
employer characteristics that may be associated with the type of health plan benefits offered 
by the employer.  For this first stage modeling of the health insurance characteristics, I 
include  the primary beneficiary’s firm size, the proportion of workers at the firm that are less 
than 30 years of age, and the proportion of workers at the firm that are unionized.  These 
variables should not affect an individual’s utilization decisions regarding mental health care 
or substance use treatment, but as noted above they may be associated with the type of 
benefits offered by firms thus affecting the individual’s choice of employer, and 
consequently the MH/SA coinsurance rates and EAP requirements that they face when using 
MH/SA services.   
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Within this first-stage estimation, I hypothesize the following associations between the 
firm characteristics and MH/SA coinsurance rates: 
• individuals employed in firms with a greater proportion of unionized workers will 
have more generous MH/SA benefits as measured by lower coinsurance rates for 
MH/SA services; 
• individuals employed in firms with a greater proportion of young workers will have 
less generous MH/SA benefits as measured by lower coinsurance rates for MH/SA 
services; and 
• individuals employed in larger firms will have more generous MH/SA benefits as 
measured by lower coinsurance rates for MH/SA services compared to individuals 
in smaller firms.  
Although I expect each of these characteristics to also affect whether EAP 
precertification is required, I do not know the direction of these effects a priori.  For example, 
EAP precertification may be less likely to be required in smaller firms because smaller firms 
may not have an EAP.  A greater proportion of unionized workers may be associated with 
required EAP precertification if the union believes in the effectiveness of the EAP; however, 
if the union believes that attendance at the EAP will harm its members’ employment (e.g., 
fear of stigma), then they may negotiate contract provisions that do not allow EAP 
requirements (e.g., Delaney, Grube, and Ames,1998).   
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Figure 1: 
Conceptual Model of Decision to Use Health Care Services  
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CHAPTER 3: METHODS 
In this chapter I describe the empirical methods used to estimate the utilization of 
mental health care and substance abuse treatment services.  The conceptual model outlined in 
Chapter 2 describes a two-step process by which an individual (1) decides to make contact 
with a health care provider for mental health care or substance abuse treatment and (2) then 
determines the amount of additional mental health care or substance abuse treatment services 
to use.  The focus of this study is to estimate the separate effects of specific health insurance 
characteristics on each of these steps, and, therefore, I estimate this relationship using a two-
part model.  The first part of the model examines the effect of health insurance characteristics 
on any use of mental health care or substance abuse treatment services in a given year.  The 
second part of the model examines the effect of these same characteristics on the intensity of 
use for those individuals with any use measured as the number of days of mental health care 
use or days of substance abuse treatment services.  Furthermore, because I observe most 
individuals across two years, I employ panel estimation techniques as described below.   
The unit of analysis is the individual.  An individual is categorized into one of 3 groups 
depending on their relationship with the employer-offered health plan.  These 3 groups are 
primary beneficiaries (employees), their spouses, and other dependents (e.g., children).  My 
econometric models include both individual-specific characteristics (e.g., age, gender) and 
characteristics that are specific to the primary beneficiary (e.g., industry in which primary 
beneficiary is employed).  I estimate separate models for utilization of mental health care use 
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and substance abuse treatment. I also estimate different models for outpatient and inpatient 
care because health plans may have different coinsurance rates by type of care and provider.   
Because variables representing the characteristics of the primary beneficiary have a 
slightly different interpretation for the 3 individual types, I estimate my models separately for 
each group.  Furthermore, the null hypothesis that the coefficients are the same in models for 
the primary beneficiaries and spouses could not be accepted based on results from likelihood 
ratio tests (LR = 124.018 for outpatient mental health models and LR = 36.96 for outpatient 
substance use models).  
Variables 
Dependent Variables 
My dependent variables are use of mental health care and substance abuse treatment.  
Both mental health care and substance abuse treatment are defined separately for inpatient 
and outpatient care.  I first consider dichotomous measures of any outpatient mental health 
care or outpatient substance abuse treatment in the year.  For outpatient mental health care, 
the dependent variable representing any service use is equal to 1 if the individual used any 
outpatient mental health care services in time t (defined as one calendar year) and zero 
otherwise.  Similarly, the dependent variable representing any use of outpatient substance 
abuse treatment is equal to 1 if the individual used any outpatient substance abuse treatment 
in time t and zero otherwise.  Next, for those individuals who used mental health care (or 
substance abuse treatment), I examine total days of service use in time t.  Dependent 
variables for inpatient mental health care and inpatient substance abuse treatment are defined 
in the same way.  
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Main Explanatory Variables 
The main explanatory variables of interest are the health insurance characteristics 
specific to MH/SA services—specifically, the coinsurance rates for MH/SA services and 
whether the plan required EAP authorization prior to MH/SA service use.  Coinsurance rates 
are defined as the percentage of the service expenses paid by the individual.  Higher 
coinsurance rates indicate less generous plans and result in higher out-of-pocket expenses for 
the individual if services are used.  For my study I am focusing on two types of MH/SA 
coinsurance rates—(1) the rate applied to services used within the plan’s network of 
providers (referred to as the in-network coinsurance rate); and (2) the rate applied to services 
used outside the plan’s network of providers (referred to as the out-of-network coinsurance 
rate).  For plans that do not distinguish between in-network and out-of-network services, 
these rates are the same.  For plans that do not allow service use outside of the network, the 
out-of-network coinsurance rate is set to 100 percent indicating that the individual is 
responsible for all of these expenses.  Each of these coinsurance rates differs by the service 
type (mental health or substance abuse) and the service setting (outpatient versus inpatient) 
resulting in 8 distinct price measures.  These rates and the models in which they are used are 
summarized in Table 1.  For example, as shown in the table, I include the mental health 
coinsurance rates for (1) outpatient in-network services, (2) outpatient out-of-network 
services, and (3) inpatient in-network services in the model of outpatient mental health care 
utilization.   
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Table 1. Coinsurance Rates for MH/SA Coverage 
 Regression models in which included:  
 Outpatient 
Mental 
Health 
Care 
Inpatient 
Mental 
Health 
Care 
Outpatient 
Substance 
Use Care 
Inpatient 
Substance 
Use Care 
Mental Health  
Coinsurance Rates 
    
Outpatient in-network  X X   
Outpatient out-of-network  X    
Inpatient in-network  X X   
Inpatient out-of-network   X   
Substance Abuse 
Coinsurance Rates 
    
Outpatient in-network    X X 
Outpatient out-of-network    X  
Inpatient in-network    X X 
Inpatient out-of-network     X 
 
 
As presented in Chapter 2, the first two coinsurance rates represent the cost-sharing 
incurred by the individual if using outpatient mental health services.  The third coinsurance 
rate (inpatient in-network) represents the cost-sharing the individual would incur for using 
inpatient mental health services and this variable is included to capture any cross-price effect 
that may be affecting outpatient utilization.  In the model of inpatient mental health care 
utilization, I include the parallel inpatient mental health coinsurance rates for (1) inpatient in-
network services, (2) inpatient out-of-network services, and (3) outpatient in-network 
services.  Finally, in the models of substance abuse service utilization I include the same 
coinsurance rates except that they apply to substance abuse services.   
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Following economic theory, I expect the coefficient on the outpatient coinsurance rates 
to be negative for outpatient service use; that is, as the coinsurance rate increases the 
individual is less likely to use outpatient services because their out-of-pocket expense (or 
“price” faced) is higher.  Inpatient care may be a substitute (although not perfect) for 
outpatient care.  Therefore, I expect the coefficient on inpatient coinsurance to be positive 
because as the price of alternative inpatient care increases for the individual (i.e., the 
inpatient coinsurance rate increases) they may be more likely to use outpatient care.   
In addition to the coinsurance rates, I also include a dichotomous variable representing 
whether the individual is required to go through their firm’s employee assistance program 
(EAP) to get precertification prior to using mental health or substance abuse services.  Four 
of the 12 employer-plan groups have such requirements.   
These health insurance characteristics are hypothesized to be endogenous because 
individuals self-select into their health plans and this selection process is affected by 
unobservable characteristics which also affect the propensity to use services.  These 
unobservables are represented in the error term and lead to unwanted correlation between the 
error term and the health insurance characteristics.  The endogeneity of health care is well-
established in numerous studies of health care demand; however the extent of selection bias 
for MH/SA coverage is less clear.  In a study of alcohol benefits offered by 57 firms and 
administered by a large managed behavioral health care organization, Harris and Sturm 
(2002) compared alcohol treatment use rates and costs of new and old enrollees between 
more generous and less generous plans. They found no evidence of adverse selection into 
more generous plans. Contrary to the selection hypothesis, they found that treatment costs of 
new members compared to old members were lower in firms with more generous treatment 
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benefits than in firms with more limited benefits.  If self-selection bias is present, I need to 
employ a model that is able to handle this endogeneity to accurately estimate MH/SA 
demand.  I describe this model in more detail below.   
Other Explanatory Variables 
In addition to the health insurance characteristics, I control for the usual demographic 
variables such as age, gender, marital status, household size, and region of the U.S. in which 
the individual lives.  I also include variables for the industry in which the primary beneficiary 
is employed, the employee type of the primary beneficiary (salary versus hourly), whether 
the individual used any medical care services (physical health), and the total number of 
months per year that an individual is enrolled in the health plan.  These variables may affect 
use of mental health care or substance abuse treatment.    
Age is included in my models as spline variables.  For the primary beneficiary and 
spouse models there are 3 categories for ages 16 to 30, 31 to 45, and 46 to 64.  In all the 
models, I exclude adults aged 65 and older because these individuals are most likely to have 
additional coverage other than the employer-based plans (e.g., Medicare).  For dependents, 
the age categories are 0 (newborn) to 5, 6 to 11, 12 to 17, and greater than 17 years.  Gender 
enters my models as a dichotomous variable equal to 1 if the individual is male.  Household 
size is a continuous variable equal to the number of individuals covered on the health plan.  
Although not all individuals in a household may be covered on a plan, the number of 
individuals on the plan is a good proxy for household size in the absence of its direct 
measure.  Marital status enters my model as a dichotomous variable equal to 1 if the 
individual is not married. To avoid perfect or near perfect collinearity, I only include marital 
status in the models for primary beneficiaries.  Not surprisingly, none of the dependents are 
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married and almost all spouses (approximately 96 percent) are married.  The region of the 
U.S. in which an individual lives is represented by 4 dichotomous variables that signify the 
primary U.S. Census regions—northeast, south, midwest and west.  Midwest, the most 
common category in my data, is omitted from the model as the reference category.   
The industry in which the primary beneficiary is employed is included in my model as 
3 dichotomous variables representing manufacturing, service, and transportation (the largest 
and omitted reference category).  Employee type of the primary beneficiary (salary versus 
hourly), enters my model as a set of dichotomous variables—salaried equals 1 if the primary 
beneficiary is a salaried employee (omitted reference category) and zero otherwise. Hourly 
equals 1 if the primary beneficiary is an hourly employee and zero otherwise.  Finally, I 
created a dichotomous variable equal to 1 if the primary beneficiary is an “other” employee 
status.  Other employee status includes union or non-union without salary or hourly indicated 
and individuals for whom this status was unknown.  As a proxy for the individual’s physical 
health I include a dichotomous variable equal to 1 if the individual used any medical care 
services (physical health) in time t.  Finally, not all individuals are enrolled for the entire 
period t.  Individuals with more months of enrollment have a greater opportunity to be 
observed using services and therefore I include a continuous variable representing months 
enrolled in period t.   
Ideally, I would like to include variables representing whether the individual has need 
for mental health care or substance abuse treatment (either self-perceived need or diagnosed 
need) and the severity of their mental health or substance abuse disorders for those with need.  
Need and severity measures for these conditions are perhaps the most noticeable omissions 
from my models. Obviously, only those individuals with perceived need would access mental 
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health or substance abuse care.  Furthermore, it is not unreasonable to expect that more 
severe individuals will use more of these services once treatment is sought.  Another 
desirable explanatory variable to include in my models is some measure of individuals’ 
perception of stigma associated with using MH/SA services.  As discussed in Chapter 2, 
stigma may have a large effect on use of MH/SA services.  Stigma can be viewed as part of 
the full social cost of using MH/SA services.  Individuals with greater fear of stigmatization 
for using MH/SA services may view these services as more costly.   
Unfortunately, claims data are limited and do not provide data on need or condition 
severity a priori.  They also do not have any measures of perceived stigma.  If available, I 
would include these variables in both parts of my two-part model with the expectation that 
individuals with need of MH/SA services will be more likely to use these services, and 
individuals with greater severity will use more services.  Furthermore, individuals with 
greater fear of stigmatization will be less likely to seek treatment services even when in need, 
and may have lower levels of use once treatment is sought.   
Empirical Specification 
The objective of my analysis is to determine the effect of MH/SA health insurance 
characteristics on the propensity to use MH/SA treatment services and their effect on the 
level of use among service users, holding all else equal.  In my sample, use of outpatient 
mental health services ranged from 5.1 percent of dependents to 7.2 percent of primary 
beneficiaries in a given calendar year and use of outpatient substance abuse services was 
about 0.3 percent per year in each of the samples; therefore I have a large number of zeros 
for the service use outcomes.  To model this pattern of zeros, I use a two-part model (Jones, 
2000; Pohlmeier and Ulrich, 1995) that divides the analysis into 2 parts—whether to use any 
  56
services and then, conditional on use, how many days of service to use.  First, separately for 
each sample I examine how MH/SA health insurance characteristics affect the propensity to 
use (1) mental health care and (2) substance abuse treatment.   
Because my dependent variables for these models are dichotomous, a logit 
specification is more appropriate than standard ordinary least squares regression.  However, 
the basic logit specification does not take into account the panel nature of my data, but rather 
assumes that observations for individual i for any period t are independent.  It is more likely 
that these data contain individual-specific effects that are serially correlated.  Therefore, 
some type of error components model must be combined with the logit specification.  A 
random effects specification is a good choice because it allows heterogeneity across both 
individuals and time.  Random effects will correct for correlation and provide correct 
standard errors.  But, the standard random effects estimation will yield consistent and 
efficient estimates only if the fixed error component (ui) is uncorrelated with the explanatory 
variables (i.e., absence of endogeneity). 
Another common panel data technique is the fixed effects approach which yields 
consistent parameter estimates even in the presence of correlation between the explanatory 
variables and the fixed effect error component.  However, fixed effects estimation does not 
yield parameter estimates for time-invariant variables because these variables are differenced 
out in the fixed effects approach.  Since many of my explanatory variables, including all my 
MH/SA health insurance characteristics, are time-invariant across the 2 years observed, fixed 
effects is not appropriate.  Therefore, I use a random effects logit regression of the form  
Prob (Useit) = Prob(yit = 1 | Iit, Xit, ui) =  Λ(Iitα, Xitβ,υit) (3.1) 
where υit = ui + εit and Λ represents the logistic distribution.  
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In Equation 3.1, yit represents the initial demand for health care and enters the model as 
a dichotomous variable equal to 1 if individual i uses any mental health care (or substance 
abuse treatment services) in time period t and zero otherwise; Iit is a vector of coinsurance 
rates for MH/SA services that are potentially endogenous (discussed in more detail below); 
Xit is a vector of exogenous sociodemographic characteristics that may affect use of services; 
α and β are vectors of parameters to be estimated, υit represents the error term which can be 
divided into 2 components—ui representing the individual-specific component of the error 
and εit representing the random error component.   
In the second part of my analysis, I examine the effect of MH/SA health insurance 
characteristics on days of mental health care (or substance abuse treatment).  My empirical 
specification is identical to the logistic models except that the dependent variable is now a 
count variable representing the number of outpatient days (or inpatient days) received for 
metal health care or substance abuse treatment services.  I use a random effects negative 
binomial model to estimate the second part—number of days of outpatient (or inpatient) use 
in period t—as a function of the explanatory variables.  A negative binomial model relaxes 
the constraint that the mean and variance of the count variable are equal (a strong assumption 
in the Poisson model) and it allows for overdispersion (i.e., E(yit|Xit) <  V(yit|Xit)).  
Overdispersion may be caused by unobserved heterogeneity in the data or interdependence 
between occurrences of successive events.  If overdispersion is present, failure to account for 
it in the model will lead to underestimates of the standard errors.  The negative binomial 
regression equation is of the form:   
Days of Useit = λit = exp(Iitα + Xitβ + υit) (3.2)  
where υit = ui + εit captures unobserved heterogeneity and is assumed to be uncorrelated with 
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the explanatory variables. 
Endogeneity of Health Plans for Utilization 
Determining the effect of health insurance characteristics on the use of mental health 
and substance abuse treatment services is difficult because the choice of health insurance 
characteristics may be endogenous regressors in the estimation of health care utilization.  
Endogeneity may enter the model in two ways.  First, individuals employed in a given job 
who expect to use MH/SA services may choose health plans that provide more generous 
coverage for MH/SA services.  This adverse selection is an issue for health insurance in 
general, but it may be especially serious for mental health and substance abuse (Frank and 
McGuire, 2000).  However, the extent of this selection bias is uncertain.  Results of recent 
studies that have examined this issue (e.g., Deb et al., 1996; Sturm, Meredith, and Wells, 
1994; Perneger et al., 1995) suggest that users of substance abuse and mental health care are 
associated with higher levels of health care spending and that they systematically select 
health plans that offer more generous coverage for behavioral health treatment (Frank and 
McGuire, 2000).  However, as noted earlier, Harris and Sturm (2002) found no evidence of 
adverse selection in their study of alcohol treatment benefits.  
Second, the presence of endogeneity may exist if individuals with expected MH/SA 
service needs choose jobs that offer more generous MH/SA health coverage.  In the U.S., 
individuals typically choose their job and health plan as a joint product (Pauly, 2001).  The 
effect of this joint selection is reflected in previous studies that have found that expected 
health insurance coverage may affect an individual’s job choice and their propensity to 
remain at a job (referred to as job-lock; e.g., Gruber and Madrian, 1994; Madrian, 1994; 
Buchmueller and Valletta, 1996).  Stroupe, Kinney, and Kniesner (2001) examined the effect 
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of health insurance on job duration for chronically ill individuals or individuals with a 
chronically ill family member.  They found that job-lock among individuals facing a chronic 
illness was substantial.  Job-lock reduced the propensity to quit for men facing a chronic 
illness by about 41 percent; for women, this propensity was reduced by about 39 percent.  
Their findings suggest that the link between health insurance and job choice may be stronger 
among individuals with chronic mental health or substance abuse conditions.   
In this study, the potential for selection bias for MH/SA health insurance characteristics 
is more likely occurring through job choice rather than through direct choice of health plans; 
that is, individuals are selecting jobs in which they expect more generous MH/SA coverage 
to be offered.  Although almost all the firms represented in my data offer multiple medical 
care plans to their employees, most only offer a single plan for MH/SA services, either 
through a carve-out or a single plan managed by the same administrators as the general 
medical care plans.  
Empirically, endogeneity may enter my models as a correlation between the 
explanatory variable Iit and υit (the error component in the main utilization model (Equation 
3.1)).  As noted above, the standard random effects’ specification assumes that there is no 
correlation between the explanatory variables and the error term.  However, in the presence 
of endogeneity random effects’ assumptions are violated and techniques must be employed to 
handle the endogeneity.  Otherwise, with correlation between Iit and υit, then E(υ | I) is not 
zero and estimates of α, the coefficient on Iit in the main equation will be biased.   
To estimate the true effect of health insurance on service use, I need to disentangle the 
effect of the job selection from the effects of the health insurance characteristics.  Much of 
the previous work examining the effect of health insurance on service use ignores the 
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endogeneity issue, however, ignoring the endogeneity of insurance will likely lead to 
misleading results with the effect of insurance being overstated (Waters, 1999; Manning, 
Wells, and Benjamin, 1987).  A common approach employed to deal with endogeneity is to 
use an instrumental variable (IV) technique which allows estimation of asymptotically 
unbiased parameter estimates and reduce measurement error.  Therefore, I use a two-stage 
instrumental variable approach combined with the random effects model to correct for the 
endogeneity of MH/SA health insurance characteristics.  In addition, I also estimate a simple 
two-part random effects model which assumes all right hand side variables as exogenous.  
This allows me to compare my results and ascertain the effect that not accounting for the 
endogeneity of MH/SA health insurance characteristics has on my results.  In the results 
chapter, I focus my discussion on the results from the simple random effects model due to 
my lack of confidence in the chosen instruments for the IV estimation which is discussed 
below.   
As a first step in the IV estimation, the MH/SA health insurance characteristics are 
specified as a linear function of some or all of the exogenous variables in the main utilization 
model above (3.1) as well as one or more identifying variables (Zi).  This regression is of the 
form: 
Iit = γXit + δZi + ηit  (3.3) 
For instruments to be valid, Zi needs to include variables that (1) affect the choice of 
MH/SA health insurance characteristics and (2) that have no direct effect on MH/SA health 
care service use.  Since I have 4 potentially endogenous variables, I need at least 4 
instruments for the system to be exactly identified and greater than 4 for the system to be 
overidentified.  The Marketscan data are limited, and I was only able to identify 5 potential 
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variables to use as instruments in estimating the MH/SA health insurance characteristics.  
These instruments represent 3 characteristics of the primary beneficiary’s firm—proportion 
of unionized workers at firm, proportion of workers less than 30 years of age, and 3 
dichotomous variables representing firm size [<20,000 workers, 20,000 to 50,000 workers, 
and 50,001 to 100,000 workers, with firm size >100,000 workers as the omitted reference 
category].  These firm characteristics may affect the types of plans offered to employees and, 
therefore, their selection of MH/SA health insurance coverage.   
Studies have found that generosity of mental health benefits vary by firm size 
(Burndorf, 2002) with larger firms offering more, generous benefits.  Long and Marquis 
(1993) found that firms with younger employees were less likely to offer health insurance 
and this may mean that, of those that do offer insurance, health plan offerings are less 
generous in firms with a greater proportion of younger employees.  Finally, studies have 
found that greater unionization in firms tends to increase health plan coverage and reduce 
employee cost-sharing (e.g., Buchmueller, DiNardo, and Valletta, 1999; Long and Marquis, 
1993).   
Estimating the first part of the two-part model with IV estimation requires an iterative 
process.  First, I estimated regression models for each of the 3 coinsurance rates and for the 
probability that an EAP precertification is required.  Because these health characteristics do 
not vary for individuals between years, each of these first-stage equations is estimated as 
pooled OLS or logit using robust standard errors and accounting for clustering on 
individuals.  In reality, individuals’ coinsurance rates are variables that take on one of several 
discrete values with the majority of individuals falling into categories of 0, 10, 20, 50, or 100, 
depending on the coinsurance rate.  However, I chose to treat these variables as continuous 
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variables which imposes a slightly different functional form on these data, but allows me to 
avoid collinearity issues within the second-stage utilization model that arise when sets of 
dichotomous variables for the coinsurance rates are used.  Next, I inserted the predicted 
values of the relevant coinsurance rates and EAP precertification for each individual into the 
random effects logit equation (3.1) and the negative binomial equation (3.2). 
By using this mechanical approach, the estimated standard errors of the coefficients in 
the second stage models are not correct.  Using the predicted values for the health insurance 
variables introduces noise into the second-stage utilization model from the first-stage 
estimation.  To be correct, standard errors should be adjusted for using the predicted values 
of health insurance characteristics rather than the actual values (Bollen, Guilkey, and Mroz, 
1995).  One method to calculate correct standard errors is to use boostrapping, but this 
technique can be complex and very computer time intensive, especially for panel data 
models.  Because of the size of my samples and the complexity of my models, it is not 
unreasonable to expect this computation to take hundreds of hours of computer time.  
Evidence from Guilkey, Mroz, and Taylor (1992) suggests that for large samples 
asymptotically correct standard errors are no more effective than the conditional standard 
errors.  Therefore, I do not estimate the asymptotically correct standard errors for the IV two-
part model.  To determine the degree of bias introduced by using the mechanical approach to 
IV estimation, I estimate correct standard errors using linear probability models (LPMs) and 
canned Stata programming (e.g., ivreg/ivreg2 command) and compare these with standard 
errors using the mechanical approach with LPMs.  These comparisons suggest that the degree 
of bias is extremely small giving me confidence that my results are robust even with the 
uncorrected standard errors.  As shown in Table 2, the average difference between the correct 
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standard errors and the uncorrected standard errors for the primary beneficiary sample is less 
than 0.001.  Comparisons for the spouse and dependent samples had similar findings.   
Table 2. Comparisons of Linear Probability Model for Outpatient MH Care among 
Primary Beneficaries 
Model 
Correct Standard Errors 
from computer IV 
estimation 
Uncorrected Standard 
Errors from mechanical 
IV estimation 
In-network Coinsurance 0.0001477 0.001605 
Out-of-network Coinsurance 0.0000977 0.0000988 
Inpatient Coinsurance 0.0002427 0.00025 
EAP required 0.0044083 0.0039129 
 
Specification Tests 
I applied several specification tests to my models and the results of these tests for the 
regressions on outpatient mental health care and outpatient substance abuse treatment are 
presented for each sample in Table 3 through Table 8.  First, since I have only two time 
periods represented in my data, an obvious question is whether panel techniques are more 
appropriate than pooled estimation.  Estimation with pooled data is appropriate if ui equals 
zero (i.e., does not exist) and all the variation in service use is due to between-group 
variation.  As shown in the tables, results from the Breusch-Pagan (1980) test which tests the 
presence of the fixed error component (i.e., whether ui is equal to zero) yield large and 
significant χ2 values and thereby support use of a panel data model to explicitly account for 
the unobserved heterogeneity.   
Next, I tested whether the coinsurance rates and EAP requirement are endogenous as 
suspected.  To do this, I use an augmented version of the Durbin-Wu-Hausman test as 
suggested by Davidson and MacKinnon (1993) and Rivers and Vuong (1988).  This test is 
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conducted by running the second-stage utilization models including both the residuals from 
the first-stage estimation of coinsurance rates and the EAP requirement and the actual values 
of coinsurance rates and EAP requirement.  If the coinsurance rates and the EAP requirement 
are exogenous, then the coefficients for residuals should not be significant (Wooldridge, 
2002; Rivers and Vuong, 1988).  As shown in the tables, results from these tests are mixed.  
Health insurance characteristics are found to be endogenous in the mental health care 
utilization equations for all samples, but these characteristics are found to be exogenous in 
the substance abuse treatment utilization equations for primary beneficiaries and spouses.  In 
theory, health insurance characteristics should be consistently endogenous or exogenous 
across all types of health care utilization.  Furthermore, the results from the tests on the 
substance abuse treatment utilization may be affected by the low prevalence of utilization in 
the samples.   
Since my system is over-identified (5 instruments for 4 endogenous variables), I am 
able to perform tests of the identifying restrictions.  First, I test the strength of my 
instruments in predicting the values of the MH/SA health insurance characterstics by 
conducting joint F-tests (χ2 for the logit estimation of EAP requirement) of the instruments in 
the first-stage regressions.  As shown in the tables, across the board, the instruments are 
found to be highly significant.  Furthermore, the first-stage regressions have high R2 statistics 
indicating that the model does well in predicting values.  The R2 values from the first stage 
regressions ranged from 0.592 to 0.981.  The marginal R2 from including the instruments in 
the first stage regression are also quite large ranging 0.19 to 0.56.   
Next, I test for the validity of the exclusion restrictions with 2 tests for 
overidentification of instruments using LPM-version of my models—Sargan’s NR2 test and 
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Basmann’s test for weak instruments (Basmann, 1960).  These test results also are 
inconsistent.  For outpatient mental health care utilization, both tests indicate valid exclusion 
of the instruments for the primary beneficiaries and dependents, but not for spouses.  For 
outpatient substance abuse treatment utilization, both tests indicate valid exclusion of the 
instruments for the primary beneficiaries and spouses, but not for dependents.  Taken 
together, these tests suggest that I have identified good instruments for most (if not all) of my 
models.   
A final point to consider is whether I have chosen instruments that are truly exogenous.  
For example, an individual that expects large firms to offer better MH/SA coverage may self-
select into large firms so that they can obtain this coverage.  Under this scenario, the size of 
the firm in which the individual is employed is not exogenous.  Rather, the individual self-
selected into this firm size and their selection is based on unobserved characteristics that may 
also affect their health plan choice and MH/SA service use.  This argument could be made 
for each of my firm characteristics.  Therefore, as is sometimes the case with instruments 
chosen for IV estimation, even though the instruments pass the empirical specification tests 
they may not be ideal for use in my first stage estimation.  Correcting for selection at the 
level of the job or firm choice is beyond the scope of my estimation abilities given my 
dataset.  I do not observe individuals’ job searches or the choice set from which they made 
the job selection, and I do not have sociodemographic variables that would help explain this 
job choice but that are not related to the health insurance choice or to MH/SA service use.  
Therefore, as noted earlier, in the next chapter I focus my discussion on the results from the 
simple random effects model due to the suspected endogeneity of the chosen instruments for 
the IV estimation, although the IV estimation results are presented for comparison.   
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Table 3. Specification Tests for Outpatient Mental Health Care for Primary 
Beneficiary Sample 
Test Distribution DF
Test 
Statistic p-value Implication 
Breusch-Pagen, OLS 
versus error component 
Χ2 1 3232.27 <0.001 
Cannot accept ui 
equals zero.  Error 
components are 
significant.  Panel 
technique preferred 
Augmented Durbin-
Wu-Hausman test 
(Davidson and 
MacKinnon), 
endogeneity of health 
insurance 
characteristics 
Χ2 4 90.78 <0.001 
Health Insurance 
Characteristics are 
endogenous 
Tests of Instrument 
Strength:      
First Stage 
Outpatient In-
Network 
Coinsurance Rate 
F 5 16110.23 <0.001 Strong Instruments 
First Stage 
Outpatient Out-of-
Network 
Coinsurance Rate 
F 5 74409.40 <0.001 Strong Instruments 
First Stage Inpatient 
In-Network 
Coinsurance Rate 
F 5 1.9e+05 <0.001 Strong Instruments 
First-stage EAP 
Precertification 
Requirement  
Χ2 4 59055.26 <0.001 Strong Instruments 
Test for overidentifying 
restrictions:  
    
Sargan NR2 Test  
Basmann Test 
Χ2 
Χ2 
1 
1 
0.382 
0.382 
0.537 
0.537 
Instruments validly 
excluded from main 
equation 
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Table 4. Specification Tests for Outpatient Mental Health Care for Spouse Sample 
Test Distribution DF
Test 
Statistic p-value Implication 
Breusch-Pagen, OLS 
versus error component 
Χ2 1 1601.93 <0.001 Cannot accept ui 
equals zero.  Error 
components are 
significant.  Panel 
technique 
preferred 
Augmented Durbin-
Wu-Hausman test 
(Davidson and 
MacKinnon), 
endogeneity of health 
insurance 
characteristics 
Χ2 4 76.13 <0.001 Health Insurance 
Characteristics are 
endogenous 
Tests of Instrument 
Strength: 
     
First Stage 
Outpatient In-
Network 
Coinsurance Rate 
F 5 11315.40 <0.001 Strong Instruments 
First Stage 
Outpatient Out-of-
Network 
Coinsurance Rate 
F 5 40259.57 <0.001 Strong Instruments 
First Stage Inpatient 
In-Network 
Coinsurance Rate 
F 5 1.2e+05 <0.001 Strong Instruments 
First-stage EAP 
Precertification 
Requirement  
Χ2 4 6.2e+05 <0.001 Strong Instruments 
Test for overidentifying 
restrictions:  
    
Sargan NR2 Test  
Basmann Test 
Χ2 
Χ2 
1 
1 
5.729 
5.727 
0.017 
0.017 
Instruments are not 
validly excluded 
from main 
equation 
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Table 5. Specification Tests for Outpatient Mental Health Care for Dependent 
Sample 
Test Distribution DF
Test 
Statistic p-value Implication 
Breusch-Pagen, OLS 
versus error component 
Χ2 1 1791.14 <0.001 
Cannot accept ui 
equals zero.  Error 
components are 
significant.  Panel 
technique preferred 
Augmented Durbin-
Wu-Hausman test 
(Davidson and 
MacKinnon), 
endogeneity of health 
insurance 
characteristics 
Χ2 4 50.40 <0.001 
Health Insurance 
Characteristics are 
endogenous 
Tests of Instrument 
Strength:      
First Stage 
Outpatient In-
Network 
Coinsurance Rate 
F 5 6024.13 <0.001 Strong Instruments 
First Stage 
Outpatient Out-of-
Network 
Coinsurance Rate 
F 5 79566.07 <0.001 Strong Instruments 
First Stage Inpatient 
In-Network 
Coinsurance Rate 
F 5 1.5e+05 <0.001 Strong Instruments 
First-stage EAP 
Precertification 
Requirement  
Χ2 4 8.5e+05 <0.001 Strong Instruments 
Test for overidentifying  
restrictions:  
    
Sargan NR2 Test  
Basmann Test 
Χ2 
Χ2 
1 
1 
0.222 
0.222 
0.638 
0.638 
Instruments validly 
excluded from main 
equation 
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Table 6. Specification Tests for Outpatient Substance Use Care for Primary 
Beneficiary Sample 
Test Distribution DF
Test 
Statistic p-value Implication 
Breusch-Pagen, OLS 
versus error component 
Χ2 1 60.39 <0.001 
Cannot accept ui 
equals zero.  Error 
components are 
significant.  Panel 
technique preferred 
Augmented Durbin-
Wu-Hausman test 
(Davidson and 
MacKinnon), 
endogeneity of health 
insurance 
characteristics 
Χ2 4 18.97 <0.001 
Health Insurance 
Characteristics are 
endogenous 
Tests of Instrument 
Strength: 
     
First Stage 
Outpatient In-
Network 
Coinsurance Rate 
F 5 9369.71 <0.001 Strong Instruments 
First Stage 
Outpatient Out-of-
Network 
Coinsurance Rate 
F 5 62633.52 <0.001 Strong Instruments 
First Stage Inpatient 
In-Network 
Coinsurance Rate 
F 5 7.7e+05 <0.001 Strong Instruments 
First-stage EAP 
Precertification 
Requirement  
Χ2 4 59055.26 <0.001 Strong Instruments 
Test for overidentifying  
restrictions:  
    
Sargan NR2 Test  
Basmann Test 
Χ2 
Χ2 
1 
1 
3.316 
3.315 
0.069 
0.069 
Instruments validly 
excluded from main 
equation at 5% level 
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Table 7. Specification Tests for Outpatient Substance Use Care for Spouse Sample 
Test Distribution DF
Test 
Statistic p-value Implication 
Breusch-Pagen, OLS 
versus error component 
Χ2 1 23.77 <0.001 
Cannot accept ui 
equals zero.  Error 
components are 
significant.  Panel 
technique 
preferred 
Augmented Durbin-
Wu-Hausman test 
(Davidson and 
MacKinnon), 
endogeneity of health 
insurance 
characteristics 
Χ2 4 9.09 0.059 
Health Insurance 
Characteristics are 
exogenous at 5% 
level 
Tests of Instrument 
Strength: 
     
First Stage 
Outpatient In-
Network 
Coinsurance Rate 
F 5 5557.31 <0.001 Strong Instruments 
First Stage 
Outpatient Out-of-
Network 
Coinsurance Rate 
F 5 41080.69 <0.001 Strong Instruments 
First Stage Inpatient 
In-Network 
Coinsurance Rate 
F 5 5.3e+05 <0.001 Strong Instruments 
First-stage EAP 
Precertification 
Requirement  
Χ2 4 6.2e+05 <0.001 Strong Instruments 
Test for overidentifying  
restrictions:     
Sargan NR2 Test  
Basmann Test 
Χ2 
Χ2 
1 
1 
0.228 
0.228 
0.633 
0.633 
Instruments validly 
excluded from 
main equation 
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Table 8. Specification Tests for Outpatient Substance Use Care for Dependent Sample 
Test Distribution DF
Test 
Statistic p-value Implication 
Breusch-Pagen, OLS 
versus error component 
Χ2 1 46.14 <0.001 
Cannot accept ui 
equals zero.  Error 
components are 
significant.  Panel 
technique preferred 
Augmented Durbin-
Wu-Hausman test 
(Davidson and 
MacKinnon), 
endogeneity of health 
insurance 
characteristics 
Χ2 4 12.32 0.015 
Health Insurance 
Characteristics are 
endogenous 
Tests of Instrument 
Strength: 
     
First Stage 
Outpatient In-
Network 
Coinsurance Rate 
F 5 4778.77 <0.001 Strong Instruments 
First Stage 
Outpatient Out-of-
Network 
Coinsurance Rate 
F 5 37408.62 <0.001 Strong Instruments 
First Stage Inpatient 
In-Network 
Coinsurance Rate 
F 5 8.4e+05 <0.001 Strong Instruments 
First-stage EAP 
Precertification 
Requirement  
Χ2 4 8.5e+05 <0.001 Strong Instruments 
Test for overidentifying  
restrictions:  
    
Sargan NR2 Test  
Basmann Test 
Χ2 
Χ2 
1 
1 
8.430 
8.428 
0.004 
0.004 
Instruments are not 
validly excluded from 
main equation  
 
  
CHAPTER 4: DATA 
The primary data used in this study are private insurance enrollment and claims data 
for 1997-1998 from MEDSTAT’s Marketscan® claims database.  These files contain the 
basic enrollment data and service-level claims for inpatient and outpatient treatment of 
employees and retirees from participating large corporations and their dependents across the 
U.S.  Collectively, the data include individuals enrolled in 72 different health insurance 
plans.  These data are particularly good to study the effect of health insurance on utilization 
because they include detailed information on individuals’ health plan designs.  Furthermore, 
these data include limited information on all enrollees regardless of service use and therefore 
allow me to study the individual’s decision to access care as well as the decisions regarding 
the frequency of service use.   
Sample Selection 
The enrollment data for 1997 and 1998 include approximately 2.1 million individuals 
(see Table 9).  I exclude those individuals with less than one month enrollment in this period 
(n=126,865) and those for whom no plan information was collected by MEDSTAT.  This left 
a usable sample of 1,637,535 individuals.  Because the number of enrollees is considerable 
and computations performed on such a large quantity of data require extensive amounts of 
computer memory and time, I conducted my analyses on a subsample of the data.  I used 
Stata’s commands for sampling (StataCorp, 2004) to obtain a 10 percent simple random 
sample of individuals resulting in a dataset with 163,754 individuals.  Sampling was done on 
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the level of the individual so that once an individual was chosen all of his/her enrollment and 
claims data were extracted for both years of analysis.  
After taking the initial random sample, I conducted additional quality checks on the 
smaller dataset that were not possible with the initial data given its size, and I found some 
discrepancies in the data from one firm.  After discussing these discrepancies with 
MEDSTAT programmers familiar with these data, it was determined that these data did not 
meet the quality standards established by MEDSTAT and should not have been included in 
the original data.  Therefore, I excluded this firm’s observations from my analysis (n = 
20,685 individuals).  Based on the limited data that I had for these individuals, I examined 
whether their exclusion from my analyses would introduce bias in my results.  This 
examination included both statistical test comparisons on mean values of selected variables 
and conducting limited regression analyses with and without these observations.  Based on 
this examination, I concluded that the exclusion of these individuals would not bias my 
results.  My final analytic dataset includes 143,069 individuals employed in 12 firms and 
enrolled in 52 different medical plans.    
Using these data, I constructed a panel dataset with yearly individual observations for 
two years—the data time period is from January 1, 1997 through December 31, 1998.  Over 
this two-year study period, some individuals are observed to move in and out of health plan 
enrollment.  For example, an individual may be observed to be enrolled in a participating 
health plan for only 6 months of the two-year period.  This does not necessarily mean that the 
individual does not have health insurance during the unobserved time.  Instead, it indicates 
that the individual is not enrolled in any of the health plans that provided data for this period 
to MEDSTAT.   
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Table 9. Selection of Individuals for Analytic Sample 
 N 
Total Enrollment Data (individuals with plan end after Jan 01, 1997) 2,057,521 
Less individuals with no plan data provided 293,121 
Less Individuals with less than one month enrollment 126,865 
  
Initial Sample 1,637,535 
10% Sample (simple random sample) 163,754 
Less suspect data observations from one firm 20,685 
Final Analytic Sample 143,069 
Number of Employer Groups Represented 12 
Number of health plans represented 52 
 
Description of Health Plans 
The 52 health plans represented in the analytic dataset denote the health care coverage 
for employees (and their spouses and other dependents) working in companies across the 
United States.  Most of these companies are national corporations with employees located in 
numerous states, and therefore a health plan may have enrollees located across the U.S.  
Furthermore, a company may offer multiple plans and it is probable that several plans may be 
available to an individual within a company.  An examination of health plans and discussions 
with other researchers and MEDSTAT programmers revealed that the plans represented in 
my analytic dataset and the individuals they cover can be assembled into 12 employer 
groups.  Health plans within a single employer group represent the plans offered to 
employees working for the same corporation although not necessarily for the same 
immediate employer, at the same facility, or in the same location. 
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The primary variables of interest for my study are MH/SA coinsurance rates and 
whether precertification by an employee assistance program (EAP) is required prior to use of 
MH/SA services.  This information was obtained by MEDSTAT from the health plan 
informational booklets that are distributed to employees and supplemental information 
provided by the employer.  These characteristics may differ for in-network and out-of-
network services and therefore separate variables exist for in-network and out-of-network 
coinsurance rates.  Table 10 presents the MH/SA health plan characteristics for the 52 health 
plans organized by the 12 employer groups.  As shown, plans within the same employer 
group had little or no difference in insurance coverage for MH/SA services.  Across 
employer groups, outpatient in-network coinsurance rates ranged from 0 to 50 percent; that 
is, plans covered 50 to 100 percent of expenses.  Outpatient out-of-network coinsurance rates 
ranged from 50 percent to 100 percent (no coverage).  Similar ranges are found for inpatient 
coinsurance rates.  Some employers did not provide information on out-of-network 
coinsurance rates—meaning that these coinsurance rates were not mentioned in the plan 
booklet and no additional information was provided by the employer to MEDSTAT.  For my 
analysis, I took a conservative view and assumed that no mention of an out-of-network rate 
means that the plan does not cover out-of-network services which results in a coinsurance 
rate of 100 percent. This assumption was made for 6 of the 12 employer groups.  Discussions 
with MEDSTAT personnel and other researchers familiar with the MEDSTAT data support 
my conservative assumption of the coverage for out-of-network services; however, I analyze 
the effect of this assumption in my sensitivity analyses.  Specifically, I re-ran my analyses 
under a less conservative view and assumed that no mention of an out-of-network rate means 
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that the plan covers out-of-network services at the same level of cost-sharing as in-network 
services. The results of this analysis are reported in Chapter 5. 
Seventy-three percent of the health plans carved-out MH/SA services from general 
medical care (see Table 10).  This means that a separate network of providers and separate 
claims administrators provide MH/SA services.  Only 16 of the 52 plans (31 percent) 
required EAP precertification prior to use of MH/SA services.  For some employers, no 
information was provided on their EAP in the plan booklet (listed as “No Mention” in the 
table).  Based on conversations with MEDSTAT personnel, I determined that lack of data 
most likely means that an EAP, if available, played no role in the health plan coverage and its 
requirements.  Therefore, for those plans with no mention of an EAP requirement in their 
plan descriptions, I assumed that no EAP requirement existed.  Finally, Table 10 presents the 
calendar dates in which plans were offered by the employer groups and these data reveal that 
plan offerings varied within employer groups across the two years of data resulting in an 
unbalanced panel.   
Twenty-six health plans are represented in both years of my data, 10 plans are 
represented in 1997 only, and 16 plans are represented in 1998 only (see Table 11).  Looking 
at it from the employer group perspective, individuals from 7 employer groups are 
represented in both years, individuals from 2 employer groups are represented in 1997 only, 
and individuals from 3 employer groups are represented in 1998 only.  Thus, individuals may 
not be included in both years of the analysis either because they no longer work for a 
represented employer or because the employer did not provide data to MEDSTAT for that 
year. 
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Table 11. Plans Offered 
 N 
Number of health plans represented 52 
Number of employer groups 12 
Plans Offered:  
In both 1997 and 1998 26 
In 1997 only 10 
In 1998 only 16 
Employer Groups Represented:  
In both 1997 and 1998* 7 
In 1997 only* 2 
In 1998 only 3 
Number of plans with plan year from:  
January through December 44 
June through May 4 
July through June  4 
*One employer group had health plan offerings in both 1997 and 1998, however they did not 
provide utilization data for 1998 and therefore they are only included in 1997 only. 
 
Analytic Variables 
Dependent Variables 
For my different analyses, I created several dependent variables.  The dependent 
variables for the main analyses include four dichotomous variables equal to 1 if the 
individual was observed to use any of the following service types during period t: (1) 
outpatient MH care services; (2) inpatient MH care services; (3) outpatient SA treatment 
services; and (4) inpatient SA treatment services.  Similarly, I created separate count 
variables measuring the number of days in period t in which the individual received services 
for: (1) outpatient MH care; (2) inpatient MH care; (3) outpatient SA treatment; and (4) 
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inpatient SA treatment.  I chose days of service for my count variable instead of encounters 
because encounters are not consistently defined in health services literature and they may be 
inconsistent in representing the number of services, costs, or intensity.  Days may also be 
inconsistent, but they are easier to define and use of days can be found in previous health 
services literature. 
Identification of Service Encounter Type 
To create the dependent variables, I first identified the claims encounters as mental 
health care, substance abuse treatment, or general medical care (SAMHSA, 2003).  The 
variables used to identify encounters and their definitions from the Marketscan database are 
presented in Table A-1 in Appendix A located at the end of the report.  These variables 
include diagnosis codes (see Table A-2 in appendix A), procedure codes (Table A-3), service 
and provider types (Table A-4), and major diagnostic codes and diagnosis-related groups 
(Table A-5).   
Identification of the service encounter as either mental health or substance abuse was 
based on the primary reason for the encounter.  Using this method applies a more narrow 
identification criterion for a service encounter because it focuses on primary diagnoses and 
procedures rather than secondary ones.  However, this approach is advantageous because it is 
similar to the approaches applied in previous studies allowing for better comparison.  Plus, it 
allows me to assign copayment (including coinsurance) and deductible dollar amounts to the 
service encounters.  
The specific steps used in the identification process for outpatient service encounters 
are as follows.  First, I evaluated the primary diagnosis code (if available) for a given 
outpatient service encounter.  If the service encounter had a primary diagnosis code that was 
 79 
for a mental health condition then that outpatient service encounter was identified as a mental 
health encounter.  Similarly, if the primary diagnosis was for substance abuse condition then 
the outpatient service encounter was identified as a substance abuse treatment encounter.  If 
the primary diagnosis code was missing for the outpatient service encounter, then I evaluated 
the secondary diagnosis code (if present) and followed the same steps as described above for 
the primary diagnosis code.  If no diagnosis codes were reported for the outpatient service 
encounter, I evaluated the procedure codes.  If the primary procedure codes were missing, I 
used the secondary procedure codes.  If no procedure codes were reported for the outpatient 
service encounter, I used the service type, followed by the type of provider, and finally the 
major diagnostic code if all previous variables were missing. 
The steps used in the identification process for inpatient service encounters are similar 
to those used for outpatient service encounters with the follow exceptions.  Service types and 
provider types were not provided for inpatient service encounters, and therefore could not be 
used for identification.  If no diagnosis codes or procedure codes were reported for the 
inpatient service encounter, I used the major diagnostic code followed by the diagnosis-
related groups.  For both outpatient and inpatient service encounters, most encounters were 
identified using the diagnosis codes and procedure codes.  Few service encounters required 
identification using the other identification variables.  
Once all service encounters were identified, I summed encounters in a given day to 
create individual-level variables for days of mental health care, days of substance abuse 
treatment, and days of general medical care.  I then summed these days across the entire year 
to create the total days of mental health care, total days of substance abuse treatment, and 
total days of general medical care in period t by individual i.  Finally, separate dichotomous 
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variables were created equal to 1 if an individual had any use of these services and zero 
otherwise. 
Explanatory Variables 
MH/SA Coinsurance Rates  
The main explanatory variables of interest for my study are MH/SA coinsurance rates 
and EAP precertification requirements.  Coinsurance rates are the percentage of the service 
encounter costs that an individual pays after the deductible has been met.  Plans typically 
differentiated between in-network and out-of-network coinsurance rates and between 
inpatient and outpatient services, therefore I created 8 variables to represent coinsurance rates 
for MH/SA services which include: 
Outpatient Coinsurance Rates 
1. Coinsurance rate for In-Network MH Care 
2. Coinsurance rate for Out-of-Network MH Care 
3. Coinsurance rate for In-Network SA Treatment  
4. Coinsurance rate for Out-of-Network SA Treatment. 
Inpatient Coinsurance Rates 
1. Coinsurance rate for In-Network MH Care 
2. Coinsurance rate for Out-of-Network MH Care 
3. Coinsurance rate for In-Network SA Treatment  
4. Coinsurance rate for Out-of-Network SA Treatment. 
Outpatient coinsurance rates for MH/SA treatment services range between 0 and 75 
percent for in-network services and between 50 and 100 percent for out-of-network services.  
Inpatient coinsurance rates range between 0 and 50 percent for in-network services and 
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between 20 and 100 percent for out-of-network services.  All plans cover at least part of in-
network services, but some plans do not cover any of the costs for out-of-network service 
use.  Some plans allow use of services outside of the network but at penalty (i.e., higher 
coinsurance rates).  In other plans, no out-of-network service use is allowed which means 
that the individual must use a provider in the network or pay the full cost of the service.  In 
other words, the coinsurance rate for out-of-network services in these plans is 100 percent.  
Health plan coverage is extremely complex and, in addition to coinsurance, may 
include other cost control mechanisms such as limits on the annual number of MH/SA visits 
in the plan year or the total annual amount paid by the plan.  Once an individual reaches any 
of these limits their coinsurance rate effectively become 100 percent.  Furthermore, many 
plans had sliding scale coinsurance rates that increase as service use increases.  For example, 
in one plan, the outpatient MH coinsurance rate is 20 percent for the first 10 outpatient 
mental health visits and then rises to 50 percent for additional visits over 10 visits.  
Furthermore, over half of the plans have some type of annual limit on visits or dollars paid 
which effectively increases the coinsurance rate to 100 percent for visits over this annual 
limit.   
To allow for this variation due to plan limits, I created counter variables that calculated 
the cumulative number of MH and SA days used and the cumulative net payments made by 
the plan for the year.  Using these variables, I was able to assign an enrollee with a revised 
coinsurance rate if they had reached one of the limits imposed by the plan.  To create the 
variables of cumulative MH/SA service days or payment amounts, I had to make an 
assumption about how the plans counted visits and dollars towards their annual limits.  
MEDSTAT’s Marketscan® provided additional detailed documentation on plan descriptions 
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in their Research Databases User’s Guide and Database Dictionary (MEDSTAT, 2000).  For 
plans in which it was clearly indicated how annual limits were applied, I used the limits as 
indicated in adjusting the coinsurance rates.  However, for some of the plans, the descriptions 
of annual limits for MH/SA visits and/or dollars did not clearly indicate whether MH/SA 
treatment visits or dollars were summed together and jointly applied towards a combined 
MH/SA annual limit or if visits and payments for mental health were counted separately from 
substance abuse treatment. Therefore, I created two versions of the cumulative count 
variables—one set of variables in which MH/SA treatment visits and dollar amounts were 
summed jointly and applied towards combined annual MH/SA limits and another set of 
variables in which visits and dollar amounts were counted separately for MH and SA 
treatment and applied towards separate annual limits.  The difference in these two different 
methods for calculating cumulative days and dollar amounts was small and had a negligible 
effect on the adjustments to the coinsurance rates.  Therefore, I use the former method in my 
analyses in which number of visits and dollars paid are applied to a combined MH/SA limit.  
This is the more stringent limit and it seems reasonable to assume that insurance plans would 
apply the most stringent limits on service use, especially for MH/SA use.   
I followed the same method to create the variables for the outpatient out-of-network 
coinsurance rates and inpatient coinsurance rates for MH/SA.  For plans that did not allow 
out-of-network service use, the coinsurance rate was set to 100 percent.   
EAP Precertification Required 
Some health plans required that the individual receive precertification for a MH/SA 
service from an EAP.  Therefore, I created a dichotomous variable equal to1 if EAP pre-
certification is required for use of MH/SA services and zero otherwise.   
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Other Explanatory Variables 
In addition to the health insurance variables, I also include sociodemographic variables 
that may affect use of health care services.  These variables include individual-specific 
variables such as age, gender (equals 1 if male), household size, region of residence (i.e., 
northeast, south, west, and Midwest), total months of observed enrollment in period t, and 
any use of medical services.  In addition, I include variables specific to the primary 
beneficiary which describe the industry (set of dichotomous variables for manufacturing, 
service, and transportation) and employee type (set of dichotomous variables for salary, 
hourly, and other).  These variables are included in all regression models because they may 
help control for employment differences in lieu of income and specific job data which are 
unavailable.  
Descriptive Statistics for Samples Used in Analyses 
Primary Beneficiaries 
Tables 12 through 14 show the means of the dependent and explanatory variables as 
well as other selected characteristics for each of the samples—primary  beneficiaries, 
spouses, and other dependents.  Primary beneficiaries are predominantly middle-aged (42.7 
years) and male (57.9 percent).  A lesser percent of MH care users are male (41.7 percent) 
while SA treatment users are more likely to be male (68.8 percent).  Tables presenting means 
specific to users of MH care and SA treatment are located in Appendix B at the end of the 
report.  The majority of primary beneficiaries are married (54.5 percent) and most primary 
beneficiaries live in the Midwest (38.2 percent) and south (29 percent) and work in 
transportation industries (47.6 percent) or service industries (31.4 percent) as salaried 
employees (41.7 percent).  A greater percentage of MH care users are employed in service 
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industries (41.5 percent) and a greater percentage of SA treatment users are hourly (39.7 
percent). 
As shown in Table 13, coinsurance rates did not differ much between MH care and SA 
treatment services with an average outpatient in-network MH coinsurance rate of 9.7 percent 
and an average outpatient in-network SA coinsurance rate of about 8.3 percent.  One average, 
individuals were significantly penalized for using out-of-network services.  The average 
outpatient out-of-network MH coinsurance rate was 79 percent and the average outpatient 
out-of-network SA coinsurance rate was 80 percent.  Approximately 24 percent of the sample 
belonged to a plan that required EAP precertication prior to MH/SA service use.   
Finally, Table 14 shows the mean MH/SA utilization for primary beneficiaries.  
Approximately 7 percent of primary beneficiaries used outpatient MH care compared to 69 
percent who used general outpatient medical services.  Thus, MH care utilization is not a 
common occurrence in this sample.  SA treatment utilization is also not common with only 
0.3 percent of the sample using these services.  Among these users, utilization of alcohol 
treatment services is more common than other drug treatment.  These prevalence rates are 
similar to other studies of employed and insured populations.  The mean number of days of 
outpatient MH care among MH users is about 8.9 days.  The mean number of days of 
outpatient SA treatment is 6.5 days.  
Not surprisingly, I found that primary beneficiaries are much less likely to use inpatient 
services.  Approximately 0.2 percent and 0.1 percent of the full sample used inpatient MH 
care and SA treatment, respectively.  Considering users only, inpatient care is more common 
among SA treatment users (16.7 percent) than MH care users (2.7 percent).   
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Spouses 
Similar to primary beneficiaries, spouses are predominantly middle-aged (44.7 years).  
Most spouses are female (67 percent).  However, this pattern flips for SA treatment users 
who are mostly male (65.1 percent) in the spouse sample.  This reveals an interesting pattern 
between MH care users and SA treatment users with a greater percentage of MH users being 
female compared to SA treatment users in which a greater percentage are male.   
By definition, I expect spouses overwhelmingly to be married and this holds in my data 
with about 94 percent of the spouse sample being married.  The remaining 6 percent are 
mostly widows. Forty-three percent of spouses live in the Midwest.  The northeast (10 
percent) and west (12 percent) regions are less common.  The majority of spouses have plans 
associated with primary beneficiaries in the transportation industry (44.3 percent) as salaried 
employees (47.9 percent).   
Spouses’ coinsurance rates are very similar to those reported for primary beneficiaries.  
Approximately 19 percent of the spouse sample belonged to a plan that required EAP 
precertification prior to service use.  Unlike the primary beneficiary sample, this percentage 
is similar for MH care users and SA treatment users.   
Approximately 6 percent of spouses used outpatient mental health, and 0.3 percent of 
spouses used SA treatment.  The mean number of days of outpatient MH care among MH 
users is 8.1 days.  The mean number of days of outpatient SA treatment is 5.7 days.  
Approximately 0.2 percent and 0.1 percent of the full spouse sample used inpatient MH care 
and SA treatment, respectively, which are the same prevalence rates observed in the primary 
beneficiary sample.  Again, inpatient care was more common among SA treatment users 
(16.6 percent) than among MH care users (2.9 percent) 
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Dependents 
Other Dependents are fairly evenly split by gender with 51.6 percent being male.  The 
average age is 12 years and ranges from newborns to past college-aged.  However, most 
(over 95 percent) are 17 years and younger and live in households of about 4 people.  Unlike 
primary beneficiaries and spouses, MH care users as well as SA treatment users are 
predominantly male in the dependent sample (56.1 percent and 72.1 percent).  MH care users 
and SA treatment users also are slightly older than the full sample with mean ages of 14.9 
years for MH care users and 18.7 years for SA treatment users.  The majority of dependents 
live in the Midwest (42.9 percent) with a salaried primary beneficiary (50.7 percent) who 
works in transportation (46.2 percent).  
Dependents’ mean coinsurance rates are very similar to both primary beneficiaries and 
spouses.  Approximately 22 percent of dependents belong to a plan that requires EAP 
precertification prior to MH/SA service use.   
Approximately 5 percent and 0.3 percent of dependents used outpatient MH care and 
outpatient SA treatment, respectively.  The mean number of outpatient MH care days among 
MH users is 7.1 days and the mean number of outpatient SA treatment days among SA users 
is 5.1 days.  Approximately 5.1 percent of MH care users used inpatient MH care and 14.5 
percent of SA treatment users used inpatient SA treatment.  
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Table 10. Health Plan Benefits Specific to MH/SA Use 
     MH Coinsurance Rates SA Coinsurance Rates 
 Dates Plan Offered  In-network Out-of-network In-network Out-of-network 
 From  To 
Is MH/SA 
Coverage 
Carved 
Out? EAP Status OP IP OP IP 
O
P IP OP IP 
Group 1             
1A Jan-93 Dec-98 Carve-out Available 20 20 100 100 20 20 100 100 
1B Jan-95 Dec-98 Carve-out Available 0 10 100 100 0 10 100 100 
1C Jan-95 Dec-98 Carve-out Available 0 10 100 100 0 10 100 100 
1D Jan-96 Dec-98 Carve-out Available 0 10 100 100 0 10 100 100 
Group 2             
2A Jan-97 Aug-97 Carve-in No Mention 50 0 100 20 10 0 100 20 
2B Jan-97 Aug-97 Carve-in No Mention 50 0 100 20 10 0 100 20 
2C Sep-97 Dec-97 Carve-in No Mention 50 0 100 20 10 0 100 20 
2D Sep-97 Dec-97 Carve-in No Mention 50 0 100 20 10 0 100 20 
Group 3             
3A Nov-96 May-97 Carve-out Required 0 0 50 50 0 0 50 50 
3B Nov-96 May-97 Carve-out Required 0 0 50 50 0 0 50 50 
3C Jun-97 Dec-98 Carve-out Required 0 0 50 50 0 0 50 50 
3D Jun-97 Dec-98 Carve-out Required 0 0 50 50 0 0 50 50 
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Table 10. Continued 
     MH Coinsurance Rates SA Coinsurance Rates 
 Dates Plan Offered  In-network Out-of-network In-network Out-of-network 
 FROM  TO 
Is MH/SA 
Coverage 
Carved 
Out? EAP Status OP IP OP IP OP IP OP IP 
Group 4             
4A Jan-95 Dec-98 Carve-out Available 20 20 50 50 20 50 100 100 
4B Jan-95 Dec-98 Carve-out Available 20 20 50 50 20 50 100 100 
4C Jan-95 Dec-98 Carve-out Available 20 20 50 50 20 50 100 100 
4D Jan-95 Dec-98 Carve-out Available 20 20 50 50 20 50 100 100 
4E Jan-95 Dec-98 Carve-out Available 20 20 50 50 20 50 100 100 
Group 5             
5A Jan-98 Dec-98 Carve-out Required 20 0 100 100 20 0 100 100 
Group 6             
6A Jan-97 Dec-98 Carve-out Available 20 20 100 100 20 20 100 100 
6B Jan-97 Dec-98 Carve-out Available 20 20 100 100 20 20 100 100 
6C Jan-97 Dec-98 Carve-out Available 20 20 100 100 20 20 100 100 
6D Jan-97 Dec-98 Carve-out Available 20 20 100 100 20 20 100 100 
6E Jan-97 Dec-98 Carve-out Available 20 20 100 100 20 20 100 100 
6F Jan-98 Dec-98 Carve-out Required 20 20 100 100 20 20 100 100 
6G Jan-98 Dec-98 Carve-out Required 20 20 100 100 20 20 100 100 
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Table 10. Continued 
     MH Coinsurance Rates SA Coinsurance Rates 
 Dates Plan Offered  In-network Out-of-network In-network Out-of-network 
 FROM  TO 
Is MH/SA 
Coverage 
Carved 
Out? EAP Status OP IP OP IP OP IP OP IP 
6H Jan-98 Dec-98 Carve-out Required 20 20 100 100 20 20 100 100 
6I Jan-98 Dec-98 Carve-out Required 20 20 100 100 20 20 100 100 
6J Jan-98 Dec-98 Carve-out Required 20 20 100 100 20 20 100 100 
Group 7             
7A Jan-98 Dec-98 Carve-in No Mention 10 10 100 100 10 10 100 100 
7B Jan-98 Dec-98 Carve-in No Mention 20 20 100 100 20 20 100 100 
7C Jan-98 Dec-98 Carve-in No Mention 20 20 100 100 20 20 100 100 
Group 8             
8A Jan-97 Dec-98 Carve-out Available 0 0 50 100 50 0 100 100 
8B Jan-97 Dec-98 Carve-out Available 0 0 50 100 50 0 100 100 
8C Jan-97 Dec-98 Carve-out Available 0 0 50 100 50 0 100 100 
Group 9             
9A Jan-98 Dec-98 Carve-out No Mention 0 0 50 50 0 0 50 50 
9B Jan-98 Dec-98 Carve-out No Mention 0 0 50 50 0 0 50 50 
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Table 10. Continued 
     MH Coinsurance Rates SA Coinsurance Rates 
 Dates Plan Offered  In-network Out-of-network In-network Out-of-network 
 From  To 
Is MH/SA 
Coverage 
Carved 
Out? EAP Status OP IP OP IP OP IP OP IP 
9C Jan-98 Dec-98 Carve-out No Mention 0 0 50 50 0 0 50 50 
9D Jan-98 Dec-98 Carve-out No Mention 0 0 50 50 0 0 50 50 
9E Jan-98 Dec-98 Carve-out No Mention 0 0 50 50 0 0 50 50 
Group 10             
10A Jul-90 Dec-98 Carve-in No Mention 10 0 100 100 10 0 100 100 
10B Jul-90 Dec-98 Carve-in No Mention 10 0 100 100 10 0 100 100 
10C Jul-90 Dec-98 Carve-in No Mention 10 0 100 100 10 0 100 100 
10D Jul-90 Dec-98 Carve-in No Mention 10 0 100 100 10 0 100 100 
Group 11             
11A Jan-96 Dec-98 Carve-in Available 0 10 50 50 0 10 50 50 
11B Jan-98 Dec-98 Carve-in Available 0 10 50 50 0 10 50 50 
11C Jan-98 Dec-98 Carve-in Available 0 10 50 50 0 10 50 50 
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Table 10. Continued 
     MH Coinsurance Rates SA Coinsurance Rates 
 Dates Plan Offered  In-network Out-of-network In-network Out-of-network 
 FROM  TO 
Is MH/SA 
Coverage 
Carved 
Out? 
EAP 
Status OP IP OP IP OP IP OP IP 
Group 12             
12A Jan-97 Dec-97 Carve-out Required 0 10 100 100 0 10 100 100 
12B Jan-97 Dec-98 Carve-out Required 0 10 100 100 0 10 100 100 
12D Jan-97 Dec-97 Carve-out Required 0 10 100 100 0 10 100 100 
12E Jan-97 Dec-97 Carve-out Required 0 10 100 100 0 10 100 100 
12F Jan-97 Dec-98 Carve-out Required 0 10 100 100 0 10 100 100 
12G Jan-97 Dec-97 Carve-out Required 0 10 100 100 0 10 100 100 
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Table 12. Mean Sociodemographic Characteristics 
 Mean 
(standard deviation) 
Variable 
Primary 
Beneficiaries Spouses 
Other 
Dependents 
Number of Observations 100,398 55,906 78,794 
Number Unique Individuals 58,842 32,451 46,262 
    
Male (proportion) 0.579 0.326 0.516 
 (0.494) (0.469) (0.500) 
    
Age (years) 42.673 44.714 12.023 
 (11.680) (10.102) (7.175) 
    
Not Married (proportion) 0.454 0.055 1.000 
 (0.498) (0.227) (0.000) 
    
Household Size (# persons) 2.449 3.296 4.293 
 (1.457) (1.227) (1.251) 
    
Lives in (proportion)    
Northeast 0.112 0.100 0.105 
 (0.315) (0.301) (0.306) 
    
South 0.289 0.262 0.276 
 (0.453) (0.440) (0.447) 
    
Midwest 0.381 0.434 0.429 
 (0.486) (0.496) (0.495) 
    
West 0.120 0.098 0.100 
 (0.324) (0.298) (0.300) 
    
Region Unknown 0.098 0.104 0.090 
 (0.298) (0.306) (0.286) 
Employment Characteristics of 
Primary Beneficiary    
Employee Type (proportion)    
Salary  0.417 0.479 0.507 
 (0.493) (0.500) (0.500) 
    
Hourly  0.361 0.286 0.312 
 (0.480) (0.452) (0.463) 
    
Other Status  0.222 0.235 0.181 
 (0.416) (0.424) (0.442) 
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Table 12. Continued 
Mean 
(standard deviation) 
Variable 
Primary 
Beneficiaries Spouses 
Other 
Dependents 
Industry of Primary 
Beneficiary (proportion)    
    
Manufacturing 0.211 0.217 0.209 
 (0.408) (0.412) (0.407) 
    
Transportation 0.478 0.443 0.462 
 (0.500) (0.497) (0.499) 
    
Service 0.311 0.340 0.329 
  (0.463) (0.474) (0.470) 
 
  94
Table 13. Mean MH/SA Insurance Characteristics 
Mean 
(standard deviation) 
Variable 
Primary 
Beneficiaries Spouses 
Other 
Dependents 
Number of Observations 100,398 55,906 78,794 
Number Unique Individuals 58,842 32,451 46,262 
    
Coinsurance Rates for MH Visit    
Outpatient In-network 9.725 9.258 8.716 
 (12.603) (12.900) (9.529) 
    
Inpatient In-network 7.454 5.927 7.373 
 (8.378) (7.944) (8.514) 
    
Outpatient Out-of-Network  78.997 77.046 79.903 
 (24.954) (25.289) (24.847) 
    
Inpatient Out-of-Network  75.742 73.526 80.024 
 (27.324) (27.666) (25.078) 
    
Coinsurance Rates for SA Visit    
Outpatient In-network 8.330 7.874 9.105 
 (9.688) (9.861) (9.926) 
    
Inpatient In-network 7.932 6.430 7.955 
 (9.814) (9.598) (10.211) 
    
Outpatient Out-of-Network  80.419 78.860 81.743 
 (24.699) (25.089) (24.418) 
    
Inpatient Out-of-Network  76.539 74.365 80.993 
 (27.291) (27.698) (24.864) 
    
EAP Precertification Required 
(proportion) 0.244 0.194 0.223 
 (0.429) (0.395) (0.416) 
    
Total months enrolled in year 10.657 10.826 10.720 
 (2.751) (2.581) (2.686) 
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Table 14. Mean Utilization Characteristics  
 Mean 
 (standard deviation) 
Variable 
All Primary 
Beneficiaries Spouses 
Other 
Dependents 
Number of Observations 100,398 55,906 78,794 
Number Unique Individuals 58,842 32,451 46,262 
    
Outpatient Services    
Proportion of Users with:    
At least one day of outpatient SA 
services 0.003 0.003 0.003 
 (0.059) (0.053) (0.056) 
    
At least one day of outpatient MH 
services 0.072 0.062 0.051 
 (0.259) (0.241) (0.221) 
    
At least one day of outpatient medical 
services 0.692 0.693 0.642 
 (0.462) (0.461) (0.479) 
    
Total Annual Days of Use  
(conditional on use)     
Outpatient MH  Services 8.890 8.108 7.113 
 (11.183) (10.637) (9.069) 
    
Outpatient SA Services 6.499 5.684 5.141 
 (9.614) (8.708) (7.003) 
    
Outpatient Medical Services 7.664 7.652 4.810 
 (9.835) (9.779) (6.258) 
Inpatient Services     
Proportion of Users with:    
At least one day of inpatient SA 
services 0.001 0.001 0.0004 
 (0.025) (0.022) (0.022) 
    
At least one day of inpatient MH 
services 0.002 0.002 0.003 
 (0.044) (0.043) (0.052) 
    
At least one day of inpatient medical 
services 0.058 0.070 0.040 
 (0.234) (0.256) (0.195) 
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Table 14. Continued 
Mean 
(standard deviation) 
Variable 
All Primary 
Beneficiaries Spouses 
Other 
Dependents 
Total Annual Days of Use  
(conditional on use)    
    
Inpatient MH Services 5.905 4.363 6.019 
 (7.902) (4.884) (8.093) 
    
Inpatient SA Services 2.656 2.321 3.395 
 (2.732) (1.657) (5.679) 
    
Inpatient Medical Services 3.730 3.038 2.909 
 (7.897) (5.091) (5.078) 
 
 
  
CHAPTER 5: RESULTS 
In this chapter I present the main results of my analyses that examine the effect of 
health insurance characteristics on the utilization of mental health (MH) care and substance 
abuse (SA) treatment for primary beneficiaries, their spouses, and other dependents.  Overall, 
my econometric models show that individuals are responsive to at least some of the MH/SA 
health insurance characteristics for outpatient MH care utilization, but these health insurance 
characteristics have less effect on SA treatment decisions and no effect on inpatient MH care 
utilization.  Comparing results across the different samples, my models show that the effect 
of MH/SA health insurance characteristics varies for individuals by their relationship to the 
health plan (i.e., primary beneficiary versus spouse or other dependent).  Primary 
beneficiaries are found to be more responsive to these characteristics than spouses and other 
dependents.  Furthermore, when significant, the requirement of EAP precertification always 
has a negative effect on use.  Thus, unlike other studies which find that use of an EAP 
increases MH/SA utilization (e.g., Zarkin, Bray, and Qi, 2000; Deitz, Cook, and Hersch, 
2005), I find that required EAP involvement decreases MH/SA utilization in the formal 
health care system.   
The chapter is divided by service type.  In the first section, I provide detailed results of 
my analyses for outpatient MH care.  The remaining sections of this chapter present the 
parallel analysis findings for (2) outpatient SA treatment, (3) inpatient MH care, and (4) 
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inpatient SA treatment.  At the end of the chapter, I provide a brief summary and comparison 
of results across the three samples.   
Regression results are presented in Tables 21 through 32 (located at the end of this 
chapter) and include estimated coefficients from the standard random effects (RE) estimation 
(without instrumented health insurance characteristics) and the instrumental variable random 
effects (RE-IV) estimation models.  The results from the two models are similar suggesting 
that self-selection bias for MH/SA coverage may not be a major concern for these data.  In 
each table, the first two columns present the parameter estimates from the standard RE 
estimation of any use (logit model) and the number of days of use (negative binomial model).  
The second two columns present the parameter estimates for the RE-IV estimation.   
For the logit analysis, each parameter estimate measures the change in the log odds 
ratio for a change of one unit in the explanatory variable (Hosmer and Lemeshow, 1989).  
The log odds ratio is defined as the ratio of the log odds for 2 groups—one group in which 
the event occurs and one group in which the event does not occur.  For dichotomous 
variables, a more intuitive interpretation is either the adjusted odds ratio, which is simply 
derived by exponentiating the parameter coefficient, or the adjusted relative risk ratio.  As 
noted by Kleinman and Norton (working paper), the adjusted odds ratio is often 
misunderstood in interpretations of the effect of dichotomous explanatory variables and 
adjusted risk ratios and risk differences provide more intuitive measures of effect.  Therefore, 
in my discussion of results, I present adjusted risk ratios in lieu of odds ratios for key 
dichotomous explanatory variables including EAP precertification, gender, and marital 
status.  These adjusted risk ratios are shown in separate tables located within the chapter and 
are calculated using Stata programming developed by Kleinman and Norton.   
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For the negative binomial estimation, the parameter estimate measures the percent 
change in the mean of the outcome (days of service use) given a unit change in the 
explanatory variable. 
Outpatient Mental Health Care 
Effect of Coinsurance Rates 
In each of my analyses the individual’s level of cost-sharing for MH/SA care is 
represented by three coinsurance variables.  The main cost-sharing variables for the 
outpatient MH care services are the outpatient in-network coinsurance rate and the outpatient 
out-of-network coinsurance rate which measure the percentage of the service cost that the 
individual must pay for in-network and out-of-network services.  A higher coinsurance rate 
means that the individual incurs a higher cost for using the service.  Based on economic 
theory and all else equal, I expect that individuals with greater outpatient coinsurance rates 
will have a smaller likelihood of using outpatient MH care services.   
As shown in Table 21, the likelihood that a primary beneficiary uses any outpatient  
MH care significantly decreases as the outpatient in-network coinsurance rate increases; that 
is, as the individual’s expected out-of-pocket expense increases.  The coefficient on the 
outpatient in-network coinsurance rate for primary beneficiaries is –0.009 (p<0.01).  This 
translates into a marginal effect of about –0.0003 which means a 1-percentage point increase 
in the outpatient in-network coinsurance rate is associated with a 0.03 percentage point 
decrease in the probability of using outpatient MH care among primary beneficiaries.  This a 
very small effect and, given that a 1-percentage point change in the coinsurance rate is highly 
unlikely, it may be more intuitive to examine a 10-percentage point change on the likelihood 
of MH care utilization, especially since coinsurance rates typically occur in 10-percent  
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Table 15. Incremental Effects of Changes in Coinsurance Rates for Outpatient Mental 
Health Care  
Sample 
Incremental  
Effect for  
Any Use 
(standard 
deviations) 
Incremental 
Effect for Level 
of Use 
(standard 
deviations) 
Total 
Incremental 
Effectb 
(standard 
deviations) 
Outpatient In-network Rate  
(change from 10% to 20%) 
   
Primary Beneficiaries –0.003*** 
(0.002) 
0.024 
(4.98e-08) 
–0.004 
(0.003) 
Spouses -----a -----a -----a 
Other Dependents -----a -----a -----a 
Outpatient Out-of-network Rate 
(change from 50% to 100%) 
  
Primary Beneficiaries 0.013*** 
(0.010) 
0.130 
(5.08e-08) 
0.031 
(0.020) 
Spouses 0.003 
(0.002) 
0.319*** 
(4.24e-08) 
0.018 
(0.008) 
Primary Beneficiaries –0.003*** 
(0.002) 
0.024 
(4.98e-08) 
–0.004 
(0.003) 
Spouses -----a -----a -----a 
Other Dependents -----a -----a -----a 
Inpatient Rate  
(change from 10% to 20%) 
   
Primary Beneficiaries –0.006*** 
(0.005) 
–0.205*** 
(4.04e-08) 
–0.022 
(0.014) 
Spouses -----a –0.119 –0.117 
Other Dependents –0.003*** 
(0.003) 
–0.222*** 
(2.74e-08) 
0.002 
(0.001) 
***Indicates associated estimated coefficient is statistically significant at the 1% level in 
regression equation. 
aCoefficients are not statistically different from zero in either equation. 
bStatistical significance was not evaluated for total effects. 
 
intervals such as 10%, 20%, and 50%. Because 10% and 20% coinsurance rates for in-
network services are two of the most common rates in my data, I focus on changes between 
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these two rates for my examination of the in-network coinsurance rates.  All else equal, what 
is the incremental effect of changing from 10% coinsurance to 20% coinsurance?  In other 
words, what is the difference in the Prob(Yi =1 | rate = 20) and Prob(Yi =1 | rate = 10)?  This 
difference can be calculated by taking the difference in the predicted probability under the 
20% coinsurance scenario and the predicted probability under the 10% coinsurance scenario.  
For primary beneficiaries, this incremental effect is –0.003 (see Table 15); that is, increasing 
the outpatient in-network coinsurance rate from 10% to 20% is associated with a 0.3 
percentage point (approximately 8 percent) decrease in the probability of outpatient MH care 
use, which is still a very small effect even for a 10-percentage point change.  
The incremental effect of changing from 10% coinsurance to 20% coinsurance on the 
days of outpatient MH care for primary beneficiaries is not statistically significant from zero.  
Thus, it appears that for primary beneficiaries the outpatient in-network coinsurance rate is 
more likely to affect the initial decision to seek care rather than the extent of care once 
treatment is sought.  Unlike primary beneficiaries, the outpatient in-network coinsurance rate 
does not have any significant effect on either the likelihood of outpatient MH care or on the 
number of days of MH care for either spouses or other dependents 
The outpatient out-of-network coinsurance rate does not have a significant effect on the 
probability of any outpatient MH care utilization for either spouses or other dependents (see 
Tables 22 through 23).  For primary beneficiaries the probability of using outpatient MH care 
increases as the outpatient out-of-network coinsurance rate increases.  This finding is 
contrary to my expectations that higher out-of-pocket expense will be associated with lower 
likelihood of use.  However, the marginal effect (ME) of the outpatient out-of-network 
coinsurance rate is extremely small (ME ≈ 0.0003) indicating that a 1-percentage point 
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increase in the outpatient out-of-network coinsurance rate is associated with a 0.03 
percentage point increase in likelihood of use.  Thinking in terms of more realistic rate 
changes, a change in the outpatient out-of-network coinsurance rate from 50% to 100% (no 
coverage) is associated with an 0.013 percentage point increase in the probability of using 
MH care among primary beneficiaries (a 53 percent increase).  
The outpatient out-of-network coinsurance rate does not have a significant effect on 
days of outpatient MH care for primary beneficiaries.  However, the outpatient out-of-
network coinsurance rate does have a significant effect on days of outpatient MH care for 
spouses.  The estimated coefficient is 0.006 (p<0.01) which implies that a change in the 
outpatient out-of-network coinsurance rate from 50% to 100% is associated with an increase 
of 0.319 days of outpatient MH care (a 35 percent increase) among spouses.   
The unexpected positive association between the level of cost-sharing for out-of-
network services and outpatient MH demand may be capturing a cross-price effect between 
in-network and out-of-network outpatient services rather than an own-price effect.  This 
finding suggests that these two types of services may be substitutes.  As the individual’s level 
of cost-sharing for out-of-network outpatient MH services increases relative to the in-
network service, individuals may substitute out-of-network care for in-network care. 
Unfortunately, my data do not contain information on whether the service was received by 
in-network or out-of-network providers so I am unable to the formally test this hypothesis.     
As discussed earlier, I included inpatient coinsurance rates in the outpatient models to 
capture the cross-price effect of inpatient MH care which I hypothesized might be a 
substitute for outpatient care.  If they are substitutes, then I would expect that as the level of 
cost-sharing for inpatient care increases relative to outpatient care, an individual will choose 
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to use outpatient care in lieu of inpatient care. If this hypothesis is true, then I would expect a 
positive coefficient for the inpatient coinsurance rate.  However, I find that the inpatient 
coinsurance rate is negatively associated with outpatient MH care utilization.   
The estimated coefficient for primary beneficiaries is –0.025 (p<0.01) for the 
probability of any outpatient MH care utilization.  This translates into a marginal effect of –
0.0008 which implies that a 1-percentage point increase in the inpatient coinsurance rate is 
associated with a 0.08 percentage point decrease in the probability of any MH care 
utilization.  Again, examining a more intuitive 10-percentage point change on the likelihood 
of MH care utilization, I find that the incremental effect of changing the inpatient 
coinsurance rate from 10% to 20% is –0.006 which means that increasing the inpatient 
coinsurance rate is associated with a 22 percent decrease (0.6 percentage points) in the 
probability of any outpatient MH care.  I also found a negative and significant association 
between the inpatient coinsurance rate and days of outpatient MH care among primary 
beneficiaries.  The incremental effect of changing from 10% coinsurance to 20% coinsurance 
on the days of outpatient MH care use for primary beneficiaries is –0.205 which means that 
increasing the outpatient out-of-network coinsurance rate from 10% to 20% is associated 
with a decrease of 0.205 days of use (a 20 percent decline). 
I found nearly the same effect for the inpatient coinsurance rate on outpatient MH 
care utilization among other dependents.  The estimated inpatient coinsurance rate coefficient 
for other dependents is –0.017 (p<0.01) for the probability of any outpatient MH care.  This 
translates into an incremental effect of changing the inpatient coinsurance rate from 10% to 
20% coinsurance of –0.003.  Thus, increasing the inpatient coinsurance rate from 10% to 
20% is associated with a 15 percent decrease (0.3 percentage points) in the probability of any 
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outpatient MH care among other dependents.  The incremental effect of changing from 10% 
coinsurance to 20% coinsurance on the days of outpatient MH care for dependents is –0.230 
which means that increasing the inpatient coinsurance rate is associated with a decrease of 
0.230 days of outpatient MH care (a 23 percent decline). 
Finally, I did not find a significant association between the probability of any 
outpatient MH care and the inpatient coinsurance rate for spouses.  However, I did find a 
negative and significant association between the inpatient coinsurance rate and days of 
outpatient MH care.  The estimated incremental effect associated with changing from 10% to 
20% for inpatient coinsurance is –0.200.  Thus, increasing the inpatient coinsurance rate from 
10% to 20% is associated with a decrease of 0.2 days of outpatient MH care (a 20 percent 
decline) among spouses. 
Effect of EAP Precertification Requirement   
The effect of requiring EAP precertification prior to using services significantly 
decreases the probability that individuals will use any outpatient MH care services.  
Furthermore, for spouses only, EAP precertification also has a negative effect on the number 
of days of outpatient MH care.  The interpretation of this EAP effect is not straightforward.  
On the one hand, EAP precertification, rather than facilitating treatment, may create an 
obstacle to treatment and discourage utilization.  On the other hand, EAP precertification 
may decrease utilization through the formal health care system by providing employees’ and 
their dependents with some MH services.  Individuals with milder conditions may receive an 
adequate dose of services through the EAP and, therefore, not need additional services.   
The estimated parameter coefficients on EAP precertification range from –0.254 
(Spouses) to –0.393 (Primary Beneficiaries) and all are statistically significant at the 1 
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percent level.  For ease of interpretation, I present the adjusted risk ratios (ARRs) and 
adjusted risk differences (ARDs) calculated from these parameter coefficients (see Table 16).  
The estimated ARR indicates that primary beneficiaries without an EAP requirement are 1.4 
times more likely to use outpatient mental health care services (1/ARR = 1.4) than primary 
beneficiaries with an EAP requirement.  Using both the ARR and ARD results, I 
mathematically derived probabilities for these 2 groups.  The probability of outpatient MH 
care use for those with an EAP requirement is approximately 5.6 percent and the probability 
of use for those without an EAP requirement is approximately 7.7 percent (yielding ARD= 
Risk Exposed  – Risk Unexposed = –2.14 percentage points).  A 2-percentage point 
difference in MH care utilization between these two groups may not seem large, but it 
indicates that having an EAP requirement is associated with a 28 percent decrease in the 
probability of outpatient MH care use among primary beneficiaries.   
For spouses, the effect of an EAP requirement is also significant and sizeable, although 
not quite as sizeable as the effect found for primary beneficiaries.  Given that spouses should 
not face workplace stigma for using the EAP (unless they are afraid that their spouse who is 
the primary policyholder will be stigmatized), this finding may suggest the “help factor” of 
EAPs for spouses.  Those spouses who are required to contact the EAP for preauthorization 
of services may receive limited treatment services from the EAP, thereby lowering their need 
of services through the formal treatment system. Spouses without an EAP requirement are 
1.3 times more likely to use outpatient MH care services than spouses with an EAP 
requirement (1/ARR = 1.3).  The probability of use for those spouses not facing an EAP 
requirement is approximately 5 percent and the probability of use for those with an EAP 
requirement is approximately 6.5 percent, which means that, all else equal, an EAP 
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requirement is associated with a 21 percent decrease in probability of outpatient MH care use 
among spouses.   
In addition, spouses are the only sample for which the EAP requirement affects the 
number of days of outpatient MH care use.  The negative binomial coefficient for having an 
EAP requirement is –0.199 (see Table 22) which when converted into an incidence rate ratio 
(IRR) of 0.820 (IRR = exp(β)) implies that having an EAP requirement decreases the 
expected number of days of outpatient MH care by a factor of 0.820.  An even better way to 
interpret the effects of the EAP requirement is in terms of the percent change in the IRR 
which is –18.03 percent (Percent Change in IRR = (IRR – 1)×100).  Thus, an EAP 
precertification requirement decreases the expected number of days of outpatient MH care 
for spouses by about 18 percent.   
The size of the effect of an EAP requirement for other dependents lies between primary 
beneficiaries and spouses.  Dependent’s ARR is 0.678 indicating that the probability of MH 
care use for other dependents with an EAP requirement is 0.678 times the likelihood of use 
for those without an EAP requirement.  An EAP requirement decreases the probability of use 
among other dependents by 32 percent; from about 5.5 percent for dependents without an 
EAP requirement to 3.7 percent for dependents with an EAP requirement.   
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Table 16. Selected Adjusted Risk Ratios (ARR) for Outpatient MH Use 
 
ARR  
(standard 
error) 
Risk if 
Exposed 
(%; RE)a 
Risk if 
not 
Exposed 
(%; RU)b 
Adjusted Risk 
Difference  
(% points; 
RE-RU) 
Percent 
Change 
(base = RU) 
Primary Beneficiaries      
EAP Required 0.722 
(0.023) 
5.55 7.69 –2.14 -27.83% 
Used Outpatient  
Medical Services 
3.032 
(0.038) 8.75 2.89 5.87 203.21% 
Male 0.704 (0.013) 5.98 8.50 –2.52 –29.62% 
Not Married 1.321 (0.027) 8.45 6.39 2.05 32.10% 
Lives in South  0.921 (0.029) 6.77 7.35 –0.58 -7.95% 
Lives in West 1.250 (0.047) 8.79 7.03 1.76 24.99% 
Spouses      
EAP Required 0.792 (0.037) 5.12 6.46 –1.34 –20.79% 
Used Outpatient 
Medical Services 
3.776 
(0.067) 7.82 2.07 5.75 277.58% 
Male 0.722 (0.026) 4.90 6.79 –1.89 –27.78% 
Lives in South 0.835 (0.036) 5.41 6.48 –1.07 –16.49% 
Hourly 0.845 (0.035) 5.47 6.47 –1.00 –15.51% 
Dependents      
EAP Required 0.789 (0.036) 4.21 5.34 –1.13 –21.12% 
Used Outpatient 
Medical Services 
2.931 
(0.050) 6.79 2.32 4.47 193.07% 
Male 1.264 (0.026) 5.74 4.54 1.20 26.41% 
Manufacturing 0.768 (0.057) 4.18 5.44 –1.26 –23.23% 
Lives in West 1.272 (0.071) 6.40 5.03 1.37 27.18% 
Hourly 0.714 (0.029) 3.97 5.56 –1.59 –28.62% 
aRE equals the calculated probability of use (i.e., risk) for individuals belonging (i.e., exposed) to the 
indicated characteristic group. 
bRU equals the calculated probability of use (i.e., risk) for individual not belonging (i.e., not exposed) 
to the indicated characteristic group. 
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Effect of Other Variables 
Not surprisingly, other confounders were found to be significant predictors of 
outpatient MH care utilization.  In all three samples, the strongest predictor of any outpatient 
MH care utilization is whether the individual used outpatient or inpatient medical services.  
Users of medical care are more likely to use outpatient MH care than non-users of medical 
care.  These associations are consistent with previous research studies that have shown that 
individuals with MH disorders are high users of medical care compared to the general 
population. 
Based on the ARRs, both primary beneficiaries and other dependents who use 
outpatient medical services are about 3 times more likely to use outpatient MH care than 
primary beneficiaries and other dependents who do not use outpatient medical services.  The 
effect is slightly greater among spouses in which those who use outpatient medical services 
are 4 times more likely to use outpatient MH care services.  The effect of inpatient medical 
services is slightly less but still significant with the likelihood of outpatient MH care ranging 
from 1.2 times for primary beneficiaries to 1.7 times for other dependents who use inpatient 
medical services compared to those individuals without use of inpatient medical services.   
Use of medical services did not have a significant effect on number of days of 
outpatient MH care use for primary beneficiaries or spouses.  However, use of both 
outpatient and inpatient medical services among other dependents is positively associated 
with the number of days of outpatient MH care.  The negative binomial coefficient for using 
outpatient medical services is 0.111 (p<0.01) yielding an incidence rate ratio of 1.117 which 
indicates that using outpatient medical services is associated with a 12 percent increase in the 
expected number of days of outpatient MH care.  Similarly, use of inpatient medical services 
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among other dependents is associated with a 20 percent increase in the expected number of 
days of outpatient MH care based on an incidence rate ratio of 1.205.   
Being male significantly decreased the probability of any outpatient mental health care 
use among primary beneficiaries and spouses.  In both samples, men are 0.7 times as likely to 
use outpatient mental health care services than women (based on ARRs).  Being male also is 
negatively associated with days of outpatient MH care use among primary beneficiaries 
(p<0.01), but not among spouses.  In the estimation for primary beneficiaries, the negative 
binomial coefficient for being male is –0.066 which when converted into an IRR of 0.936 
implies that being male is associated with a 6 percent decrease in the expected number of 
days of outpatient MH care.   
Being male has mixed effects for other dependents.  Being male significantly increases 
the probability of any outpatient MH care use among other dependents with boys being 1.3 
times more likely to use outpatient MH care compared to girls.  This finding is not surprising 
given that among youths mental health care is more often sought for behavioral problems 
such as aggression which is more commonly identified among boys.  MH care is less often 
sought for depression which is more common among girls.  However, being male is 
associated with a 12 percent decrease in the expected number of days of outpatient MH care 
(based on percent change in the IRR). 
In each of the samples, the use of outpatient MH care varies significantly by age with 
younger individuals significantly more likely to use outpatient MH care services and to have 
more days of use.  Finally, family structure plays a role for primary beneficiaries and other 
dependents.  For primary beneficiaries, larger households are associated with increased 
likelihood of any outpatient mental health care use, but fewer days of use.  Furthermore, 
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being single increases the likelihood of any use, with single individuals 1.3 times more likely 
to use outpatient MH care.  On the other hand, for other dependents, larger households are 
associated with decreased likelihood of any outpatient MH care use, and had no effect on the 
number of days of use.  
Outpatient Substance Use Treatment 
Effect of Coinsurance Rates 
Similar to my analysis of outpatient MH care, the main insurance variables for 
outpatient SA treatment are the outpatient in-network coinsurance rate, the outpatient out-of-
network coinsurance rate, and the inpatient coinsurance rate that are specific to SA treatment 
services.  These variables are interpreted in the same way—that is, the rate represents the 
percentage of the service cost that the individual must pay.   
The outpatient coinsurance rates have no significant effect on the likelihood of using 
outpatient SA treatment services for any of the three samples (see Tables 24 through 26).  
Furthermore, the inpatient coinsurance rate has no effect on days of outpatient SA treatment 
across the three samples.   But, among primary beneficiaries the outpatient coinsurance rates 
have a significant effect on the number of days of outpatient SA treatment.  In addition, the 
inpatient coinsurance rate has a significant and negative association with the probability of 
any outpatient SA treatment among primary beneficiaries.   
The incremental effect of changing the outpatient in-network coinsurance rate from 
10% to 20% on days of SA treatment for primary beneficiaries is –0.644 which means that 
increasing the outpatient in-network coinsurance rate from 10% to 20% is associated with a 
decrease of 0.644 days of use (a 27 percent decrease).  However, the incremental effect of 
changing the outpatient out-of-network coinsurance from 50% to 100% (no coverage) on  
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Table 17. Incremental Effects of Changes in Coinsurance Rates for Outpatient 
Substance Abuse Treatment 
Sample 
Incremental  
Effect for  
Any Use 
(standard 
deviations) 
Incremental 
Effect for Level 
of Use 
(standard 
deviations) 
Total 
Incremental 
Effectb 
(standard 
deviations) 
Outpatient In-network Rate  
(change from 10% to 20%) 
   
    
Primary Beneficiaries –0.3.44e-06 
(0.002) 
–0.644*** 
(3.80e-08) 
–0.002 
(0.002) 
Spouses -----a -----a -----a 
Other Dependents -----a -----a -----a 
Outpatient Out-of-network Rate 
(change from 50% to 100%) 
  
Primary Beneficiaries –0.3.79e-05 
 (2.97e-05) 
1.903*** 
(8.06e-08) 
0.007 
(0.005) 
Spouses -----a -----a -----a 
Other Dependents -----a -----a -----a 
Inpatient Rate  
(change from 10% to 20%) 
   
Primary Beneficiaries –0.5.30e-04*** 
(4.34e-04) 
–0.217 
(4.52e-08) 
–0.002 
(0.001) 
Spouses -----a -----a -----a 
Other Dependents -----a -----a -----a 
Outpatient In-network Rate 
(change from 10% to 20%) 
   
Primary Beneficiaries –0.3.44e-06 
(0.002) 
–0.644*** 
(3.80e-08) 
–0.002 
(0.002) 
***Indicates associated estimated coefficient is statistically significant at the 1% level in 
regression equation. 
aCoefficients are not statistically different from zero in either equation. 
bStatistical significance was not evaluated for total effects. 
 
days of outpatient SA treatment for primary beneficiaries is an increase of 1.9 days of SA 
treatment (a 68 percent increase).  Again, this positive effect on treatment days suggests 
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substitution may be occurring between in-network and out-of-network services for outpatient 
SA treatment.   
Taken together, these findings show that for primary beneficiaries the effect of cost-
sharing is greater for outpatient SA treatment days demanded compared to outpatient MH 
care.  On the other hand,  unlike outpatient MH care, cost-sharing has no significant effect on 
the probability of outpatient SA treatment utilization for primary beneficiaries. 
Effect of EAP Precertification Requirement   
Similar to outpatient MH care, an EAP requirement is associated with a lower 
likelihood of use for outpatient SA treatment services among primary beneficiaries, but has 
no significant effect on the number of days of use.  The estimated parameter coefficient is –
0.506 (p<0.01) which translates into an adjusted risk ratio (ARR) of 0.602 (see Table 18).   
Primary beneficiaries with an EAP precertification requirement are 0.6 times as likely 
to use outpatient SA treatment as primary beneficiaries without an EAP requirement.  In 
other words, having an EAP requirement is associated with a 40 percent decrease in the 
probability of outpatient SA treatment among primary beneficiaries.  Unlike primary 
beneficiaries, the EAP requirement does not have any significant effect on SA treatment 
demand for either spouses or other dependents. 
Effect of Other Variables 
The effect of variables on outpatient SA treatment demand varies considerably between 
the participation equation (logit model) and the intensity of use equation.  Use of medical 
services, gender, age, and employee status (hourly) are found to have a significant 
association with the likelihood of using outpatient SA treatment in all three samples, but 
none of these variables is found to have a significant effect on the number of days of use.  On 
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the other hand, industry type among primary beneficiaries and living in the Northeast among 
other dependents are found to have a statistically significant effect on the number of days of 
use, but no effect on the likelihood of use. 
Adjusted risk ratios indicate that individuals in all samples who use outpatient medical 
services are about 2 to 3 times more likely to use outpatient SA treatment as individuals 
without outpatient medical service use (see Table 18).  In addition, the likelihood of any 
outpatient SA treatment is about 2.5 times greater among individuals who use inpatient 
medical services.  The likelihood of using outpatient SA treatment is significantly greater 
among primary beneficiaries aged 16 to 30 years and is lower for both primary beneficiaries 
and spouses aged 46 to 64 years.  The likelihood of outpatient SA treatment is significantly 
greater among other dependents aged 12 to 17 years and this likelihood significantly 
decreases after 17 years of age.   
As expected, being male is significantly associated with greater use of outpatient SA 
treatment in all samples.  The gender effect is largest in the spouse sample where men are 5 
times more likely to use outpatient SA treatment services compared to women.  Men are 2.1 
and 2.4 times more likely to use outpatient SA treatment services among primary 
beneficiaries and other dependents, respectively.  
Although industry type is not associated with the likelihood of service use, being 
employed in the transportation and service industry are found to be positively associated with 
the number of days of outpatient SA treatment for primary beneficiaries (p<0.01) when 
compared to primary beneficiaries employed in the manufacturing industry.  Being employed 
in the transportation industry substantially increases the expected number of days of 
outpatient SA treatment by about 139 percent.  Being employed in the service industry is  
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Table 18. Selected Adjusted Risk Ratios (ARR) for Outpatient SA Treatment  
 
ARR  
(std error) 
Risk if 
Exposed 
(%; RE)a 
Risk if 
not 
Exposed 
(%; RU)b 
Adjusted 
Risk 
Difference 
(% points; 
RE-RU) 
Percent 
Change 
(base = RU)
Primary Beneficiaries      
EAP Required 0.602 
(0.081) 0.24 0.39 –0.16 –39.78% 
Used Outpatient 
Medical Services 
1.632 
(0.103) 0.40 0.24 0.15 63.23% 
Used Inpatient 
Medical Services 
2.354 
(0.368) 0.77 0.32 0.44 135.44% 
Male 2.102 
(0.142) 0.47 0.22 0.25 110.18% 
Not Married 1.731 
(0.163) 0.47 0.27 0.20 73.09% 
Hourly 2.181 
(0.280) 0.60 0.28 0.32 118.41% 
Spouses      
Used Outpatient  
Medical Services 
1.958 
(0.183) 0.34 0.18 0.17 95.05% 
Used Inpatient  
Medical Services 
2.609 
(0.558) 0.67 0.26 0.41 160.85% 
Male 5.005 
(0.560) 0.66 0.13 0.53 400.52% 
Hourly 2.252 
(0.481) 0.52 0.23 0.29 125.25% 
Other Dependents      
Used Outpatient 
Medical Services 
3.116 
(0.225) 0.43 0.14 0.29 211.58% 
Used Inpatient 
Medical Services 
2.440 
(0.578) 0.74 0.30 0.43 143.98% 
Male 2.589 
(0.194) 0.46 0.18 0.28 158.89% 
aRE equals the calculated probability of use (i.e., risk) for individuals belonging (i.e., exposed) to the 
indicated characteristic group. 
bRU equals the calculated probability of use (i.e., risk) for individual not belonging (i.e., not exposed) 
to the indicated characteristic group. 
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associated with an increase in the expected number of days of almost 70 percent.  Similarly, 
region of residence is not associated with the likelihood of service use, but living in the 
Northeast compared to the Midwest substantially increases the expected number of days of 
outpatient SA treatment by about 96 percent for other dependents.   
Inpatient Mental Health Care 
Effect of Health Insurance Characteristics 
As shown in Tables 27 through 29, none of the health insurance characteristics had any 
significant effect on inpatient MH care demand for any of the samples.  Unlike outpatient 
MH care, it appears that individuals do not respond to expected levels of cost-sharing or 
preauthorization requirements in making decisions about inpatient MH care utilization.  
Effect of Other Variables 
Although most of the variables included in the estimation of inpatient MH utilization 
are not found to be significant, there are some notable exceptions.  Primary beneficiaries who 
use outpatient or inpatient medical services are about 2 and 6 times more likely to use 
inpatient MH care than their non-using counterparts (see Table 19).  Similarly, spouses who 
use either outpatient or inpatient medical services are 4 times more likely to use inpatient 
MH care than their non-using counterparts.  Primary beneficiaries who work hourly are 2 
times more likely to use inpatient MH care than salaried employees, and primary 
beneficiaries aged 46 to 64 are significantly less likely to use inpatient MH services (see 
Table 28). Finally, although region of residence has no effect on the likelihood of using 
inpatient MH care services, region does have a significant effect on the expected number of 
days of inpatient MH care for primary beneficiaries.  Living in the south and west is  
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Table 19. Selected Adjusted Risk Ratios (ARR) for Inpatient MH Care 
 
ARR  
(std error) 
Risk if 
Exposed 
(%; RE)a 
Risk if 
not 
Exposed 
(%; RU)b 
Adjusted 
Risk 
Difference 
(% points; 
RE-RU) 
Percent 
Change 
(base = RU)
Primary Beneficiaries      
Used OP Medical 
Services 
2.419 
(0.189) 0.23 0.09 0.14 141.87% 
Used IP Medical 
Services 
6.374 
(0.836) 0.92 0.14 0.78 537.42% 
Hourly 1.948 
(0.329) 0.31 0.16 0.15 94.79% 
Spouses      
Used OP Medical 
Services 
3.991 
(0.424) 0.23 0.06 0.17 299.13% 
Used IP Medical 
Services 
4.413 
(0.831) 0.62 0.14 0.48 341.32% 
Dependents      
Used OP Medical 
Services 
3.557 
(0.274) 0.36 0.10 0.26 255.68% 
Used IP Medical 
Services 
7.362 
(1.181) 1.63 0.22 1.41 636.17% 
aRE equals the calculated probability of use (i.e., risk) for individuals belonging (i.e., exposed) to the 
indicated characteristic group. 
bRU equals the calculated probability of use (i.e., risk) for individual not belonging (i.e., not exposed) 
to the indicated characteristic group. 
 
 
associated with a decrease in the expected number of days of inpatient MH care of about 38 
percent and 44 percent compared to primary beneficiaries living in the Midwest. 
Inpatient Substance Abuse Treatment 
Effect of Health Insurance Characteristics 
As shown in Table 30, the likelihood that a primary beneficiary uses any inpatient SA 
treatment significantly decreases as the inpatient in-network coinsurance rate increases.  The 
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primary beneficiaries’ incremental effect associated with changing the inpatient in-network 
coinsurance rate from 10% to 20% for inpatient SA treatment is –0.0005.  This effect 
indicates that changing the inpatient in-network coinsurance rate is associated with a 0.05 
percentage point decrease in the probability of any inpatient SA treatment utilization (a 73 
percent decrease).  The estimated coefficient for inpatient out-of-network coinsurance rate 
was positive and also significant.  The incremental effect of increasing the inpatient out-of-
network coinsurance rate from 50% to 100% is 0.002, indicating that going from half-
coverage to no coverage of out-of-network inpatient SA treatment services is associated with 
an increase in the probability of use of 0.2 percentage points.  Again, an examination of the 
statistical significance of the estimated coefficients clearly shows that the inpatient 
coinsurance rates affect the primary beneficiary’s initial decision to use inpatient SA 
treatment services.  Once that decision is made, the inpatient coinsurance rates have little or 
no effect on the intensity of service use.   
Neither the outpatient coinsurance rate nor the EAP requirement is found to have a 
significant effect on the utilization of inpatient SA services for primary beneficiaries.  In 
addition, as shown in Tables 31 and 32, none of the health insurance characteristics had any 
significant effect on inpatient SA treatment for spouses or other dependents. 
Effect of Other Variables 
Adjusted risk ratios indicate that primary beneficiaries who use inpatient medical 
services are 5.5 times more likely to use inpatient SA treatment as primary beneficiaries 
without inpatient medical service use (see Table 20).  The effect of inpatient medical service 
use is even greater among spouses and other dependents with individuals who use inpatient 
medical services being over 9 times more likely to use inpatient SA treatment than  
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individuals who do not use inpatient medical services.  In addition, the likelihood of any SA 
treatment is 5.5 times greater among other dependents with outpatient medical service use.   
Similar to outpatient SA treatment, being male is significantly associated with use of 
inpatient SA treatment.  Men are 2.4 to 5.6 times more likely to use inpatient SA treatment 
than women across the three samples.  The gender effect is greatest among other dependents.  
The likelihood of any inpatient SA treatment is less among spouses aged 46 to 64 
years, while other dependents aged 12 to 17 years have a greater likelihood of inpatient SA 
treatment.  Although age has no effect on likelihood of use among primary beneficiaries, the 
number of treatment days is negatively associated with being aged 46 to 64 years. 
For spouses, being from a larger household decreases the likelihood of any inpatient 
SA treatment.  This finding is not surprising because greater family responsibilities may be 
associated with a larger household making it more difficult for a spouse to enter inpatient 
treatment.  Household size was not a significant factor for primary beneficiaries, but being 
single increases the likelihood of any inpatient SA treatment.  Based on ARRs, non-married 
primary beneficiaries are about 2 times more likely to use inpatient SA treatment as married 
primary beneficiaries.  
Industry type is associated with the likelihood of inpatient SA treatment for primary 
beneficiaries only.  Individuals employed in the service industry are 0.18 times as likely to 
use inpatient SA treatment as individuals employed in the manufacturing industry. 
Furthermore, being employed in the service industry is associated with an 83 percent 
decrease in days of inpatient SA treatment compared to individuals in the manufacturing 
industry (p<0.05).   
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Table 20. Selected Adjusted Risk Ratios (ARR) for Inpatient SA Treatment  
 
ARR  
(std error) 
Risk if 
Exposed 
(%; RE)c 
Risk if 
not 
Exposed 
(%; RU)d 
Adjusted 
Risk 
Difference 
(% points;  
RE-RU) 
Percent 
Change 
(base = RU)
Primary Beneficiaries      
Used Inpatient  
Medical Services 
5.493 
(1.513) 0.26 0.05 0.22 449.28% 
Male 3.574 
(0.544) 0.09 0.03 0.07 257.44% 
Not Married 1.949 
(0.439) 0.09 0.05 0.04 94.87% 
Service 0.181 
(0.759) 0.02 0.11 –0.09 –81.86% 
Hourly 2.356 
(0.664) 0.11 0.05 0.06 135.60% 
Spouses      
Used Inpatient  
Medical Services 
9.522 
(3.453) 0.32 0.03 0.29 852.22% 
Male 2.448 
(0.756) 0.008 0.003 0.01 144.83% 
Dependents      
Used Outpatient  
Medical Services 
5.473 
(0.981) 0.07 0.01 0.06 447.34% 
Used Inpatient 
Medical Services 
9.723 
(3.190) 0.36 0.04 0.32 872.31% 
Male 5.553 
(1.009) 0.09 0.02 0.07 455.33% 
aRE equals the calculated probability of use (i.e., risk) for individuals belonging (i.e., 
exposed) to the indicated characteristic group. 
bRU equals the calculated probability of use (i.e., risk) for individual not belonging (i.e., not 
exposed) to the indicated characteristic group. 
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Sensitivity and Other Special Analyses 
In this section, I briefly present the results of my sensitivity analysis pertaining to my 
assumptions about out-of-network coinsurance rates as well as the results of my specialized 
analysis pertaining to gender differences. 
Sensitivity Analysis for Out-of-Network Coinsurance Rates 
In Chapter 4, I stated that some employers did not provide clear information on out-
of-network coinsurance rates, and that for my analysis I took a conservative view and 
assumed that no mention of an out-of-network rate means that the plan does not cover out-of-
network services which results in a coinsurance rate of 100 percent (Scenario 1). This 
assumption was made for 6 of the 12 employer groups.  To test this assumption, I re-ran my 
analyses under a less conservative view and assumed that no mention of an out-of-network 
rate means that the plan covers out-of-network services at the same level of cost-sharing as 
in-network services (Scenario 2). The results from this analysis revealed that my assumption 
had little effect on the overall findings.  In most cases, regressions under Scenario 2 yielded 
results that were similar showing little response to cost-sharing.  For example, in the 
outpatient MH care analysis, the incremental effect of changing the outpatient out-of-network 
from 50% to 100% on the probability of any MH care goes from 0.013 (a 53% decrease) 
under Scenario 1 to 0.007 (a 20% decrease) under Scenario 2 for primary beneficiaries.  The 
incremental effect of a similar change on the outpatient out-of-network coinsurance rate on 
days of MH care goes from a statistically insignificant 0.130 to a statistically significant 
0.392 (p<0.01).  Similarly, the incremental effect of changing the out-of-network coinsurance 
rate on the probability of any outpatient MH care for spouses is the same under Scenarios 1 
and 2.  And, the incremental effect of changing the outpatient out-of-network rate on days of 
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use among spouses goes from 0.319 under Scenario 1 to 0.446 under Scenario 2 with both 
being statistically significant at the 1% level.  Although the out-of-network coinsurance rate 
is insignificant for days of MH care under Scenario 1 among dependents, in my sensitivity 
analysis this variable is statistically significant at the 5 percent level under Scenario 2, but the 
estimated incremental effect is still extremely small; 0.184 under Scenario 2 compared to 
0.161 under Scenario 1.   
In the outpatient SA treatment analysis, all coinsurance variables remained 
insignificant under Scenario 2 for spouses and other dependents.  For primary beneficiaries, 
the incremental effect  of changing the outpatient out-of-network from 50% to 100% on the 
probability of any SA treatment goes from –0.00004 under Scenario 1 (not statistically 
significant) to 0.011 (p<0.01).  The incremental effect on days of SA treatment is similar 
under both scenarios.  I found similar results for inpatient MH and SA treatment.  Thus, it 
appears that overall my results are robust to changes in the assumptions regarding the out-of-
network coinsurance rates.    
  
Gender Analysis 
As part of my examination of the price effect, I examined whether men and women 
respond differently to the coinsurance rates and the EAP requirement.  To do this analysis, I 
added 4 interactive terms to each of the regression equations that interacted each of the health 
insurance characteristics to the dichotomous variable for gender.  The results of this analysis 
revealed no statistically significant differences in the effect of the health insurance 
characteristics by gender. 
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Table 21. Estimation of outpatient MH care utilization (Primary beneficiaries) 
 
Model 1: 
Basic RE Coefficients 
(standard errors) 
Model 2: 
IV RE Coefficients 
(standard errors) 
 
Probability 
of Any Use 
Days of 
Use 
Probability 
of Any Use 
Days of 
Use 
N observations 100398 7246 100398 7246 
n unique individuals 58842 5488 58842 5488 
Health Insurance Characteristics      
Outpatient Coinsurance  
(in-network) -0.009*** 0.002 -0.014*** 0.006*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) 
Outpatient Coinsurance  
(out-of-network) 0.009*** 0.003 0.005** -0.006***
 (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) 
Inpatient Coinsurance  
(in-network) -0.025*** -0.021*** -0.007 -0.003 
 (0.004) (0.003) (0.005) (0.004) 
EAP Precertification Required -0.393*** -0.034 -0.666*** -0.142** 
 (0.048) (0.036) (0.083) (0.066) 
Total Months Enrolled in Year 0.048*** 0.040*** 0.047*** 0.040*** 
 (0.007) (0.006) (0.007) (0.006) 
Physical Health Behavior      
Used outpatient medical services 1.313*** 0.016 1.304*** 0.018 
 (0.048) (0.037) (0.048) (0.037) 
Used inpatient medical services 0.249*** -0.043 0.266*** -0.034 
 (0.056) (0.037) (0.056) (0.037) 
Demographics      
Male -0.492*** -0.066** -0.495*** -0.075***
 (0.036) (0.027) (0.036) (0.027) 
Age      
16 to 30 years  0.114*** 0.025** 0.118*** 0.028** 
 (0.014) (0.011) (0.014) (0.011) 
31 to 45 years  0.025*** 0.004 0.023*** 0.004 
 (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) 
*** significant at the 1 percent level 
** significant at the 5 percent level 
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Table 21. Continued 
 
Model 1:  
Basic RE Coefficients 
(standard errors) 
Model 2: 
IV RE Coefficients 
(standard errors) 
 
Probability 
of Any Use 
Days of 
Use 
Probability 
of Any Use 
Days of 
Use 
46 to 64 years  -0.071*** -0.023*** -0.066*** -0.022***
 (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) 
Household Size  0.035** -0.023** 0.049*** -0.019 
 (0.015) (0.011) (0.016) (0.011) 
Not Married 0.360*** 0.041 0.418*** 0.062 
  (0.045) (0.033) (0.045) (0.033) 
Region of Residence 
(Midwest omitted)      
Northeast 0.059 0.343*** 0.121 0.400*** 
 (0.064) (0.047) (0.065) (0.048) 
South  -0.129** 0.034 -0.128** 0.027 
 (0.052) (0.041) (0.054) (0.042) 
West 0.271 0.298*** 0.257*** 0.276*** 
 (0.061) (0.046) (0.063) (0.048) 
Unknown Region 0.072 0.201*** 0.041 0.216*** 
 (0.069) (0.047) (0.074) (0.051) 
Industry of Primary Beneficiary 
(Transportation omitted)     
Manufacturing 0.150 -0.003 0.085 0.125 
 (0.085) (0.066) (0.102) (0.078) 
Service 0.066 -0.210*** 0.323*** 0.170** 
 (0.089) (0.070) (0.103) (0.081) 
Employee Type of Primary 
Beneficiary (Salary omitted)     
Hourly -0.080 -0.233*** -0.048 -0.226***
 (0.050) (0.039) (0.051) (0.040) 
Other Status 0.189** 0.028 0.176 -0.181** 
 (0.082) (0.065) (0.098) (0.076) 
Intercept -8.846*** -0.012 -8.806*** 0.266 
 (0.403) (0.332) (0.406) (0.334) 
Joint Significance   
All Insurance Variables Χ-sq(4) 128.78 48.90 176.82 54.67 
p-value <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 
*** significant at the 1 percent level 
** significant at the 5 percent level 
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Table 22. Estimation of outpatient MH care utilization (Spouses) 
 
Model 1: 
Basic RE Coefficients 
(standard errors) 
Model 2: 
IV RE Coefficients 
(standard errors) 
 
Probability 
of Any Use 
Days of 
Use 
Probability 
of Any Use 
Days of 
Use 
N observations 55906 3472 55906 3472 
n unique individuals 32451 2667 32451 2667 
Health Insurance Characteristics      
Outpatient Coinsurance  
(in-network) -0.004 -0.004 -0.011*** -0.007** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) 
Outpatient Coinsurance  
(out-of-network) 0.003 0.006*** -0.003 0.001 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) 
Inpatient Coinsurance  
(in-network) 0.0003 
-
0.021*** 0.015** -0.008 
 (0.006) (0.005) (0.006) (0.005) 
EAP Precertification Required -0.254*** 
-
0.199*** -0.355*** -0.281*** 
 (0.067) (0.053) (0.096) (0.078) 
Total Months Enrolled in Year 0.053*** 0.038*** 0.052*** 0.038*** 
 (0.011) (0.009) (0.011) (0.009) 
Physical Health Behavior      
Used outpatient medical services  1.525*** 0.061 1.513*** 0.058 
 (0.069) (0.058) (0.069) (0.058) 
Used inpatient medical services  0.360*** -0.009 0.360*** -0.017 
 (0.071) (0.048) (0.071) (0.048) 
Demographics      
Male -0.432*** -0.061 -0.429*** -0.062 
 (0.057) (0.048) (0.058) (0.049) 
Age      
16 to 30 years  0.059** 0.024 0.061** 0.023 
 (0.025) (0.021) (0.025) (0.021) 
31 to 45 years  0.029*** -0.0004 0.027*** -0.0004 
 (0.006) (0.005) (0.006) (0.005) 
*** significant at the 1 percent level 
** significant at the 5 percent level 
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Table 22. Continued 
 
Model 1:  
Basic RE Coefficients 
(standard errors) 
Model 2:  
IV RE Coefficients 
(standard errors) 
 
Probability 
of Any Use 
Days of 
Use 
Probability of 
Any Use 
Days of 
Use 
46 to 64 years  -0.063*** -0.022*** -0.059*** -0.019*** 
 (0.006) (0.005) (0.006) (0.005) 
Household Size  -0.009 -0.011 -0.001 -0.009 
  (0.021) (0.017) (0.021) (0.017) 
Region of Residence 
 (Midwest omitted)     
Northeast -0.053 0.317*** -0.028 0.329*** 
 (0.091) (0.070) (0.091) (0.071) 
South  -0.237*** 0.053 -0.264*** 0.012 
 (0.071) (0.060) (0.072) (0.061) 
West 0.102 0.271*** 0.048 0.223*** 
 (0.088) (0.072) (0.089) (0.072) 
Unknown Region -0.047 0.188*** -0.129 0.144** 
 (0.091) (0.068) (0.095) (0.072) 
Industry of Primary Beneficiary  
(Transportation omitted)     
      
Manufacturing 0.0003 -0.120 -0.154 -0.189 
 (0.125) (0.109) (0.143) (0.121) 
Service 0.105 -0.305*** 0.380*** -0.059 
 (0.124) (0.102) (0.131) (0.107) 
Employee Type of Primary 
Beneficiary (Salary omitted):      
Hourly -0.220*** -0.209*** -0.206*** -0.200*** 
 (0.068) (0.056) (0.069) (0.057) 
Other Status -0.052 0.140 0.010 0.137 
 (0.116) (0.101) (0.130) (0.109) 
Intercept -7.193*** -0.096 -6.884*** 0.188 
 (0.731) (0.604) (0.735) (0.607) 
Joint Significance 
All Insurance Variables Χ-sq(4) 15.29 40.89 39.59 43.21 
p-value 0.004 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 
*** significant at the 1 percent level 
** significant at the 5 percent level 
 
  126
Table 23. Estimation of outpatient MH care utilization (Dependents) 
 
Model 1: 
Basic RE Coefficients 
(standard errors) 
Model 2: 
IV RE Coefficients 
(standard errors) 
 
Probability 
of Any Use 
Days of 
Use 
Probability 
of Any Use 
Days of 
Use 
N observations 78794 4055 78794 4055 
n unique individuals 46262 3101 46262 3101 
Health Insurance Characteristics      
Outpatient Coinsurance  
(in-network) 0.001 0.004 -0.015** 0.006 
 (0.004) (0.003) (0.006) (0.005) 
Outpatient Coinsurance  
(out-of-network) 0.004 0.003 0.004 -0.002 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) 
Inpatient Coinsurance  
(in-network) -0.017*** -0.022*** -0.005 -0.011** 
 (0.006) (0.005) (0.006) (0.005) 
EAP Precertification Required -0.260*** -0.050 -0.495*** -0.112 
 (0.063) (0.050) (0.109) (0.088) 
Total Months Enrolled in Year 0.063*** 0.031*** 0.062*** 0.031*** 
 (0.010) (0.009) (0.010) (0.009) 
Physical Health Behavior      
Used outpatient medical services  1.245*** 0.111*** 1.238*** 0.109*** 
 (0.051) (0.041) (0.051) (0.041) 
Used inpatient medical services 0.641*** 0.186*** 0.655*** 0.194*** 
 (0.105) (0.065) (0.105) (0.065) 
Demographics      
Male 0.301*** -0.118*** 0.307*** -0.117*** 
 (0.042) (0.033) (0.042) (0.033) 
Age      
0-5 years 0.535*** 0.225*** 0.537*** 0.225*** 
 (0.052) (0.053) (0.052) (0.053) 
6-11 years 0.278*** 0.028 0.278*** 0.028 
 (0.017) (0.015) (0.017) (0.015) 
12-17 years -0.044*** 0.001 -0.044*** 0.001 
 (0.011) (0.009) (0.011) (0.009) 
*** significant at the 1 percent level 
** significant at the 5 percent level 
  127
Table 23. Continued 
 
Model 1: 
Basic RE Coefficients 
(standard errors) 
Model 2:  
IV RE Coefficients 
(standard errors) 
 
Probability 
of Any Use 
Days of 
Use 
Probability 
of Any Use 
Days of 
Use 
Greater than 17 years -0.009 -0.003 -0.006 -0.003 
 (0.008) (0.006) (0.008) (0.006) 
Household Size  -0.128*** -0.025 -0.124*** -0.024 
 (0.018) (0.014) (0.018) (0.014) 
Region of Residence  
 (Midwest omitted)      
Northeast 0.104 0.184*** 0.084 0.211*** 
 (0.086) (0.066) (0.088) (0.067) 
South  -0.017 -0.025 -0.044 -0.027 
 (0.069) (0.056) (0.073) (0.059) 
West 0.303*** 0.082 0.254*** 0.065 
 (0.084) (0.065) (0.089) (0.069) 
Unknown Region 0.001 0.160** -0.120 0.176** 
 (0.089) (0.063) (0.101) (0.072) 
Industry of Primary Beneficiary 
(Transportation omitted)      
Manufacturing -0.323*** 0.073 -0.528*** 0.121 
 (0.119) (0.097) (0.144) (0.116) 
Service -0.139 -0.400*** -0.092 -0.152 
 (0.121) (0.102) (0.133) (0.108) 
Employee Type of Primary 
Beneficiary (Salary omitted)     
Hourly -0.429*** -0.136*** -0.395*** -0.139*** 
 (0.065) (0.051) (0.066) (0.052) 
Other Status 0.241** -0.007 0.324** -0.112 
 (0.117) (0.098) (0.129) (0.105) 
Intercept -8.850*** -0.486 -8.734*** -0.260 
 (0.296) (0.285) (0.302) (0.286) 
Joint Significance 
All Insurance Variables Χ-sq(4) 30.62 28.47 59.31 20.77 
p-value <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 
*** significant at the 1 percent level 
** significant at the 5 percent level 
 
 
  128
Table 24. Estimation of outpatient SA treatment utilization (Primary Beneficiaries) 
 
Model 1:  
Basic RE Coefficients 
(standard errors) 
Model 2: 
IV RE Coefficients 
(standard errors) 
 
Probability 
of Any Use 
Days of 
Use 
Probability 
of Any Use 
Days of 
Use 
N observations 100398 351 100398 351 
n unique individuals 58842 307 58842 307 
Health Insurance Characteristics      
Outpatient Coinsurance  
(in-network) -0.0001 -0.064*** -0.066 -0.054 
 (0.012) (0.014) (0.035) (0.039) 
Outpatient Coinsurance  
(out-of-network) -0.0003 0.038*** 0.017 0.018 
 (0.007) (0.008) (0.012) (0.015) 
Inpatient Coinsurance  
(in-network) -0.027** -0.022 -0.021 -0.012 
 (0.011) (0.015) (0.013) (0.019) 
EAP Precertification Required -0.506*** -0.044 -0.623** 0.726** 
 (0.159) (0.176) (0.280) (0.327) 
Total Months Enrolled in Year -0.009 0.022 -0.015 0.017 
 (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) 
Physical Health Behavior      
Used outpatient medical services 0.494*** 0.020 0.491*** 0.015 
 (0.140) (0.134) (0.141) (0.132) 
Used inpatient medical services 0.869*** -0.145 0.869*** -0.170 
 (0.170) (0.175) (0.171) (0.179) 
Demographics      
Male 0.751*** 0.077 0.757*** 0.013 
 (0.124) (0.132) (0.124) (0.129) 
Age      
16 to 30 years  0.245*** 0.065 0.246*** 0.071 
 (0.055) (0.054) (0.055) (0.054) 
31 to 45 years  0.012 -0.005 0.010 -0.005 
 (0.013) (0.015) (0.013) (0.014) 
46 to 64 years  -0.088*** -0.024 -0.079*** -0.024 
 (0.015) (0.017) (0.016) (0.017) 
*** significant at the 1 percent level 
** significant at the 5 percent level 
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Table 24. Continued 
 
Model 1: 
Basic RE Coefficients 
(standard errors) 
Model 2: 
IV RE Coefficients 
(standard errors) 
 
Probability 
of Any Use 
Days of 
Use 
Probability of 
Any Use 
Days of 
Use 
Not Married 0.552*** -0.092 0.586*** -0.173 
 (0.144) (0.155) (0.148) (0.158) 
Household Size 0.007 -0.060 0.026 -0.067 
  (0.048) (0.056) (0.049) (0.055) 
Region of Residence 
(Midwest omitted)     
Northeast -0.335 -0.060 -0.645** -0.230 
 (0.224) (0.239) (0.288) (0.327) 
South  -0.042 -0.184 -0.218 -0.369 
 (0.154) (0.168) (0.192) (0.205) 
West -0.002 -0.145 -0.233 -0.357 
 (0.190) (0.204) (0.233) (0.235) 
Unknown Region -0.437 0.204 -0.915*** -0.145 
 (0.251) (0.256) (0.340) (0.372) 
Industry of Primary Beneficiary 
(Transportation omitted)     
Manufacturing 0.197 0.872*** 0.361 0.559 
 (0.252) (0.311) (0.281) (0.307) 
Service 0.234 -1.165*** -0.480 -0.772 
 (0.329) (0.356) (0.584) (0.718) 
Employee Type of Primary 
Beneficiary (Salary omitted)     
Hourly 0.788*** -0.073 0.765*** -0.178 
 (0.169) (0.186) (0.188) (0.195) 
Other Status 0.415 -0.486 -0.085 -0.515 
 (0.251) (0.309) (0.337) (0.354) 
Intercept -14.304*** -2.656 -14.731*** -1.600 
  (1.639) (1.629) (1.669) (1.681) 
Joint Significance 
All Insurance Variables Χ-sq(4) 24.77 25.09 37.40 6.12 
p-value <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 0.1903 
*** significant at the 1 percent level 
** significant at the 5 percent level 
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Table 25. Estimation of outpatient SA treatment utilization (Spouses)  
 
Model 1:  
Basic RE Coefficients 
(standard errors) 
Model 2: 
IV RE Coefficients 
(standard errors) 
 
Probability 
of Any Use 
Days of 
Use 
Probability 
of Any Use 
Days of 
Use 
N observations 55906 158 55906 158 
n unique individuals 32451 140 32451 140 
Health Insurance Characteristics      
Outpatient Coinsurance  
(in-network) 0.008 -0.003 0.036 0.033 
 (0.019) (0.024) (0.037) (0.043) 
Outpatient Coinsurance  
(out-of-network) -0.003 0.0005 -0.017 -0.017 
 (0.011) (0.014) (0.016) (0.021) 
Inpatient Coinsurance (in-network) 0.005 -0.0004 0.007 0.012 
 (0.015) (0.020) (0.016) (0.020) 
EAP Precertification Required -0.475 -0.317 -0.376 -0.420 
 (0.265) (0.251) (0.370) (0.401) 
Total Months Enrolled in Year 0.048 0.062 0.051 0.068 
 (0.039) (0.039) (0.039) (0.039) 
Physical Health Behavior      
Used outpatient medical services  0.679*** -0.218 0.690*** -0.206 
 (0.206) (0.206) (0.206) (0.204) 
Used inpatient medical services  0.975*** -0.058 0.979*** 0.012 
 (0.237) (0.275) (0.237) (0.275) 
Demographics      
Male 1.624*** -0.101 1.655*** -0.054 
 (0.188) (0.201) (0.189) (0.205) 
Age      
16 to 30 years  0.064 0.131 0.067 0.128 
 (0.092) (0.086) (0.092) (0.084) 
31 to 45 years  0.011 -0.00002 0.010 -0.002 
 (0.020) (0.023) (0.020) (0.023) 
46 to 64 years  -0.105*** -0.032 -0.108*** -0.031 
 (0.024) (0.029) (0.025) (0.030) 
Household Size  -0.058 -0.010 -0.055 -0.003 
  (0.074) (0.078) (0.074) (0.079) 
*** significant at the 1 percent level 
** significant at the 5 percent level 
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Table 25. Continued 
 
Model 1:  
Basic RE Coefficients 
(standard errors) 
Model 2: 
IV RE Coefficients 
(standard errors) 
 
Probability 
of Any Use 
Days of 
Use 
Probability 
of Any Use 
Days of 
Use 
Region of Residence 
 (Midwest omitted)     
Northeast 0.181 0.350 0.314 0.560 
 (0.330) (0.339) (0.360) (0.404) 
South  -0.213 -0.273 -0.187 -0.229 
 (0.258) (0.306) (0.269) (0.317) 
West -0.372 -0.309 -0.329 -0.207 
 (0.359) (0.403) (0.375) (0.413) 
Unknown Region -0.324 0.704 -0.307 0.827 
 (0.422) (0.423) (0.444) (0.453) 
Industry of Primary Beneficiary 
(Transportation omitted)     
Manufacturing 0.046 0.353 -0.113 0.277 
 (0.394) (0.421) (0.425) (0.505) 
Service 0.418 0.183 0.849 0.824 
 (0.499) (0.615) (0.654) (0.802) 
Employee Type of Primary 
Beneficiary (Salary omitted)     
Hourly 0.824*** 0.326 0.859*** 0.373 
 (0.266) (0.306) (0.270) (0.311) 
Other Status 0.315 0.140 0.464 0.199 
 (0.381) (0.440) (0.449) (0.552) 
Intercept -9.820*** -3.380 -9.299*** -2.717 
  (2.700) (2.597) (2.736) (2.583) 
Joint Significance 
All Insurance Variables Χ-sq(4) 3.72 1.73 2.53 2.29 
p-value 0.445 0.786 0.639 0.682 
*** significant at the 1 percent level 
** significant at the 5 percent level 
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Table 26. Estimation of outpatient SA treatment utilization (Dependents) 
 
Model 1: 
Basic RE Coefficients 
(standard errors) 
Model 2:  
IV RE Coefficients 
(standard errors) 
 
Probability 
of Any Use 
Days of 
Use 
Probability 
of Any Use 
Days of 
Use 
N observations 78794 248 78794 248 
n unique individuals 46262 213 46262 213 
Health Insurance Characteristics      
Outpatient Coinsurance  
(in-network) -0.023 0.040 -0.129** 0.134** 
 (0.018) (0.024) (0.064) (0.059) 
Outpatient Coinsurance  
(out-of-network) 0.011 -0.012 0.048** -0.039** 
 (0.010) (0.009) (0.021) (0.018) 
Inpatient Coinsurance  
(in-network) -0.026 -0.010 -0.059** 0.0003 
 (0.017) (0.022) (0.024) (0.017) 
EAP Precertification Required -0.224 -0.214 0.390 -0.591 
 (0.240) (0.244) (0.437) (0.391) 
Total Months Enrolled in Year 0.016 0.032 0.011 0.048 
 (0.034) (0.033) (0.034) (0.035) 
Physical Health Behavior      
Used outpatient medical services 1.153*** 0.066 1.145*** 0.044 
 (0.175) (0.160) (0.175) (0.157) 
Used inpatient medical services  0.917*** 0.284 0.887*** 0.317 
 (0.259) (0.228) (0.260) (0.229) 
Demographics      
Male 0.970*** -0.038 0.959*** -0.012 
 (0.144) (0.147) (0.144) (0.146) 
Age      
0 to 5 years 0.070 -0.032 0.072 -0.106 
 (0.321) (0.274) (0.321) (0.278) 
6 to 11 years 0.205 0.088 0.210 0.121 
 (0.160) (0.148) (0.160) (0.154) 
12 to 17 years 0.536*** 0.055 0.532*** 0.062 
 (0.064) (0.075) (0.064) (0.075) 
*** significant at the 1 percent level 
** significant at the 5 percent level 
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Table 26. Continued 
 
Model 1: 
Basic RE Coefficients 
(standard errors) 
Model 2:  
IV RE Coefficients 
(standard errors) 
 
Probability 
of Any Use 
Days of 
Use 
Probability of 
Any Use 
Days of 
Use 
Greater than 17 years -0.053** 0.014 -0.045 0.003 
 (0.025) (0.026) (0.026) (0.026) 
Household Size  -0.061 -0.004 -0.079 0.012 
  (0.057) (0.047) (0.057) (0.047) 
Region of Residence 
(Midwest omitted)     
Northeast -0.078 0.675** -0.699 1.327*** 
 (0.302) (0.309) (0.462) (0.454) 
South  -0.058 0.181 -0.308 0.500 
 (0.236) (0.259) (0.282) (0.307) 
West 0.064 0.128 -0.207 0.466 
 (0.301) (0.317) (0.356) (0.364) 
Unknown Region -0.500 0.769*** -1.275** 1.586*** 
 (0.312) (0.289) (0.544) (0.511) 
Industry of Primary Beneficiary 
(Transportation omitted)     
Manufacturing -0.357 0.346 0.204 -0.626 
 (0.361) (0.429) (0.535) (0.548) 
Service -0.503 0.040 -2.284** 1.457 
 (0.464) (0.469) (0.956) (0.845) 
Employee Type of Primary 
Beneficiary (Salary omitted)     
Hourly -0.396 0.223 -0.558** 0.365 
 (0.212) (0.203) (0.236) (0.211) 
Other Status -0.111 -0.425 -1.164 1.079 
 (0.350) (0.427) (0.787) (0.787) 
Intercept -11.320*** 0.613 -12.224*** 1.003 
 (1.368) (1.283) (1.418) (1.319) 
Joint Significance 
All Insurance Variables Χ-sq(4) 6.16 3.92 9.29  6.30 
p-value  0.188 0.417  0.054  0.178 
*** significant at the 1 percent level 
** significant at the 5 percent level 
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Table 27. Estimation of inpatient MH care utilization (Primary Beneficiaries) 
 
Model 1: 
Basic RE Coefficients 
(standard errors) 
Model 2: 
IV RE Coefficients 
(standard errors) 
 
Probability 
of Any Use 
Days of 
Use 
Probability 
of Any Use 
Days of 
Use 
N observations 100398 199 100398 199 
n unique individuals 58842 198 58842 198 
Health Insurance Characteristics      
Inpatient Coinsurance  
(in-network) -0.035 0.019 -0.027 0.014 
 (0.022) (0.021) (0.024) (0.023) 
Inpatient Coinsurance  
(out-of-network) 0.003 -0.001 0.003 -0.001 
 (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) 
Outpatient Coinsurance  
(in-network) 0.007 0.001 0.004 0.001 
 (0.008) (0.006) (0.012) (0.010) 
EAP Precertification Required -0.404 0.075 -0.445 0.249 
 (0.225) (0.217) (0.369) (0.345) 
Total Months Enrolled in Year 0.027 -0.002 0.026 -0.0001 
 (0.035) (0.035) (0.035) (0.035) 
Physical Health Behavior      
Used medical services  0.904*** 0.301 0.904*** 0.297 
 (0.247) (0.246) (0.247) (0.246) 
Used inpatient medical services 1.939*** 0.156 1.945*** 0.142 
 (0.182) (0.155) (0.183) (0.157) 
Demographics      
Male -0.124 -0.068 -0.126 -0.066 
 (0.158) (0.150) (0.159) (0.150) 
Age      
16 to 30 years  0.082 0.044 0.083 0.044 
 (0.059) (0.061) (0.059) (0.061) 
31 to 45 years  0.015 0.002 0.015 0.002 
 (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) 
46 to 64 years  -0.055*** 0.019 -0.052*** 0.018 
 (0.019) (0.018) (0.019) (0.018) 
*** significant at the 1 percent level 
** significant at the 5 percent level 
  135
Table 27. Continued 
 
Model 1: 
Basic RE Coefficients 
(standard errors) 
Model 2:  
IV RE Coefficients 
(standard errors) 
 
Probability 
of Any Use 
Days of 
Use 
Probability 
of Any Use 
Days of 
Use 
Not Married 0.342 0.166 0.351 0.177 
 (0.203) (0.205) (0.206) (0.204) 
Household Size  -0.097 -0.022 -0.093 -0.016 
  (0.076) (0.075) (0.077) (0.075) 
Region of Residence 
(Midwest omitted)      
Northeast -0.340 -0.514 -0.337 -0.519 
 (0.322) (0.321) (0.322) (0.316) 
South  0.343 -0.470** 0.315 -0.478** 
 (0.221) (0.208) (0.231) (0.219) 
West 0.088 -0.581** 0.055 -0.583** 
 (0.289) (0.271) (0.301) (0.283) 
Unknown Region -0.108 
-
0.929*** -0.093 
-
0.939*** 
 (0.338) (0.327) (0.359) (0.345) 
Industry of Primary Beneficiary 
(Transportation omitted)      
Manufacturing -0.397 0.151 -0.469 0.102 
 (0.517) (0.431) (0.573) (0.509) 
Service -0.174 -0.249 -0.134 -0.310 
 (0.362) (0.357) (0.379) (0.370) 
Employee Type of Primary 
Beneficiary (Salary omitted)     
Hourly 0.687*** 0.193 0.667*** 0.163 
 (0.230) (0.219) (0.234) (0.219) 
Other Status 1.030 0.215 1.075 0.258 
 (0.585) (0.540) (0.618) (0.593) 
Intercept -11.305*** 0.098 -11.379*** 0.104 
  (1.926) (1.886) (1.936) (1.895) 
Joint Significance 
All Insurance Variables Χ-sq(4) 9.00 2.35 6.15  2.89 
p-value  0.061  0.671  0.187  0.577 
*** significant at the 1 percent level 
** significant at the 5 percent level 
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Table 28. Estimation of inpatient MH care utilization (Spouses) 
 
Model 1: 
Basic RE Coefficients 
(standard errors) 
Model 2: 
IV RE Coefficients 
(standard errors) 
 
Probability 
of Any Use 
Days of 
Use 
Probability 
of Any Use 
Days of 
Use 
N observations 55906 102 55906 102 
n unique individuals 32451 101 32451 101 
Health Insurance Characteristics      
Inpatient Coinsurance (in-network) 0.010 -0.015 0.033 -0.024 
 (0.028) (0.027) (0.031) (0.031) 
Inpatient Coinsurance  
(out-of-network) -0.004 0.004 -0.013 0.012 
 (0.009) (0.011) (0.011) (0.014) 
Outpatient Coinsurance 0.001 0.008 -0.024 0.004 
 (0.013) (0.011) (0.020) (0.018) 
EAP Precertification Required 0.003 -0.410 0.541 -0.602 
 (0.301) (0.253) (0.410) (0.381) 
Total Months Enrolled in Year 0.077 -0.031 0.074 -0.014 
 (0.061) (0.058) (0.061) (0.057) 
Physical Health Behavior      
Used outpatient medical services  1.396*** 0.636 1.408*** 0.645 
 (0.386) (0.426) (0.386) (0.427) 
Used inpatient medical services 1.543*** -0.061 1.539*** -0.076 
 (0.241) (0.199) (0.242) (0.203) 
Demographics      
Male 0.197 -0.224 0.244 -0.237 
 (0.244) (0.223) (0.246) (0.218) 
Age      
16 to 30 years  0.224 0.082 0.222 0.092 
 (0.156) (0.159) (0.157) (0.159) 
31 to 45 years  0.010 -0.005 0.007 -0.008 
 (0.026) (0.022) (0.026) (0.022) 
46 to 64 years  -0.041 -0.010 -0.034 -0.008 
 (0.027) (0.022) (0.027) (0.022) 
*** significant at the 1 percent level 
** significant at the 5 percent level 
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Table 28. Continued 
 
Model 1: 
Basic RE Coefficients 
(standard errors) 
Model 2:  
IV RE Coefficients  
(standard errors) 
 
Probability 
of Any Use 
Days of 
Use 
Probability 
of Any Use 
Days of 
Use 
Household Size  -0.114 -0.135 -0.110 -0.144 
  (0.100) (0.090) (0.101) (0.090) 
Region of Residence  
(Midwest omitted)     
Northeast 0.386 -0.430 0.264 -0.292 
 (0.372) (0.377) (0.381) (0.389) 
South  -0.005 0.389 -0.239 0.419 
 (0.311) (0.302) (0.330) (0.341) 
West -0.187 -0.456 -0.452 -0.410 
 (0.423) (0.417) (0.438) (0.447) 
Unknown Region -0.639 0.168 -0.932 0.211 
 (0.549) (0.519) (0.575) (0.565) 
Industry of Primary Beneficiary 
(Transportation omitted)     
Manufacturing 0.098 0.267 -0.376 -0.162 
 (0.695) (0.770) (0.930) (0.806) 
Service 0.444 0.329 0.653 0.132 
 (0.458) (0.408) (0.507) (0.487) 
Employee Type of Primary 
Beneficiary (Salary omitted)     
Hourly 0.553 0.773** 0.409 0.857*** 
 (0.306) (0.300) (0.309) (0.305) 
Other Status 0.106 0.391 0.199 1.046 
 (0.744) (1.007) (0.953) (1.039) 
Intercept -16.203*** -0.415 -15.374*** -1.431 
  (4.723) (4.862) (4.759) (4.928) 
Joint Significance 
All Insurance Variables Χ-sq(4) 0.24 3.68 2.93 3.09 
p-value  0.993  0.451 0.570 0.543 
*** significant at the 1 percent level 
** significant at the 5 percent level 
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Table 29. Estimation of inpatient MH care utilization (Dependents) 
 
Model 1: 
Basic RE Coefficients 
(standard errors) 
Model 2: 
IV RE Coefficients 
(standard errors) 
 
Probability 
of Any Use 
Days of 
Use 
Probability 
of Any Use 
Days of 
Use 
N observations 78794 210 78794 210 
n unique individuals 46262 209 46262 209 
Health Insurance Characteristics      
Inpatient Coinsurance  
(in-network) -0.040 -0.026 -0.049 0.001 
 (0.022) (0.021) (0.026) (0.024) 
Inpatient Coinsurance (out-of-
network) -0.002 0.007 0.005 0.003 
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.009) (0.009) 
Outpatient Coinsurance (in-
network) 0.012 0.008 0.007 -0.024 
 (0.010) (0.009) (0.018) (0.018) 
EAP Precertification Required -0.272 0.306 -0.504 0.543 
 (0.243) (0.236) (0.419) (0.407) 
Total Months Enrolled in Year 0.036 -0.083** 0.035 -0.084** 
 (0.041) (0.042) (0.041) (0.042) 
Physical Health Behavior      
Used outpatient medical services  1.287*** 0.380 1.281*** 0.352 
 (0.209) (0.218) (0.210) (0.216) 
Used inpatient medical services 2.088*** 0.280 2.108*** 0.285 
 (0.209) (0.174) (0.212) (0.177) 
Demographics      
Male 0.160 -0.011 0.164 -0.019 
 (0.143) (0.143) (0.143) (0.141) 
Age      
0 to 5 years  ----- ----- ----- ----- 
 ----- ----- ----- ----- 
6 to 11 years  0.694*** -0.184 0.694*** -0.164 
 (0.139) (0.130) (0.138) (0.130) 
12 to 17 years  0.065 0.015 0.064 0.010 
 (0.040) (0.041) (0.040) (0.041) 
Greater than 17 years  -0.009 -0.009 -0.009 0.002 
 (0.021) (0.020) (0.021) (0.020) 
*** significant at the 1 percent level 
** significant at the 5 percent level 
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Table 29. Continued 
 
Model 1: 
Basic RE Coefficients 
(standard errors) 
Model 2: 
IV RE Coefficients 
(standard errors) 
 
Probability 
of Any Use 
Days of 
Use 
Probability 
of Any Use 
Days of 
Use 
Household Size  -0.035 0.104 -0.036 0.101 
  (0.060) (0.054) (0.060) (0.054) 
Region of Residence 
(Midwest omitted)     
Northeast -0.070 -1.067*** -0.058 
-
1.081*** 
 (0.285) (0.313) (0.294) (0.315) 
South  0.139 -0.094 0.177 -0.225 
 (0.228) (0.220) (0.250) (0.234) 
West 0.007 -0.544 0.037 -0.712** 
 (0.313) (0.299) (0.334) (0.317) 
Unknown Region -0.446 -0.371 -0.444 -0.573 
 (0.299) (0.298) (0.345) (0.337) 
Industry of Primary Beneficiary 
(Transportation omitted)     
Manufacturing -0.479 -0.426 -0.874 -0.880 
 (0.536) (0.476) (0.604) (0.634) 
Service -0.664 -0.786 -0.907 -0.514 
 (0.421) (0.412) (0.431) (0.414) 
Employee Type of Primary  
Beneficiary (Salary omitted)    
Hourly 0.277 0.217 0.328 0.158 
 (0.196) (0.178) (0.202) (0.185) 
Other Status -0.051 0.870 0.498 1.068 
 (0.634) (0.584) (0.672) (0.716) 
Intercept 14.700*** 4.096** 15.092*** 4.222** 
  (1.709) (1.648) (1.746) (1.676) 
Joint Significance 
All Insurance Variables Χ-sq(4) 14.12 4.00 15.85  3.03 
p-value  0.007  0.4064  0.003  0.552 
*** significant at the 1 percent level 
** significant at the 5 percent level 
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Table 30. Estimation of inpatient SA treatment utilization (Primary Beneficiaries) 
 
Model 1: 
Basic RE Coefficients 
(standard errors) 
Model 2: 
IV RE Coefficients 
(standard errors) 
 
Probability 
of Any Use 
Days of 
Use 
Probability 
of Any Use 
Days of 
Use 
N observations 100398 61 100398 61 
n unique individuals 58842 61 58842 61 
Health Insurance Characteristics      
Inpatient Coinsurance (in-network) -0.131*** -0.032 -0.133*** -0.022 
 (0.041) (0.036) (0.042) (0.032) 
Inpatient Coinsurance  0.029** 0.013 0.035** 0.008 
(out-of-network) (0.013) (0.011) (0.015) (0.011) 
Outpatient Coinsurance  -0.005 -0.001 -0.031 0.037 
(in-network) (0.020) (0.016) (0.039) (0.027) 
EAP Precertification Required -0.793 -0.732 -0.601 -1.240** 
 (0.419) (0.388) (0.596) (0.494) 
Total Months Enrolled in Year -0.088 0.018 -0.091 0.015 
 (0.048) (0.046) (0.049) (0.045) 
Physical Health Behavior      
Used outpatient medical services  0.479 0.288 0.497 0.298 
 (0.347) (0.324) (0.348) (0.321) 
Used inpatient medical services 1.709*** 0.207 1.698*** 0.211 
 (0.316) (0.251) (0.316) (0.241) 
Demographics      
Male 1.276*** -0.395 1.261*** -0.316 
 (0.328) (0.245) (0.328) (0.242) 
Age      
16 to 30 years  0.271 0.315 0.276 0.295 
 (0.160) (0.196) (0.161) (0.194) 
31 to 45 years  0.030 -0.044 0.028 -0.023 
 (0.034) (0.030) (0.034) (0.030) 
46 to 64 years  -0.059 0.074*** -0.055 0.066*** 
 (0.031) (0.026) (0.031) (0.025) 
*** significant at the 1 percent level 
** significant at the 5 percent level 
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Table 30. Continued 
 
Model 1:  
Basic RE Coefficients 
(standard errors) 
Model 2: 
IV RE Coefficients 
(standard errors) 
 
Probability 
of Any Use 
Days of 
Use 
Probability 
of Any Use 
Days of 
Use 
Not Married 0.669** 0.244 0.626 0.371 
 (0.331) (0.247) (0.339) (0.258) 
Household Size  0.013 0.049 0.004 0.047 
  (0.115) (0.102) (0.118) (0.100) 
Region of Residence 
(Midwest omitted)     
Northeast -0.304 -0.835 -0.421 -0.707 
 (0.518) (0.494) (0.551) (0.518) 
South  0.448 -0.699 0.298 -0.660 
 (0.382) (0.385) (0.410) (0.394) 
West 0.645 -1.245*** 0.463 
-
1.177*** 
 (0.463) (0.425) (0.502) (0.423) 
Unknown Region -0.348 -0.347 -0.636 -0.096 
 (0.519) (0.435) (0.613) (0.478) 
Industry of Primary Beneficiary 
(Transportation omitted)      
Manufacturing -1.711 -0.243 -1.823 0.023 
 (0.953) (0.944) (0.989) (0.749) 
Service -1.711** -1.748** -2.063*** -1.553** 
 (0.719) (0.794) (0.784) (0.716) 
Employee Type of Primary  
Beneficiary (Salary omitted)    
Hourly 0.859** 0.245 0.813** 0.292 
 (0.378) (0.312) (0.393) (0.307) 
Other Status 2.630** 0.720 2.627** 0.612 
 (1.061) (1.061) (1.069) (0.766) 
Intercept -17.742*** 5.771 -17.823*** 5.957 
  (4.736) (289.136) (4.775) (290.025)
Joint Significance 
All Insurance Variables Χ-sq(4) 19.76 4.210 20.10 6.98 
p-value  <0.001  0.379 <0.001   0.137 
*** significant at the 1 percent level 
** significant at the 5 percent level 
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Table 31. Estimation of inpatient SA treatment utilization (Spouses) 
 
Model 1: 
Basic RE Coefficients 
(standard errors) 
Model 2: 
IV RE Coefficients 
(standard errors) 
 
Probability 
of Any Use 
Days of  
Use 
Probability 
of Any Use 
Days of  
Use 
N observations 55906 28 55906 28 
n unique individuals 32451 28 32451 28 
Health Insurance 
Characteristics      
Inpatient Coinsurance  
(in-network) -0.008 Did 0.019 Did 
 (0.041) not (0.065) not 
Inpatient Coinsurance  0.019 converge 0.020 converge 
(out-of-network) (0.025)  (0.031)  
Outpatient Coinsurance  -0.026  -0.127  
(in-network) (0.053)  (0.167)  
EAP Precertification Required 0.587  2.056  
 (0.530)  (1.308)  
Total Months Enrolled in 
Year 0.092  0.090  
 (0.099)  (0.099)  
Physical Health Behavior      
Used outpatient medical 
services  -0.200  -0.098  
 (0.478)  (0.486)  
Used inpatient medical services 2.263***  2.254***  
 (0.441)  (0.441)  
Demographics      
Male 0.899**  0.948  
 (0.418)  (0.421)  
Age      
16 to 30 years  0.083  0.065  
 (0.192)  (0.193)  
31 to 45 years  0.026  0.019  
 (0.046)  (0.047)  
46 to 64 years  -0.131**  -0.128**  
 (0.055)  (0.055)  
Household Size  -0.441**  -0.445**  
  (0.197)   (0.200)   
*** significant at the 1 percent level 
** significant at the 5 percent level 
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Table 31. Continued 
 
Model 1: 
Basic RE Coefficients 
(standard errors) 
Model 2: 
IV RE Coefficients 
(standard errors) 
 
Probability 
of Any Use 
Days of 
Use 
Probability 
of Any Use 
Days of 
Use 
Region of Residence 
(Midwest omitted)       
Northeast -0.840  -1.678  
 (0.839)  (1.445)  
South  -1.050  -1.621  
 (0.627)  (0.895)  
West -0.534  -1.149  
 (0.731)  (1.019)  
Unknown Region 0.699  -0.221  
 (0.807)  (1.644)  
Industry of Primary Beneficiary  
(Transportation omitted) 
      
Manufacturing -1.771  -3.256  
 (2.150)  (3.262)  
Service -0.449  -1.031  
 (1.080)  (1.321)  
Employee Type of Primary 
Beneficiary (Salary omitted)     
Hourly 1.465**  1.027  
 (0.588)  (0.707)  
Other Status 2.159  2.265  
 (2.050)  (2.519)  
Intercept -11.840**  -10.241  
  (5.690)   (6.127)   
Joint Significance 
All Insurance Variables Χ-sq(4) 2.47 ----- 4.77  ----- 
p-value  0.649 -----   0.312 -----  
*** significant at the 1 percent level 
** significant at the 5 percent level 
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Table 32. Estimation of inpatient SA treatment utilization (Dependents) 
 
Model 1: 
Basic RE Coefficients 
(standard errors) 
Model 2: 
IV RE Coefficients  
(standard errors) 
 
Probability 
of Any Use 
Days of 
Use 
Probability 
of Any Use 
Days of 
Use 
N observations 78794 38 78794 38 
n unique individuals 46262 38 46262 38 
Health Insurance Characteristics      
Inpatient Coinsurance  
(in-network) 
 
-0.119 0.135 -0.168** 0.088 
 (0.062) (0.126) (0.068) (0.084) 
Inpatient Coinsurance  
(out-of-network) 0.035 -0.076 0.092** -0.006 
 (0.019) (0.124) (0.038) (0.120) 
Outpatient Coinsurance  
(in-network) 0.002 0.100 -0.206 -0.016 
 (0.029) (0.232) (0.145) (0.435) 
EAP Precertification Required 0.072 -0.253 1.776** -0.870 
 (0.569) (0.986) (0.901) (1.918) 
Total Months Enrolled in Year 0.082 0.167 0.099 0.172 
 (0.116) (0.256) (0.120) (0.260) 
Physical Health Behavior     
Used outpatient medical services  1.707*** -0.256 1.745*** -0.175 
 (0.546) (0.726) (0.546) (0.789) 
Used inpatient medical services 2.301*** 0.435 2.238*** 0.416 
 (0.387) (0.564) (0.389) (0.591) 
Demographics     
Male 1.728*** -1.088 1.715*** -1.097 
 (0.426) (0.573) (0.425) (0.569) 
Age     
0 to 5 years  ----- ----- ----- ----- 
 ----- ----- ----- ----- 
6 to 11 years  ----- ----- ----- ----- 
 ----- ----- ----- ----- 
12 to 17 years  0.580*** 0.143 0.572*** 0.115 
 (0.170) (0.335) (0.168) (0.327) 
*** significant at the 1 percent level 
** significant at the 5 percent level 
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Table 32. Continued 
 
Model 1: 
Basic RE Coefficients 
(standard errors) 
Model 2: 
IV RE Coefficients 
(standard errors) 
 
Probability 
of Any Use 
Days of 
Use 
Probability 
of Any Use 
Days of 
Use 
Greater than 17 years 0.017 0.135 0.038 0.138 
 (0.033) (0.085) (0.035) (0.089) 
Household Size  -0.283 0.290 -0.357** 0.322 
  (0.156) (0.236) (0.161) (0.254) 
Region of Residence 
(Midwest omitted)     
Northeast 0.541 -1.332 -0.230 -1.455 
 (0.727) (1.297) (1.108) (2.862) 
South  0.576 -1.363 0.226 -1.391 
 (0.636) (1.085) (0.768) (1.544) 
West 1.042 -0.732 0.701 -0.802 
 (0.745) (1.024) (0.904) (1.321) 
Unknown Region 1.028 0.584 -0.320 0.463 
 (0.699) (0.933) (1.329) (3.352) 
Industry of Primary Beneficiary 
(Transportation omitted)     
Manufacturing -1.930 9.261 -5.033 4.031 
 (1.465) (9.388) (2.735) (9.050) 
Service -1.275 2.464 -3.887** 0.021 
 (1.006) (4.239) (1.897) (5.866) 
Employee Type of Primary 
Beneficiary (Salary omitted)      
Hourly 0.671 0.837 0.241 0.820 
 (0.485) (0.563) (0.552) (0.946) 
Other Status 2.919 -7.889 4.683** -2.224 
 (1.555) (10.027) (2.169) (6.179) 
Intercept -21.556*** 14.442 -22.716*** 11.012 
  (3.457) (697.684) (3.627) (783.830)
Joint Significance 
All Insurance Variables Χ-sq(4) 4.33 1.99 9.24  2.11 
p-value  0.363 0.739  0.055  0.715 
*** significant at the 1 percent level 
** significant at the 5 percent level 
  
CHAPTER 6: CONCLUSION AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
Cost has often been cited as a major reason that people in need of MH/SA treatment do 
not seek treatment services.  In the 2003 NSDUH survey, 33 percent of individuals who 
wanted treatment for drug or alcohol problems reported that they did not receive it because of 
the cost (SAMHSA, 2004), yet both MH care and SA treatment have usually received less 
generous insurance coverage compared to general medical care.  The primary justification for 
the inequitable treatment of MH/SA services has been the belief that MH/SA demand is more 
responsive to price, which suggests that these services are more discretionary than general 
medical care and will result in greater welfare loss associated with insurance.  However, 
previous research studies regarding the relationship between the costs faced by individuals 
and MH/SA demand are not conclusive because of limitations in the data used, the types of 
insurance examined, and the scope of services studied.  More evidence is available for MH 
care than for SA treatment, but even the evidence for MH care has gaps that need to be 
addressed (e.g., little evidence for inpatient MH care). 
In this study, I find that the demand response relative to cost-sharing differs between 
MH and SA services and by the relationship of the individual to the health plan.  Overall, 
primary beneficiaries (the primary policy holder) are more responsive to the level of cost-
sharing for both outpatient MH care and SA treatment (both inpatient and outpatient) than 
either spouses or other dependents.  However, the size of the incremental effects associated 
with 10 percentage-point changes in the coinsurance rates are quite small across all samples 
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for both MH care and SA treatment. These findings suggest that individuals may be no more 
responsive to cost-sharing for outpatient MH/SA care than they are for general medical care.  
Overall, these findings suggest that the association between the level of cost-sharing and 
MH/SA treatment utilization may be similar to general medical care and that previous 
arguments against parity for MH care may not be justified.  
Another interesting finding is that cost-sharing has different effects on each stage of the 
decision-process for utilization.  For primary beneficiaries, the coinsurance rates appear to 
have a greater effect on the probability of any use for both outpatient MH care and inpatient 
SA treatment.  And, the coinsurance rates more greatly affect extent of use among primary 
beneficiaries for outpatient SA treatment.   
On the other hand, the coinsurance rates more greatly affect extent of use for outpatient 
MH care and outpatient SA treatment among spouses.  This is an important finding because it 
suggests that setting a level of cost-sharing to ensure initial access to services may not be 
sufficient.  Policy makers and insurers need to consider the role that cost-sharing plays in 
both decisions to ensure not only initial access but also appropriate lengths of treatment 
episodes once access is obtained.  
Contrary to my expectations, the association between cost-sharing levels for inpatient 
services and outpatient service utilization, when significant, implies a complementary 
relationship between these different service modalities.  This result is only found for 
outpatient MH care and outpatient SA treatment, but it is important because it suggests that 
policy holders and insurers should not consider these services separately when making 
coverage decisions.  A similar complementary relationship between inpatient and outpatient 
care has been put forth in the general medical care literature (Cutler and Zeckhauser, 2000).  
 148 
When changes in health insurance coverage are being considered for one type of service 
modality, its impact on other types of services should also be considered before any changes 
are implemented.  Failure to do so may result in undesirable consequences for overall 
MH/SA utilization.   
No study has examined the effect that an EAP precertification requirement has on 
MH/SA service utilization, although a few studies have found that use of an EAP increases 
overall healthcare utilization (e.g., Zarkin, Bray, and Qi, 2002; Deitz, Cook and Hersch, 
2005).  I find that requiring EAP precertification prior to using MH/SA services significantly 
decreases the probability that individuals will use any outpatient MH care services.  
Furthermore, for spouses only, EAP precertification also has a negative effect on the number 
of days of outpatient MH care.  The policy implications for this finding are not clear.  If EAP 
precertification decreases utilization in the formal health care system by helping employees 
and their dependents identify their MH/SA problems, providing limited care for milder 
conditions, and referring individuals to appropriate additional care as needed, this suggests 
that firms with an EAP may avoid costly care by implementing EAP precertification as part 
of their health plan.  However, if EAP precertification, rather than facilitating treatment, 
creates an unintentional obstacle to treatment and discourages utilization, then insurers and 
employers may want to reconsider this method.  Individuals who fear stigma or workplace 
retaliation because of their MH/SA problems may not want to approach the EAP because of 
its association with the workplace.  Furthermore, this additional step may make treatment too 
costly for some individuals because of the added time and inconvenience of going through 
the EAP.  Regardless of the reason, untreated MH/SA problems most likely will lead to even 
more costly health care in the future.  Given our lack of understanding regarding the role that 
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the EAP plays in MH/SA service utilization—one of facilitator or one of inadvertent 
obstacle—it is apparent that more research in this area is needed. 
Limitations 
This study has some limitations that should be noted.  First, because my data are claims 
data I only observe MH/SA utilization that is covered by the individual’s health plan.  Use of 
MH/SA services outside of the plan may occur for a variety of reason such as children’s use 
of school counselors, employees’ use of the EAP, or individuals deciding to pay out-of-
pocket rather than submit claims.  Therefore, my conclusions are based solely on the use of 
services within the health plan.  Second, the data used contain only limited information on 
sociodemographic variables and do not contain data on MH/SA treatment need or the 
enrollee’s race/ethnicity.  Both of these variables have been shown to be strong predictors 
regarding MH/SA service use and ideally I would like to control for them in my estimations.  
However, their omission is only a problem for my findings on health insurance 
characteristics if they are correlated with the insurance variables.  I have attempted to control 
for the self-selection bias often associated with health insurance, and I have also argued that 
my results suggest that self-selection may not be a serious problem with these data because 
the uncorrected (standard RE) results and bias-corrected (instrumental RE) results are very 
similar.  Therefore, I believe that these omissions do not bias my findings.   
Another limitation is that I only control for selected MH/SA health insurance 
characteristics.  Health plan coverage is extremely complex and, in addition to coinsurance 
and EAP precertification requirements, may include other cost control mechanisms such as 
copayments, deductibles, and limits on the annual number of MH/SA visits in the plan year.  
Furthermore, the structure of the plan management (e.g., carveout versus carvein; indemnity 
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plan versus point of service plan) may affect individuals’ utilization decisions. I have 
attempted to address some of these additional features in my creation of the coinsurance 
variables, but accounting for all the various health insurance characteristics is beyond the 
scope of this study.  Rather, I focused on the most relevant characteristics associated with the 
individual’s out-of-pocket cost and on those characteristics for which the data are the most 
reliable.   
Although MEDSTAT’s Marketscan database is one of the best sources of claims data 
available to researchers, I encountered some limitations specific to these data that should be 
noted.  I handled some of these limitations by making assumptions about the variables in 
question and then analyzing these assumptions in my sensitivity analysis.  With other 
limitations, no reliable assumptions could be made and this meant that certain variables were 
not included in my analyses.  First, I could not easily distinguish between in-network and 
out-of-network services in the MEDSTAT data.  This limitation is not uncommon to claims 
data, but it does mean that I was unable to formally test whether substitution is taking place 
between these services as level of cost-sharing relative to each service type changes.   
Second, the data documentation was not always clear as to the meaning of the coding 
used for some variables.  For example, for some employers, no information was provided on 
their EAP; however, the data documentation was not clear as to how these missing data 
points should be interpreted.  Fortunately, I was able to determine with the assistance of 
MEDSTAT personnel that lack of data most likely means that an EAP, if available, played 
no role in the health plan coverage and its requirements.  However, I was not able to 
determine whether EAP services in general were available at the worksite, and therefore I 
was not able to include variables related to EAP access beyond the precertification 
  151
requirements.  Another example is that data on out-of-network coinsurance rates were 
missing for some health plans.  Again, data documentation did not provide clear information 
as to the meaning of these missing data elements.  Discussions with MEDSTAT 
programmers indicated that these coinsurance rates were not mentioned in the plan booklet 
and no additional information was provided by the employer to MEDSTAT.  Therefore, I 
made assumptions as to the value of the out-of-network coinsurance rates for individuals 
with missing data, and then I evaluated these assumptions in my sensitivity analysis.   
Third, the data documentation often was not clear about the application of annual day 
or dollar limits on MH/SA service use.  Although MEDSTAT’s documentation provided 
additional detail on plan descriptions in their Research Databases User’s Guide and Database 
Dictionary (MEDSTAT, 2000), for some plans the descriptions of annual limits for MH/SA 
visits and/or dollars did not clearly indicate whether MH/SA treatment visits or dollars were 
summed together and jointly applied towards a combined MH/SA annual limit or if visits and 
payments for MH care were counted separately from SA treatment.  In most cases, data 
problems were due to the type and depth of information (or lack thereof) provided by 
participating employers to MEDSTAT.  Furthermore, MEDSTAT staff were available to 
help with data issues.  These data limitations are not unique to MEDSTAT data and can be 
found in other claims datasets.  Even with its limitations, the detailed information contained 
in MEDSTAT’s Marketscan® claims and enrollment data make it one of the more attractive 
insurance datasets to use for health services research and it provides a valuable opportunity to 
conduct research specific to MH/SA services. 
Despite limitations, my results are noteworthy for several reasons.  First, because of the 
detailed information on individuals’ MH/SA coverage included in my data I am able to look 
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beyond the simple question of whether having health insurance per se affects MH/SA 
utilization and focus on the effects of specific MH/SA health insurance characteristics on 
each stage of the utilization decision process.  I am also able to look at health insurance 
characteristics beyond the standard price variables.  My examination of EAP precertification 
is an important addition to the literature as EAPs continue to become more prevalent in the 
workplace and to expand their services as employers seek cost-effective ways to address 
employee problems.   
Second, I am able to separately identify use of MH care and SA treatment for both 
outpatient and inpatient modalities.  My results thus provide insights into the separate 
demand response for these four treatment modalities and allow comparisons among them.  
These comparisons suggest that policy makers and insurers should not necessarily lump MH 
care and SA treatment coverage together because demand responsiveness of these services to 
cost-sharing differ.   
Finally, my analysis is performed on over 150,000 adults and over 75,000 children and 
young adults enrolled in 12 behavioral health plans and located across the U.S.  Many of the 
previous health utilization studies that used claims data have been limited to examining 
levels of use among users because they do not have data on non-using enrollees. 
Furthermore, previous behavioral health utilization studies including those that use self-
reported data have tended to use data from limited geographic areas or focused on a small 
number of health plans.  Thus, the results of my study are applicable to a larger population.  
My results suggest that MH care demand is no more responsive to cost-sharing than general 
medical demand.  However, the findings for SA treatment demand are mixed with the effect 
of cost-sharing differing across the samples.  Still, even with these mixed findings, my results 
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suggest that in determining coverage for behavioral health services MH care and SA 
treatment should be considered separately.  Furthermore, because demand response relative 
to cost-sharing varies across the two decision stages, equal attention must be placed on 
evaluating the importance of both the initial decision to use and on the extent of utilization. 
Research Implications 
My analyses for this study suggest several areas for continued research in the field of 
MH care and SA treatment.  First, the positive coefficient on the out-of-network coinsurance 
rate raises questions as to whether substitution is occurring between in-network and out-of-
network services.  Although the data used for this study do not easily lend themselves to 
analysis of this question, this is an area of research that requires further study.  Most health 
plans allow use of out-of-network services, but this access comes at a higher cost to the 
individual usually in the form of higher coinsurance rates or more stringent annual limits on 
use.  Given that it is more costly, the question arises as to why an individual might choose 
out-of-network services and to what extent is this choice occurring?  As noted earlier, other 
factors may influence the individual—such as quality or convenience—which may lead them 
to choose an out-of-network provider, however research is needed to test these hypotheses 
and to evaluate other factors that may be affecting this decision. 
Another area for future research concerns the role of the EAP.  My finding that an EAP 
precertification requirement has a negative association with MH/SA utilization when 
significant suggests that more research is needed to better understand the role that the EAP 
plays in MH/SA health care, especially when it is coupled with health plan coverage.  The 
blending of EAP services and health plan coverage is a fairly recent phenomenon that began 
with the introduction of the managed behavioral health care company and continues to grow 
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today.  However, little research has been done to examine the effect that such a pairing may 
have on overall MH/SA treatment utilization.  As noted earlier, willingness to contact an 
EAP may be affected by fears of job loss or social stigma perceptions.  Therefore, requiring 
employees and their dependents to contact the workplace EAP to obtain authorization for 
MH/SA services may create unintended obstacles for those individuals in need of services.  
On the other hand, use of the EAP may decrease utilization in the formal health care system 
by providing employees’ and their dependents with some MH/SA services.  Taken together, 
these findings suggest that more research is needed to understand the different roles that an 
EAP may take in the provision of MH/SA services for individuals connected to the labor 
market and the impact that each of these roles may have on MH/SA service utilization.  
More research is also needed examining the effect of additional MH/SA health 
insurance characteristics on MH/SA service use.  For this study, I chose to focus on 
coinsurance rates and the EAP precertification requirement as a first step in a study of the 
relationship between specific MH/SA health insurance coverage and service utilization.  
However, this is just a first step.  Rather than relying on coinsurance rates as a means to 
control utilization, health plans are increasingly turning to other mechanisms such as annual 
limits on the number of visits covered, limits on lengths of treatment episodes, and annual 
dollar limits on plan payments to control utilization and costs.  The impact of these types of 
mechanisms need further study, especially in the field of SA treatment.  It is not uncommon 
for private insurance to limit the number of MH/SA outpatient visits to between 20 and 30 
visits per year and inpatient days to 30 days per year—limits that may be below the threshold 
limits that are often cited as being appropriate to achieve successful treatment outcomes.  For 
example, the threshold program length is one year for methadone maintenance and 3 months 
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for residential rehabilitation (Simpson and Joe, 2004).  An obvious question to ask is: what 
happens to those individuals whose treatment needs extend beyond the health plan coverage?  
And, how prevalent is this problem; that is, for how many individuals do we observe such 
limits creating obstacles for appropriate levels of treatment?   
Finally, although my study focuses on individuals less than 65 years of age, I believe 
that as the baby boomer cohort continues to age into a managed care Medicare system, we 
need to continue to extend our research to this aging population.  Although use of illicit drugs 
such as heroin and cocaine are less prevalent among older individuals, we do observe abuse 
of alcohol and prescription drugs.  Most of these individuals have limited financial resources 
and, therefore, Medicare and other supplemental coverage for health care plays an important 
role in their decisions regarding MH/SA treatment utilization. 
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Appendix A 
Codes Used in Identifying MH/SA Encounters 
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Table A-1. Variables Used to Categorize Encounters 
Variable Type Description 
Diagnosis Codes Diagnosis codes use the International Classification of Disease, 9th 
Division, Clinical Modifications (ICD-9-CM) classification system.  
For each outpatient encounter, there are up to 2 possible diagnosis 
codes reported.  For each inpatient admission, there may be a 
principal diagnosis code and up to 14 secondary diagnosis codes 
reported.   
Procedure Codes Procedure codes use three possible coding systems.  The most 
prevalent is the Current Procedural Terminology, 4th Edition (CPT-
4).  Less prevalent are the ICD-9-CM procedure codes and the 
Healthcare Common Procedural Coding System (HCPCS).  For each 
outpatient encounter, there may be up to one procedure code 
reported.  For each inpatient encounter, there may be 14 procedure 
codes reported.   
Service Type  
(outpatient 
encounters only) 
Service type refers to the type of outpatient claim.  For each 
outpatient encounter, there may be up to one service type reported.  
The service type codes are mapped from benefit plan carriers’ 
specific coding to MEDSTAT common values.  This variable is not 
available for inpatient admissions.   
Provider Type  
(outpatient 
encounters only) 
Provider type refers to the type of provider providing the service.  
Provider types include facilities, physicians, and other provider 
types.  For each outpatient encounter, there may be up to one 
provider type reported.  The provider type codes are mapped from 
benefit plan carriers’ specific coding to MEDSTAT common 
values.  This variable is not available for inpatient admissions.   
Major Diagnostic 
Code 
For both inpatient admissions and outpatient encounters, a major 
diagnostic code (MDC) may be reported.  The MDC represents the 
body-system or disease related groupings of clinical conditions, 
based on diagnosis codes.  These codes were assigned by 
MEDSTAT using DRG grouper 14.0.   
Diagnosis-related 
group  
(inpatient 
admissions only) 
The diagnosis-related groups (DRGs) represent clinically and 
statistically distinct categories for inpatient care.  DRG codes were 
developed for HCFA as a proxy for resources to treat a patient.  
These codes were assigned by MEDSTAT using DRG grouper 
14.0.  This variable is not available for outpatient encounters. 
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Table A-2. Diagnosis Codes for Mental Health Care and Substance abuse Services  
Description ICD-9-CM Codes 
Mental Health Disorders  
Serious Mental Illnesses (SMI)  
Schizophrenic disorders 295.0–295.95 
Major depressive Disorders 296.2–296.36 
Other affective psychoses  
Manic disorders 296.0–296.16 
Bipolar affective disorders 296.4–296.7 
Other and unspecified manic-depressive pyschoses 296.8–296.89 
Other and unspecified affective psychoses 296.9–296.99 
Other psychoses  
Transient organic psychotic conditions 293–293.9 
Other organic psychotic conditions, chronic 294–294.9 
Paranoid states or delusional disorders 297–297.9 
Other non-organic psychoses 298–298.9 
Psychoses with origin specific to childhood 299–299.91 
Other Mental Illness (OMI)  
Stress and adjustment disorders  
Acute reaction to stress 308–308.9 
Adjustment reaction 309–309.9 
Personality disorders 301–301.12,  
301.2–301.9 
Childhood disorders  
Disturbance of conduct; not elsewhere specified 312–312.9 
Disturbance of emotions, specific to childhood and 
adolescence 
 
313–313.22 
Hyperkinetic syndrome of childhood 314–314.9 
   
Other mood disorders and anxiety  
Neurotic disorders 300–300.9 
Cyclothymic disorder 301.13 
Depressive disorder, not elsewhere specified 311 
Other mental disorders  
Sexual deviations and disorders 302–302.9 
Physiological malfunction arising from mental factors 306–306.9 
Special symptoms or syndromes, not elsewhere specified 307–307.9 
Specific non-psychotic mental disorders due to organic 
brain damage 
 
310–310.9 
Psychotic factors associated with diseases specified 
elsewhere 
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Mental disorders in pregnancy, antepartum, postpartum 648.4–648.44 
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Table A-2. Continued 
Description ICD-9-CM Codes 
Substance Use/Abuse Disorders  
Any Alcohol Diagnosis  
Alcoholic psychoses 291–291.9 
Alcohol dependence/nondependent abuse 303–303.93 
Alcohol abuse 305.0–305.03 
Alcohol screening V791 
Any Drug Diagnosis  
Drug psychoses 292–292.9 
Drug dependence/nondependent abuse 304–304.93, 305 
Drug abuse 305.1–305.93 
Drug dependence in pregnancy, antepartum, and postpartum 6483–6483.4 
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Table A-3. Procedure Codes for Mental Health and Substance Abuse Services 
Description ICD-9-CM Codes 
CPT-4 Codes for Mental Health Services  
Psychiatric diagnostic interview examination  90801 
Interactive psychiatric diagnostic interview examination 90802 
Psychotherapy in an office or other outpatient facility setting 90804–90809 
Interactive psychotherapy in an office of other outpatient facility 
setting  
90810–90815 
Psychotherapy in an inpatient or residential facility setting  90816–90822 
Interactive psychotherapy in an inpatient or residential facility 
setting 
90823–90829 
Individual medical psychotherapy by a physician 90841–90844 
Psychoanalysis 90845 
Family psychotherapy 90846, 90847 
Multiple-family group psychotherapy by a physician 90849 
Group psychotherapy  90853 
Interactive individual psychotherapy 90855 
Interactive group psychotherapy 90857 
Medication management 90862 
Electroconvulsive therapy 90870, 90871 
Narcosynthesis 90865 
Psychophysiological therapy 90875, 90876 
Hynotherapy 90880 
Environmental manipulation 90882 
Psychiatric evaluation of records 90885 
Family consultation 90887 
Report preparation 90889 
Psychiatric service/therapy 90899 
Psychological testing 96100, G0115 
Psychosocial consultation G0114 
Psychosocial counsel G0116 
Intensive outpatient psychiatric services S9480 
Crisis intervention mental health services S9485 
Clinical psychologist services AH 
Clinical social worker services AJ 
  
ICD-9 Procedure Codes for Mental Health Services  
Psychiatric interviews, consultations, and evaluations  94.0–94.11 
Psychiatric somatotherapy 94.2–94.29 
Individual psychotherapy 94.3–94.39 
Psychotherapy and counseling 94.4–94.44 
Referral for psychologic rehabilitation 94.5–94.52,  
94.55, 94.59 
Other counseling 94.49 
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Table A-3. Continued 
Description ICD-9-CM Codes 
CPT-4 Procedure Codes for Substance Abuse Services  
Methadone 83840 
  
ICD-9 Procedure Codes for Substance Abuse Services  
Alcohol and drug rehabilitation and detoxification 94.6–94.69 
Substance abuse counseling 94.45, 94.46 
Referral for substance abuse rehabilitation 94.53, 94.54 
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Table A-4. Provider and Service Codes for Mental Health and Substance abuse 
Services 
Description CPT-4 Codes 
Mental Health Services  
Provider Type   
Mental health facilities 21 
Psychiatry 83 
Psychologist 171 
Service Type  
Psychiatric, not elsewhere coded (NEC) 101 
Psychiatric day/night care  104 
Psychiatric exam/testing 105 
Individual psychiatric therapy 106 
Group psychiatric therapy 107 
  
Substance Abuse Treatment Services  
Provider Type   
Chemical dependency treatment center 22 
Service Type  
Substance abuse, (NEC) 102 
Detoxification  103 
  
Mental Health/Substance Abuse Services (Indistinguishable)  
Provider Type   
Mental health/chemical dependency, (NEC) 20 
Mental health/chemical dependency day care 23 
Service Type  
Psychiatric/Substance Abuse, (NEC) 100 
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Table A-5. Major Diagnostic Group and Diagnosis-Related Groups for Mental Health 
and Substance Abuse Services 
Description ICD-9-CM Codes 
Major Diagnostic Group  
Mental Diseases and Disorders 19 
Alcohol/Drug Use and Alcohol/Drug Induced Organic Mental 
Disorders 
20 
  
Diagnosis-Related Group  
OR Procedure with Principal Diagnosis of Mental Illness 424 
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Appendix B 
Sample Characteristics for Users of MH/SA Treatment Services 
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Table B-1. Mean Sociodemographic Characteristics of MH Care Users by Sample 
Mean (proportions unless specified) 
(standard deviation) 
Variable 
Primary 
Beneficiaries Spouses 
Other 
Dependents 
(e.g., children) 
Number of Observations 7,269 3,490 4,080 
Number Unique Individuals 5,507 2,683 3,121 
    
Male 0.417 0.244 0.561 
 (0.493) (0.429) (0.496) 
    
Age (years) 43.283 44.282 14.937 
 (10.024) (9.461) (5.802) 
    
Not Married 0.466 0.052 1.000 
 (0.499) (0.222) (0.000) 
    
Household Size 2.559 3.404 4.164 
(number of persons on policy) (1.494) (1.284) (1.228) 
    
Located in:    
Northeast 0.101 0.095 0.093 
 (0.302) (0.294) (0.291) 
    
South 0.210 0.219 0.200 
 (0.407) (0.440) (0.400) 
    
Midwest 0.471 0.472 0.512 
 (0.499) (0.499) (0.500) 
    
West 0.127 0.113 0.102 
 (0.333) (0.316) (0.302) 
    
Region Unknown 0.090 0.101 0.093 
 (0.287) (0.301) (0.290) 
    
Employment Characteristics of  
Primary Beneficiary Employee Type 
Salary  0.515 0.531 0.616 
 (0.500) (0.499) (0.486) 
    
Hourly 0.248 0.227 0.200 
 (0.432) (0.419) (0.400) 
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Table B-1. Continued 
Mean (proportions unless specified) 
(standard deviation) 
Variable 
Primary 
Beneficiaries Spouses 
Other 
Dependents 
(e.g., children) 
    
Other Status  0.237 0.242 0.184 
 (0.425) (0.428) (0.387) 
Industry of Primary Beneficiary    
Manufacturing 0.231 0.228 0.190 
 (0.421) (0.420) (0.392) 
    
Transportation 0.356 0.410 0.391 
 (0.479) (0.492) (0.488) 
    
Service 0.413 0.362 0.419 
  (0.492) (0.481) (0.493) 
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Table B-2. Mean Sociodemographic Characteristics of SA Treatment Users by Sample 
Mean (proportions unless specified) 
(standard deviation) 
Variable 
Primary 
Beneficiaries Spouses 
Other 
Dependents 
(e.g., children) 
Number of Observations 365 169 262 
Number Unique Individuals 318 148 225 
    
Male 0.685 0.651 0.721 
 (0.465) (0.478) (0.449) 
    
Age (years) 42.578 42.432 18.725 
 (9.677) (9.119) (4.028) 
    
Not Married 0.518 0.041 1.000 
 (0.500) (0.200) (0.000) 
    
Household Size 2.485 3.408 4.084 
(number of persons on policy) (1.442) (1.293) (1.395) 
    
Located in:    
Northeast 0.090 0.112 0.076 
 (0.287) (0.317) (0.266) 
    
South 0.296 0.225 0.168 
 (0.457) (0.419) (0.375) 
    
Midwest 0.397 0.503 0.603 
 (0.490) (0.501) (0.490) 
    
West 0.132 0.077 0.073 
 (0.338) (0.267) (0.260) 
    
Region Unknown 0.085 0.083 0.080 
 (0.279) (0.276) (0.272) 
    
Employment Characteristics of Primary 
Beneficiary Employee Type 
Salary 0.337 0.479 0.683 
 (0.473) (0.501) (0.466) 
    
Hourly 0.397 0.349 0.187 
 (0.490) (0.478) (0.391) 
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Table B-2. Continued 
Mean (proportions unless specified) 
(standard deviation) 
Variable 
Primary 
Beneficiaries Spouses 
Other 
Dependents 
(e.g., children) 
    
Other Status 0.266 0.172 0.130 
 (0.442) (0.378) (0.337) 
    
Industry of Primary Beneficiary    
Manufacturing 0.258 0.166 0.122 
 (0.438) (0.373) (0.328) 
    
Transportation 0.452 0.396 0.359 
 (0.498) (0.491) (0.481) 
    
Service 0.290 0.498 0.519 
  (0.455) (0.498) (0.501) 
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Table B-3. Mean MH/SA Insurance Characteristics of MH Care Users by Sample 
Mean  
(standard deviation) 
Variable 
Primary 
Beneficiaries Spouses 
Other 
Dependents 
Number of Observations 7,269 3,490 4,080 
Number Unique Individuals 5,507 2,683 3,121 
    
Coinsurance Rates for MH Visit 
Outpatient In-network 8.915 8.539 8.334 
 (11.874) (11.615) (9.544) 
    
Inpatient In-network 5.656 5.599 5.218 
 (7.469) (7.695) (7.680) 
    
Outpatient Out-of-Network 80.538 77.007 80.084 
 (24.300) (25.055) (24.601) 
    
Inpatient Out-of-Network 77.011 74.020 78.794 
 (26.970) (26.958) (25.637) 
    
Coinsurance Rates for SA Visit 
Outpatient In-network 7.306 7.324 7.764 
 (8.257) (8.817) (8.062) 
    
Inpatient In-network 5.899 6.218 5.571 
 (8.367) (9.759) (8.938) 
    
Outpatient Out-of-Network 80.874 78.240 80.778 
 (24.445) (25.135) (24.561) 
    
Inpatient Out-of-Network 77.416 75.052 79.382 
 (26.937) (26.975) (25.543) 
    
EAP Precertification Required 
(proportion) 0.169 0.154 0.135 
 (0.375) (0.361) (0.342) 
    
Total months enrolled in given 
year 11.197 11.317 11.377 
  (1.988) (1.830) (1.768) 
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Table B-4. Mean MH/SA Insurance Characteristics of SA Treatment Users by Sample 
Mean 
(standard deviation) 
Variable 
Primary 
Beneficiaries Spouses 
Other 
Dependents  
Number of Observations 365 169 262 
Number Unique Individuals 318 148 225 
    
Coinsurance Rates for MH Visit    
Outpatient In-network 8.164 10.000 8.570 
 (11.468) (11.339) (9.311) 
    
Inpatient In-network 7.233 6.450 3.321 
 (8.002) (8.263) (6.784) 
    
Outpatient Out-of-Network 76.355 83.730 82.538 
 (24.965) (23.337) (24.623) 
    
Inpatient Out-of-Network 74.274 80.414 81.183 
 (26.682) (26.443) (25.381) 
    
Coinsurance Rates for SA Visit    
Outpatient In-network 7.562 8.639 7.580 
 (9.824) (8.305) (6.522) 
    
Inpatient In-network 7.315 6.805 3.435 
 (8.282) (9.410) (7.300) 
    
Outpatient Out-of-Network 77.730 84.517 82.729 
 (24.627) (23.061) (24.563) 
    
Inpatient Out-of-Network 74.411 81.006 81.374 
 (26.685) (26.314) (25.333) 
    
EAP Precertification Required 
(proportion) 0.195 0.166 0.103 
 (0.396) (0.373) (0.305) 
    
Total months enrolled in given year 10.860 11.183 11.294 
 (2.464) (2.040) (1.942) 
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Table B-5. Mean MH/SA Utilization Characteristics for MH Care Users by Sample 
Mean  
(standard deviation) 
Variable 
Primary 
Beneficiaries Spouses 
Other 
Dependents 
 7269 3490 4080 
 5507 2683 3121 
Proportion of Users with:    
At least one day of outpatient SA 
services 0.018 0.015 0.027 
 (0.133) (0.121) (0.163) 
    
At least one day of outpatient MH 
services 0.997 0.995 0.994 
 (0.056) (0.072) (0.078) 
    
At least one day of outpatient 
medical services 0.897 0.907 0.835 
 (0.303) (0.291) (0.371) 
    
At least one day of inpatient SA 
services 0.004 0.003 0.005 
 (0.065) (0.056) (0.072) 
    
At least one day of inpatient MH 
services 0.027 0.029 0.051 
 (0.163) (0.168) (0.221) 
    
At least one day of inpatient 
medical services 0.089 0.115 0.045 
 (0.285) (0.319) (0.207) 
    
By provider type    
At least one day of SA services 
from MH/SA specialty provider 0.011 0.007 0.014 
 (0.104) (0.086) (0.116) 
    
At least one day of SA services 
from non-specialty provider 0.019 0.016 0.029 
 (0.137) (0.127) (0.167) 
    
At least one day of MH services 
from MH/SA specialty provider 0.680 0.630 0.646 
 (0.467) (0.483) (0.478) 
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Table B-5. Continued 
Mean  
(standard deviation) 
Variable 
Primary 
Beneficiaries Spouses 
Other 
Dependents 
At least one day of MH services from 
non-specialty provider 1.000 1.000 1.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
    
By diagnosis type    
At least one day of MH services for 
depression 0.265 0.244 0.135 
 (0.441) (0.429) (0.341) 
    
At least one day of services for 
serious mental illness 0.079 0.087 0.079 
 (0.269) (0.282) (0.270) 
    
At least one day of services for other 
mental illness 0.803 0.793 0.902 
 (0.398) (0.405) (0.297) 
    
At least one day of services for 
alcohol treatment 0.012 0.009 0.014 
 (0.111) (0.097) (0.118) 
    
At least one day of services for drug 
treatment 0.008 0.008 0.018 
 (0.090) (0.091) (0.132) 
    
Total Annual Days of Outpatient Use    
MH Care Services 9.024 8.194 7.379 
 (11.422) (10.785) (9.624) 
    
SA Treatment Services 0.133 0.068 0.185 
 (1.621) (0.868) (1.933) 
    
General Medical Care Services 10.559 11.262 5.617 
 (14.399) (14.741) (8.587) 
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Table B-6. Mean Utilization Characteristics for SA Treatment Users by Sample 
Mean  
(standard deviation) 
Variable 
Primary 
Beneficiaries Spouses 
Other 
Dependents 
 365 169 262 
 318 148 225 
Proportion of Users with:    
At least one day of outpatient 
SA services 0.962 0.935 0.947 
 (0.191) (0.247) (0.225) 
    
At least one day of outpatient 
MH services 0.373 0.325 0.435 
 (0.484) (0.470) (0.497) 
    
At least one day of outpatient 
medical services 0.784 0.781 0.824 
 (0.412) (0.415) (0.381) 
    
At least one day of inpatient 
SA services 0.167 0.166 0.145 
 (0.374) (0.373) (0.353) 
    
At least one day of inpatient 
MH services 0.077 0.065 0.134 
 (0.266) (0.247) (0.341) 
    
At least one day of inpatient 
medical services 0.134 0.154 0.088 
 (0.341) (0.362) (0.284) 
    
By provider type    
At least one day of SA 
services from MH/SA 
specialty provider 0.488 0.521 0.492 
 (0.500) (0.501) (0.501) 
    
At least one day of SA 
services from non-specialty 
provider 1.000 1.000 1.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
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Table B-6. Continued 
Mean  
(standard deviation) 
Variable 
Primary 
Beneficiaries Spouses 
Other 
Dependents 
At least one day of MH services from 
MH/SA specialty provider 0.260 0.231 0.378 
 (0.439) (0.423) (0.486) 
    
At least one day of MH services from 
non-specialty provider 0.381 0.337 0.447 
 (0.486) (0.474) (0.498) 
    
By diagnosis type    
At least one day of MH services for 
depression 0.134 0.107 0.149 
 (0.341) (0.309) (0.498) 
    
At least one day of services for 
serious mental illness 0.299 0.284 0.336 
 (0.458) (0.452) (0.473) 
    
At least one day of services for other 
mental illness 0.058 0.041 0.092 
 (0.233) (0.200) (0.289) 
    
At least one day of services for 
alcohol treatment 0.658 0.740 0.473 
 (0.475) (0.440) (0.500) 
    
At least one day of services for drug 
treatment 0.397 0.355 0.531 
 (0.490) (0.480) (0.500) 
    
Total Annual Days of Outpatient Use    
MH Care Services 3.591 3.598 4.950 
 (8.164) (8.717) (9.445) 
    
SA Treatment Services 6.693 5.698 5.359 
 (9.658) (8.437) (7.783) 
    
General Medical Care Services 7.748 9.112 5.023 
  (12.278) (14.051) (7.391) 
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